The European Higher Education and Research Landscape 2020
Scenarios and Strategic Debates

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Contents

Part 1

The Development of the Scenarios

1 Introduction

Jürgen Enders

Today, universities and other higher education providers are key to the development of the knowledge-based society in Europe. They produce, teach and transfer knowledge; they perform most of Europe's fundamental research and employ one-third of European researchers. They have an increasing role to play in innovation, thus becoming crucial to regional development. Universities live in times of rapid political and economic change within and beyond Europe. Public expectations about access to higher education, government concerns about the role that universities can play in socio-economic development and the application of certain principals of market economics and organisational management have created a new context for higher education. The strategic question facing higher education systems is not if but how to pursue major changes entailed by the ongoing transitions of our modern societies.

Certainly, this is an issue for the European university – a term that served until recently as a rather historical reminiscence. Nowadays it is gaining again in prominence in the search for a successful and sustainable future for our European societies and beyond.
With this book, we wish to broaden the debate on the future of the European university through a presentation and discussion of scenarios that provide possibility spaces for the European Higher Education and Research Landscape of 2020. The research for these scenarios was undertaken by the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies. In preparing the scenarios, we made use of the views and perspectives of higher education experts (scholars, policy-makers, managers and practitioners) from across Europe in undertaking a Delphi-study on the future of European higher education. In September 2004, we presented the scenarios at CHEPS' 20th anniversary conference and discussed them with experts from Europe and beyond. Later on, we invited further comments on our scenarios that are documented in this book.

We know that looking into the future is a risky though inspiring undertaking. Obviously, only time will tell about the things to come. Thus it is important to stress that this book is not an exercise in prediction. But we are convinced that it matters how people think about the future and what they do about it. This book is meant as a contribution to such a debate that allows for a mapping of possible futures.

2 Scenarios as a Method

Harry F. de Boer and Don F. Westerheijden

Why Look at the Future?

'The changes visible in the last few years ... are expected to be dwarfed by the changes to come.' (Ringland, 1998). Surely this is a cliché, but the deep-rooted feeling there may be some truth in the phrase keeps people in all walks of life interested in knowing about the future, either because they feel they need to *enact* the future (plan or influence it), or because they want to *react* timely to the unplannable. In both options '...creating models of the future as a way of rehearsing change' (Ringland, 1998) seems highly desirable, and that is what we aimed at in this exercise with the three scenarios for Europe's future higher education landscape. The only alternative is fatalism: the future cannot be planned and we cannot react. As a research centre such fatalism goes against our nature and in particular our mission, which includes contributing to the social debate about higher education. Being a research centre we are also committed to scientific approaches to the questions we tackle, yet we are extremely aware that there is no such thing as a science of the future. For the future, the only science is science fiction.

In this chapter we describe how we balanced science and fiction when creating our scenarios, using the basis established through a Delphi study and then the method underlying the development of the scenarios, which present *possibilities* for the future intended to stimulate further discussion among all persons interested in Europe's higher education and research on what may be likely to happen and what they would like to see happen. But prior to this, we will substantiate epistemologically in section 2 the claim there is no science of the future.

Futurology Is Not a Science

Many have tried to predict the future, sometimes of whole societies, sometimes of relatively simple events. The blunders in the latter category make hilarious reading as when Thomas Watson, chairman of IBM, in 1943 is supposed to have said: 'I think

there is a world market for maybe five computers.'[1] The blunders in the former category of predicting (and then enacting) the future of whole societies led to genocide and war as, amongst others, Karl Popper commented in his fulminations against historicism in fascism and communism. Putting his rightful anger to good use, Popper investigated to what extent we can know the future at all. The crux for him lay in the growth of knowledge:

> We cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of our scientific knowledge (…) The argument does not, of course, refute the possibility of every kind of social prediction; on the contrary, it is perfectly compatible with the possibility of testing social theories … by way of predicting that certain developments will take place under certain conditions. It only refutes the possibility of predicting historical developments to the extent to which they may be influenced by the growth of our knowledge. (Popper, 1961 (1957)).

Basing himself firmly on Popper's epistemology, Van Vught concluded '(t)he future can only be predicted scientifically if we have at our disposal preferably strictly tested and not yet falsified theories. Even then predictions are only tentative and provisional, as our theories may be refuted tomorrow' (Van Vught, 1985). He did not focus on the additional condition, namely that the environment in which the theory 'operates' is predictable as well in terms of the same theory or another support-theory. Some major problems in the area of applied social sciences, including higher education studies, are that such well-performing theories are lacking and the environment of the complex, wider social developments are unpredictable with the theories at our disposal.

We could stop at this point, acknowledging it is impossible to say anything from a scientifically valid point of view about the future of higher education in Europe, or we could look for alternatives. The most promising of which in our view is to have a second look at the task itself. Do we *want* to predict the future at all? No. Van Vught at the end of his inaugural lecture on futures studies (1985) called for humility. Keeping options open was the wisest approach one could take, realising how little we knew and how fragile scientific knowledge is. Moreover, we should understand the function of research about the future is not its relation to the future itself. Rather, it relates to human action in the present. Human action is future-oriented to the extent that it is goal-oriented. For that reason our expectations and visions of the future are relevant to our current thinking, understanding and deciding (Masini, 1993). Therefore our aim is to contribute to a discussion about higher education's future amongst this book's readers: managers of higher education institutions, policy-makers in higher education ministries or agencies, researchers of higher education, stakeholders, interested citizens, etc. It will be up to them to use the insights provided to plan or influence the future – or react to it. After all, science fiction author Frank Herbert is quoted as saying: 'The function of science fiction is not always to predict the future but sometimes to prevent it.'

[1] Yet '(a)lthough Watson is well known for his alleged 1943 statement…there is no evidence he ever made it.' (*Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_J._Watson, accessed 3.6.2005).

Therefore all we have to do, as suggested in the first paragraph of this chapter, is provide models on which the reader's thoughts and plans can be 'exercised'; they have to be of *possible* futures and perhaps *desirable* ones. The latter provides an indication of the directions in which some of the actors may be trying to influence higher education's future. For this more humble purpose, the availability of well-established scientific theories would be highly useful, but even as researchers looking for systematic approaches to knowledge, we are not left empty-handed without them. For we can then turn to subjective approaches – somewhere between science and fiction. In fact we relied on collecting the opinions of higher education experts (as explained below). From a methodological point of view, that is sub-optimal, because '…subjective methods are characterised by strong trust in the judgemental capacity of individuals, especially of experts' (Van Vught, 1985) and their 'judgemental capacity' is not the same as a scientifically controllable explicit theory. Still, their ideas on possibilities and desirabilities for the future may make others think, especially when presented in an appealing manner. Hence our connection of two methods, a Delphi questionnaire to gain insight into experts' views and scenario-writing to present these (and other!) views to a wider audience.

We end this section by again quoting the author with whom we started, Ringland, who wrote that:

> The originators of the work were clear in their aims (which were not always understood by others): they were not predicting the future, they were developing a model which would help people to understand aspects of the nature of (higher education) and help to open up the public debate (Ringland, 1998).

In this spirit, let us now turn to the methods we employed in our balance between science and fiction.

Tending to Science: The Delphi Method Questionnaire

The establishment of the Delphi technique, named after the Greek oracle where necromancers foretold the future, heralded an era of modern future research.[2] According to Gordon (1994), one of the founding fathers of the Delphi technique: 'the modern renaissance of futures research began with the Delphi technique at RAND', the Californian think-tank in the early 1960s. In this period RAND researchers such as Helmer, Reschner, Dalkey and Gordon discovered that experts, particularly when they agree, are more likely than non-experts to be correct about questions in their field. The use of expert opinion is one of the key characteristics of the Delphi technique.

[2] The name started as a joke but it stuck, to the great dissatisfaction of, amongst others, its co-inventors Helmer and Dalkey: 'The resulting image of a priestess, sitting on a stool over a crack in the earth, inhaling sulfur fumes, and making vague and jumbled statements that could be interpreted in many different ways, did not exactly inspire confidence in the method.' (http://eies.njit.edu/~turoff/Papers/delphi3.html#Introduction; accessed: 10.5.2005)

Moreover, there were signs that predictions made by a group of people are more likely to be right than predictions made by the same individuals working alone. This became known as the 'MacGregor effect' (see e.g. Loye, 1978 in Lang, 1995).

It was originally designed as a forecasting technique for predicting the future of military technology (during the Cold War).[3] Since the early 1960s it has been used thousands of times, for different purposes, in different fields and on different scales. In other words, the technique is not only used in technological fields, but also in areas such as health care, education, economy and commerce. It is one of the best-known forecasting techniques (and it can be used for other purposes as well).

The modern Delphi method is designed to encourage a 'controlled' debate. It is an interactive communication structure between experts in a field, facilitated by the researchers doing the work. In this interaction anonymity, in the sense that no one knows who else is participating, is considered essential. RAND-experiments had shown that face-to-face interaction – bringing experts together in a conference room – had negative consequences for the accuracy of the group opinion. Another outcome of the early experiments was that feedback of results improved the outcomes.

All in all the aspects of *experts*, *anonymity* and *feedback*, represent three irreducible elements of the Delphi technique. It 'consists of a systematic interrogation of a group of anonymous experts through the use of questionnaires. The process is repeated through several cycles in order to promote convergence and identify consensus' (Rogers, in Ringland, 1998). More often than not the group of experts moves towards consensus. But even if this is not the case, the arguments used that lead to different opinions are useful for policy and planning purposes (Gordon, 1994).[4] The integrative nature of the expert discussions brings about additional value by generating consensus amongst participants and building a shared view on future visions (EurEnDel 2003). One of the main values of the technique rests with the ideas it generates, both those that evoke consensus and those that do not.

The Delphi technique can be seen as an exercise in group communication among a panel of geographically dispersed experts.[5] In the original Delphi process, the key elements are 1) structuring the information flow, 2) feedback to the participants through the 'Delphi researchers' and 3) anonymity of the participants. In terms of controlled feedback another characteristic may be the use of statistical measures.

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[3] Gordon and Helmer published one of the first modern Delphi studies, *Report on a Long-Range Forecast*, in 1964. Gordon (1994) refers to this report as the all-time RAND best seller. It contained forecasts of scientific and technological breakthroughs through 2000 and beyond, based on the opinions of 82 experts.

[4] In fact, as Turoff and Hiltz argue, the Delphi is a 'communication structure aimed at producing detailed critical examination and discussion, not at forcing a quick compromise.' (http://eies.njit.edu/~turoff/Papers/delphi3.html#Introduction, accessed: 10.5.2005).

[5] An interesting website is http://www.wilderdom.com/delphi.html ('Delphi study: Research by interactive, consultative inquiry', accessed: 10.5.2005).

Although the Delphi technique has many supporters it has also incurred much criticism. Sackman (1975) and Armstrong (1978) in particular have been highly sceptical. In their view the technique is unscientific and not accurate in its forecasting. Makridakis and Wheelright (1978) summarise the criticisms as follows: 1) a low reliability level of judgements amongst experts and therefore dependency of forecasts on the particular judgements selected, 2) the sensitivity of results to ambiguity in the questionnaire used for data collection in each round and 3) the difficulty in assessing the degree of expertise incorporated into the forecast.[6]

Given the key features of the Delphi technique it can be used for several purposes other than forecasting (see Maassen and Van Vught, 1984). For instance it can be a useful tool in developing policy goals and strategies. Or, highly relevant to the world of higher education, it can be used for the development of rating scales. A third alternative application concerns the use of the Delphi in cost benefit analyses. Finally, the Delphi is suitable for conflict resolution or problem solving. Here, however, we have used the technique as a forecasting tool; the outcomes ('predictions') were used as input for the scenario exercise.

Our Application of the Delphi Study

Ideally each individual should complete a questionnaire designed by the Delphi researchers and then receive feedback on all the outcomes. They would then fill out the questionnaire a second time with this information at hand. Essentially the same questionnaire should thus be completed several times by the set of experts.[7] Those with views significantly divergent from a developing consensus are required to substantiate them, which serves as useful intelligence for others. The underlying idea is that the majority can thus weigh up dissenting views that are based on privileged or rare information. The following ten steps should be taken to conduct a Delphi study (cf. amongst others Fowles, 1978):

1. Formation of a team to undertake and monitor a Delphi on a given subject;
2. Selection of an expert panel to participate in the exercise;
3. Development of the first round questionnaire;
4. Testing the questionnaire (pilot phase);
5. Sending the questionnaires to the experts;
6. Analysis of first round results;
7. Preparing the second round questionnaires, including the results of the first;

[6] In this respect we fully agree with Gordon's point of view that the Delphi should be used for appropriate questions. For some issues other techniques are better. Factual questions should not be candidates for Delphi studies (Gordon 1994). Another way to increase the usefulness of the Delphi technique is to use it in combination with other techniques (e.g. the Cross Impact Analyses, the Analytic Hierarchy Process, or the Scenario technique, as in our case).

[7] Many variants have been developed. In these variants one or more of the traditional characteristics of the Delphi method are more or less seriously violated. In most of these cases, we would argue such studies should not be seen as Delphi studies.

8. Sending the questionnaires to participating experts;
9. Analysis of second round results (and then repeating steps 7 to 9 as long as desired);
10. Presentation of results and drawing conclusions.

The topic of the CHEPS Delphi study was 'the European higher education and research landscape in 2020'. Will a uniform study structure be implemented across European higher education systems? Will a European research council be the most important funding organisation for basic research? Will academics still play an important role in university management? These and related questions were supposed to be answered through consulting experts all over Europe. Initially a team of CHEPS researchers was created who consulted their colleagues in order to tap information and review higher education literature so they could design a first round questionnaire. After the preliminary interviews within CHEPS, the first round questionnaire consisted of 49 statements on higher education and research in Europe.

As will be explained in more detail in chapter 3, the statements were organised around six themes: 1) education, 2) research and innovation, 3) funding, 4) quality, 5) higher education, society and labour market and 6) institutional governance and management. The experts were asked to separately estimate the desirability and likelihood of all 49 statements on a five-point scale. It makes sense to make a distinction between the desirability of a future state and the occurrence of future developments. First, because it provides additional information. Second, because 'is' and 'ought' can be related ('wishful thinking'). Desired events are usually seen as more likely to happen, and by separating 'will be' from 'ought to be' we hoped to diminish the wishful thinking effect, or at least get a better view on it. Aside from desirability and likelihood the experts were asked to provide arguments to elucidate their views. These qualitative foundations of the experts' views on Europe's higher education future are regarded as highly valuable. In fact they are an indispensable aspect of a proper Delphi study and almost as vital as input for the scenarios.[8] Finally, many of the 49 statements invited the experts to estimate their occurrence in their home country. Through this additional question we aimed to clarify the expected European diversity or homogeneity, and also to gain insight into the jump from the 'familiar (the national situation) to the unfamiliar (the European level)' from the experts' point of view.[9]

After analysing the first round results, the CHEPS research team selected the most challenging issues to develop a second round questionnaire. The first round experts were confronted for a second time, this time with 15 statements (out of the 49). The 15 statements were accompanied by the first round results (scores and arguments), to

[8] It may be noted that usually a Delphi sample does not – and is not intended to – produce statistically significant results. The results provided do not predict the response of a larger population (or even of a different Delphi panel). 'They represent the synthesis of opinion of the particular group, no more, no less.' (Gordon, 1994). The particular group in our case were experts in the world of higher education.

[9] The experts selected in their capacity as 'international' or 'European' experts were not asked to make this comparison between the European level and their home country.

enable the respondents to rethink their opinions. The outcomes of the second round were regarded as the outcomes of the Delphi study.[10] These were then used as input for writing the scenarios on Europe's higher education future.

Tending to Fiction: Writing Scenarios

Scenario Method, Its Potential and Limitations

A scenario, as we understand, can be defined as 'an internally consistent view of what the future might turn out to be – not a forecast, but a possible future outcome' (Porter, 1985). It functions as one of the 'tools and technologies for managing the uncertainties of the future' (Ringland, 1998). 'Managing' maybe goes too far for us, given our introduction to this chapter, but let us say a scenario is a tool for mapping 'the uncertainties of the future'.

The scenario method has been popular amongst strategic planners employed by companies since Shell revealed how its scenario exercise helped it to prepare for the 1970s oil crisis. 'By the late 1970s scenario planning was adopted by a significant fraction of the Fortune 1000 companies ... Roughly three-quarters of the firms had adopted the approach after the oil embargo provided such a deep shock to previously-stable views of the future' (Ringland, 1998). Later the method fell into a degree of disrepute, perhaps through '...an over-simplistic use of the technique, with a confusion between forecasts and scenarios' (Ringland, 1998).

The point about scenarios is they give a consistent elaboration (extrapolation) of a certain theme expected to play an important role in the future. In this sense they are akin to Weber's 'ideal type' descriptions: not intended to be a description of the empirical phenomena, but an exaggeration to highlight an important principle or dimension. On this basis, the emphasis in Porter's definition of a scenario should be on '*possible* future outcome', for it must be empirically possible, but does not have to be probable (as a forecast intends to be).

Internally consistent scenarios can be constructed in several ways. Miller distinguished two popular ones, the Bear and the GBU methods. The Bear method 'takes an initial starting point, for instance population or economic output, and then develops scenarios on the basis of a range of growth rates – low, medium and high. This method can be called the baby-bear, momma-bear and papa-bear approach (Bear for short).' (Miller, 2003). Besides this essentially quantitative approach of extrapolation, one could focus 'more on preferences and implicit expectations in order to sketch scenarios that capture what people consider to be the most desirable, the least desirable and the muddling through but most likely. This method can be dubbed the good, the bad and the ugly approach (GBU for short).' (*ibid*.) Complicating things further, Miller advocates an approach that does not just look at trends and desirabilities, but considers all possibilities (in Popper's terms: all that is not forbidden by theories), which he sees as

[10] Detailed results of the Delphi study are reported in the next chapter.

'one way of being systematic and explicit about the hypothetical 'what if', in three steps: 'The first step is to determine or define the key attribute (variable A) of the scenario's subject. The second step is to sketch a space, perhaps multidimensional, using the primary determinants of change (a, b, c) in variable A. And the third step is to identify distinct scenarios within the possibility space' (Miller, 2003). Yet how to identify those distinct scenarios was not stated by Miller. It probably needed a creative moment.

Our Application of Scenarios

To reduce our dependence on a creative moment, we referred back to our application of the Delphi method, which clearly distinguished between probable and desirable futures. This can be seen as an improved GBU approach for it gave us two dimensions rather than one: good – bad – ugly and probable – improbable. To some extent the desirable and probable coincided, according to the responses, but that was not always the case. The tension between the two could be used to give direction to our creativity. Moreover, we were aware subjective methods such as the Delphi suffer from what Ascher called 'assumption drag', i.e. the phenomenon that people maintain assumptions shown to be false (quoted in Van Vught, 1985). Combining the tension between desirability and probability with the 'assumption drag', we appointed persons to write counter-scenarios to the 'majority scenario', challenging the assumptions apparently underlying the experts' responses. The creative moment remained as we had to decide which main assumptions we wanted to challenge.

Here we touch upon another commonly-lamented limitation of any systematic method and therefore also of the methods we applied: what you get out is what you put in. This is only true to some extent. The true part – and the gravest – is that the dimensions, the space in which the respondents' answers are interpreted by researchers, are predefined. They were given certain statements to react upon, which were included in the study due to the underlying variables they represented to the researchers. The multidimensional space was therefore limited by our research team's theories.

The untrue part of the statement 'what you get out is what you put in' is that setting up the space dimensions does not determine where in the space one ends up: the respondents were free to say what they thought was likely and desirable. This could make all the difference to the scenarios, of course. In a previous scenario exercise we engaged in (Huisman, De Boer & Westerheijden, 2001), there had been an unexpectedly high level of support from the Dutch higher education community for what we had set up as the ultra-liberal and ultra-globalised 'counter-scenario'.

As an additional impetus to 'think outside the box', we paid attention to the open questions in the first round Delphi questionnaire, where respondents could give their reasons behind agreeing or disagreeing with statements. That was another way to test whether our setting up of the possibility space had not been too narrow.

In the current scenario exercise then, the main dimensions distinguishing our scenarios embodied:

1. The dominant coordination mechanism: state *vs*. market *vs*. network;
2. European integration and harmony;
3. Economic and institutional developments (e.g. success of large *vs*. small organisations).

The stable dimensions, exogenous developments that could not be influenced and which were kept constant across the scenarios, included amongst others:

1. Demography: greying and 'de-greening' of the European population;
2. Economy: no major effects of recession or boom;
3. The degree of integration of research and higher education.

Out of this, and out of pragmatic arguments such as the availability of scenario-writers, three scenarios resulted. One would reflect the (large) majority opinions of the Delphi respondents. State coordination, European integration, harmony and large-scale organisations were to be the hallmarks of this scenario, which became 'Centralia'. Another would take the institutional and economic developments towards the network economy as its focal point. Presumably this development had been undervalued in the Delphi study. It also incorporated some majority opinions in the Delphi study, e.g. on the amount of control exercised by the academic community. From this came 'Octavia'. Finally the antithesis to the majority opinions of Centralia with regard to market coordination, small organisations and little higher-level control or integration characterised what became 'Vitis Vinifera'.

With the science tendency results of the previous section and the methodical considerations just presented, all ingredients were added and the fiction tendency of the process took over. The ingredients had to be combined into what we wanted to make three equally attractive pictures of higher education's future in Europe.

A serious choice concerned the metaphor for the scenarios. Since we intended the scenarios to appeal to a large audience *a prima vista*, yet not make one glaringly more appealing than the other, it was important to find an overarching metaphor with three equal 'instances'. In the previous scenario exercise where we alluded to the future of Dutch higher education, different gardens had been the metaphor (see also: Westerheijden, Huisman & De Boer, 2004). In a variation on that theme, ideal-type fictional cities were chosen this time.

The focus in the first part of the development of the scenarios had been on the *factors* influencing developments and one of the things the actual scenario-writing had to do was to bring in the *actors* and politics as policy, including of course higher education policy, as something created by human action. In setting up consistent scenarios we also had to make the human motivation, the principles underlying their actions, consistent. This was not so much of a problem for the 'counter-scenarios', as from the beginning they were intended to highlight some possible futures not in the consensual

majority of the Delphi study respondents. In those cases we could just posit a consistently applied principle of action; in the Vitis Vinifera scenario, for instance, it was a market-liberal ideology. For the scenario built on the majority opinions in the Delphi study Centralia, it required some interpretation to reconstruct what might have been a more or less consistent ideology from which that set of opinions made sense. As previously stated when discussing the 'ideal-type' character of scenarios, we did not want to suggest any single 'real' respondent held the beliefs which we constructed as that ideal-type ideology. The description in that scenario of a future ideology became the section on 'New Arcadianism'. This ideology – as any empirically existent ideology – may not be completely internally consistent. Indeed we had to develop a differentiation between a surface of more arcadian or even outright romantic rhetoric and a hard core of dominance of values about economy and technology. The point about constructing 'New Arcadianism' was not its internal consistency *per se*, but that this (inconsistent) set of values and norms seemed to us necessary to make the human action in the Centralia scenario a fairly consistent application of a single ideology.

Seeing a possible future as a resultant of intentional human action may give the impression that the resulting scenario must be a utopia, something ideal as everyone willingly contributes to it. First, this impression would hugely underestimate the effect of the *factors* (nature, the logic of the system) on the outcomes of human action. Good will in a hostile environment will not necessarily produce a utopia and even the interaction of several good-willing actors may produce outcomes they did not intend.

Second, the question of what is a desirable future, or whether a scenario represents a utopia or a dystopia, depends on the reader's preferences. We did not want to suggest that one of the three scenarios is more desirable than the other. As mentioned above, that is why we strove for a balanced metaphor in which each scenario could be seen as equally desirable. For that reason, in all three the developments have been described mostly in positive terms – as possible utopias rather than dystopias. Still, with a little reading between the lines the reader may find the negative tendencies inherent to the scenarios with ease.

Presenting the Scenarios

The Centralia scenario was built on majority opinions, both regarding probability and desirability. In that sense it should have been the utopia for most of our readers. Curiously, though, in scenario presentations across Europe, audiences made up of people with profiles similar to the respondents (actually even including some of our respondents) were largely in favour of the Octavia scenario, with usually only very small minorities voting for Centralia and even smaller ones (if any) for Vitis Vinifera. These tendencies were visible both when voting for the probability of the scenarios and when voting for their desirability, although more respondents thought the Centralia scenario was likely to happen than liked it to happen.

This shows the value of constructing scenarios: taking majority and consensus opinions on individual statements and 'straightening out' these opinions into a fairly consistent scenario may well have explicitly uncovered relationships among opinions

and beliefs held by higher education experts of which they themselves were not yet aware. If through this we can contribute to the debate about the future of higher education in Europe, we will have achieved a great deal, although we realise that:

> …clearly, the whole process is iterative. In a sense this study is only the first iteration... Given that many of the factors and actors are changing rapidly it is inevitable that a second cycle will be necessary in the future. (M.D. Rogers in Ringland 1998).

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3 A Brief Report on the Delphi Study 'European Higher Education and Research in 2020'

Jeroen Huisman, Petra Boezerooy, Ana-Maria Dima, Margarita Hoppe-Jeliazkova, Anneke Luijten-Lub, Egbert de Weert and Marijk C. van der Wende

Introduction

Below we present the main findings from the research project *European Higher Education and Research in 2020*.

The project was designed to gain insight into the expectations and desires of European higher education experts on the topic 'higher education and research landscape in 2020'. Will a uniform study structure be implemented across European higher education systems? Will a European Research Council be the most important funding organisation for basic research? Will academics still play an important role in university management?

We formulated 49 statements on higher education in Europe in 2020, that were organised around six themes: 1) education, 2) research and innovation, 3) funding, 4) quality, 5) higher education, society and labour market, and 6) institutional governance and management.

Approximately 750 individuals from 24 countries and an additional 30 supranational experts were approached by e-mail to participate in the project by filling out a web-based questionnaire. Participants were asked to estimate the desirability and likelihood of all 49 statements. In addition, they were asked to give arguments to support their views. For many of the statements participants were also invited to estimate the statement would be likely in their home country.

Of the about 780 participants, 164 sent in answers before the deadline (21% response rate). For some countries and groups of individuals the response rates were rather low. Overall the different European regions (north, west, east, south) and participant groups

(national policy-makers; intermediary organisations; employers/employee organisations, students; institutional leaders; researchers) were well represented in the sample.

We explored what we perceived to be the most challenging issues in a second round. The respondents of the first round were confronted (again) with fifteen of the initial forty-nine statements. But this time, they were informed about the results of the first round and the arguments used by other respondents. For a number of statements the results for the first and second round (84 respondents) differed significantly.

The findings for each of the statements are presented in the appendix. These include the total number of respondents to the statement, the overall scores per category (including the number of individuals giving 'no opinion'), the average score and the standard deviation. A scale ranging from 'very probable/desirable' to 'highly improbable/desirable' was converted a four-point scale, implying that an average of 2.500 could be interpreted as the neutral middle position. The qualitative data (i.e. the argumentations of the respondents) are not presented in this report, but did however form important inputs for building the scenarios.

Most Important Findings

We found a number of important findings that are presented below, including: (a) the statements that were considered most likely/desirable; (b) the statements that were considered least likely/desirable; (c) the statements that led to the largest variety of responses; (d) the statements for which the difference between desirability and likelihood was largest; (e) statements that led to large differences between regions in Europe; and (f) statement that led to large differences between types of respondents.

Most Probable or Desirable

The statements reported to be most desirable:

- In Europe 2020, more than 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) is spent on research, technological development and innovation (average = 1.354).
- In Europe 2020, recognition of prior learning has become a common practice in higher education institutions (average = 1.525).
- In Europe 2020, more than 50% of academic journals are e-journals, owned and controlled by academics themselves (average = 1.599).
- In Europe 2020, more than 40% of masters students hold a bachelors degree from a different institution (possibly but not necessarily in another country) (average = 1.617).
- In Europe 2020, regional (both intra-national and cross-border) authorities are responsible for regional innovation clusters (average = 1.648).
- In Europe 2020, higher education management has developed into a recognisable professional career (average = 1.705).
- In Europe 2020, consensus has been achieved on the Bachelor-Master structure: a uniform 3+2 structure is implemented in all countries and degrees are comparable across Europe (average = 1.769).

The statements reported to be most probable:

- In my country in 2020, the Bachelor-Master structure has been implemented with a 3+2 structure and degrees are comparable to those across Europe (average = 1.692).
- In Europe 2020, vast differences in academic salaries still exist across countries (average = 1.778).
- In my country in 2020, only a few 'clusters of excellence' are competitive on a global level in each (multi-)disciplinary research field (average = 1.795).
- In Europe 2020, regional (both intra-national and cross-border) authorities are responsible for regional innovation clusters (average = 1.816).

Least Probable or Desirable

The statements reported to be least desirable:

- In Europe 2020, only a few universities consider making an independent and critical contribution to intellectual and cultural life to be an important part of their mission (average = 3.365).
- In 2020, the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world's most dynamic knowledge economy has clearly failed. The most excellent research is still done elsewhere (e.g. United States, South East Asia, China) (average = 3.312).
- In Europe 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds societal demand, resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a large scale (average = 3.217).
- In Europe 2020, the quality of academic research is highly skewed – research is much stronger in the North-West with Southern and Eastern countries lagging significantly behind (3.134).
- In Europe 2020, research fields that are economically less relevant for business and industry are far weaker than they were in 2000 (average = 3.099).
- In Europe 2020, the effective marketing of 'quality' rather than the genuine quality of education and research attracts the brightest students (average = 3.082).

The statements reported to be least probable:

- In my country in 2020, there is a jungle of accreditation agencies, some linked to the ministry of education, others private and for-profit (average = 2.968).
- In my country in 2020, only a few universities consider making an independent and critical contribution to intellectual and cultural life to be an important part of their mission (average = 2.901).
- In Europe 2020, all (national as well as European) accreditation schemes have been abandoned (average = 2.883).
- In my country in 2020, more than 60 per cent of basic research (in terms of full-time equivalent researchers) is conducted outside higher education institutions (average = 2.873).

The Statements with most Variation in the Responses

- In Europe 2020, participation rates in higher education have increased considerably to some 70% of 18-22 year olds (probability in own country, standard deviation = .994).
- In Europe 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees (desirability, standard deviation = .972).
- In Europe 2020, the European Union has a single, centralised accreditation office for higher education, which is part of the EU apparatus (desirability, standard deviation = .971).
- In Europe 2020, private higher education institutions that are accredited by recognised accreditation agencies are treated the same way in all respects as accredited public higher education institutions (desirability, standard deviation = .906).

The Statements with Largest Discrepancies between Desirability and Probability

Probable, but not or less desirable:

- In 2020, the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world's most dynamic knowledge economy has clearly failed. The most excellent research is still done elsewhere (e.g. United States, South East Asia, China) (difference between desirability and probability = 1.300).
- In Europe 2020, the quality of academic research is highly skewed – research is much stronger in the North-West with Southern and Eastern countries lagging significantly behind (difference between desirability and probability = 1.190).

Desirable, but not or less probable:

- In Europe 2020, the quality of study programmes is fairly consistent across all countries – from North to South and from East to West (difference between desirability and probability = .843).
- In Europe 2020, more than 25% of first-degree students study in another European country for the full duration of their programme (difference between desirability and probability = .795).

Desirable, but not probable in own country:

- In Europe/my country 2020, more than 25% of first-degree students study in another European country for the full duration of their programme (difference between desirability in Europe and probability in own country = .920).
- In Europe 2020, more than 40% of masters students hold a bachelors degree from a different institution (possibly but not necessarily in another country) (difference between desirability in Europe and probability in own country = .896).

Less desirable, but probable in own country:

- In 2020, my country has failed to make its full contribution to meeting the objectives of the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world's most dynamic knowledge economy (difference between desirability in Europe and probability in own country = 1.085).

- In my country in 2020, research fields that are economically less relevant for business and industry are far weaker than they were in 2000 (difference between desirability in Europe and probability in own country = .947).

The Statements with most Variation in the Responses by Region/Type of Respondent

The statements with large variety in responses by region:

- In Europe/my country 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds societal demand, resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a large scale.

Respondents from Western Europe judge this statement as (significantly) less probable in Europe 2020 and (significantly) less probable in their own country in 2020. Respondents from Southern Europe judge this statement as (significantly) more probable in their own country in 2020.

- In Europe/my country 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees.

Respondents from Western Europe judge this statement as (significantly) more probable in their own country in 2020, respondents from Northern Europe judge this statement as (significantly) less probable in their own country in 2020.

- In Europe 2020/my country, participation rates in higher education have increased considerably to some 70% of 18-22 year olds.

Respondents from Western Europe judge this statement as (significantly) less probable in Europe 2020 and in their own country in 2020. Respondents from Southern Europe judge this statement as (significantly) more desirable in their own country in 2020.

The statements with a large variety in responses by type of respondent:

- In Europe 2020, recognition of prior learning has become a common practice in higher education institutions.

Representatives of national governments (ministries) judge this statement as (significantly) less probable in Europe 2020.

- In Europe 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees.

Representatives of universities (central level administrators/leaders) judge this statement as (significantly) less probably in their own country.

- In Europe 2020, the typical higher education institution is managed in a business-like way, stressing efficiency and productivity.
  Higher education researchers judge this statement as (significantly) less desirable in Europe 2020.

Comparison First and Second Round (15 statements)

Comparing the first and second round answers (second round 87 respondents), the most striking findings were:

- Standard deviations: the second round standard deviations were all lower, hinting at an increasing homogenisation of views. This should be interpreted carefully for the size of the two groups was clearly different. Statistical tools could not be used to determine significant differences.
- Average scores: almost all (24 out of 30) increased. Respondents in general were inclined to see the statements (even) more improbable and undesirable than in the first round.
- The largest differences were found for the following statements:

In Europe 2020, more than 60 per cent of basic research (in terms of full-time equivalent researchers) is conducted outside higher education institutions (probability from 2.491 to 2.821; desirability from 2.578 to 3.171).

In Europe 2020, the European Research Council funds more than 50% of the research projects in higher education institutions (probability from 2.689 to 3.163; desirability from 2.199 to 1.579).

In Europe 2020, the European Union has a single, centralised accreditation office for higher education, which is part of the EU apparatus (probability from 2.700 to 3.072; desirability from 2.566 to 3.000).

In Europe 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds societal demand, resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a large scale (probability from 2.414 to 2.741; desirability from 3.217 to 3.598).

In Europe 2020, the academic staff structure in higher education is standardised across all countries and all higher education and research institutions (probability from 2.654 to 3.119; desirability from 2.321 to 2.713).

Appendix: Overview of the Results

I. Education, Research and Innovation

1a) In Europe 2020, consensus has been achieved on the Bachelor-Master structure: a uniform 3+2 structure is implemented in all countries and degrees are comparable across Europe.

Note: The Bologna Declaration agreement on comparable degree structures has been realised.

N=162	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	48	89	23	2	1.870 (.688)	0

N=160	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	57	79	20	2	1.769 (.706)	2

Second round:

N=84	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	27	50	6	1	1.774 (.628)	0

N=84	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	30	43	8	1	1.756 (.677)	2

1b) In my country in 2020, the Bachelor-Master structure has been implemented with a 3+2 structure and degrees are comparable to those across Europe.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	79	50	23	4	1.692 (.816)	0

2a) In Europe 2020, recognition of prior learning has become a common practice in higher education institutions.

Note: The diversity of students entering higher education in terms of educational background and (work) experience has resulted in many students claiming credit for this 'prior learning'. Institutions have developed procedures for doing this.

N=161	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	31	96	26	0	1.870 (.619)	8

N=160	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	68	70	12	0	1.525 (.638)	10

2b) In my country in 2020, recognition of prior learning has become a common practice in higher education institutions.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	40	80	27	2	1.853 (.715)	7

3a) In Europe 2020, universities' research agendas are determined in close interaction with external stakeholders.

Note: The distinction between basic/fundamental research on the one hand and applied research on the other has blurred. Most research is characterised by elements relating both to its fundamental nature (knowledge for the sake of knowledge) and to its practical application. As a consequence, the role of individual professors in setting the research agenda has diminished.

N=162	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	45	92	22	1	1.846 (.656)	2

N=162	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	39	73	42	5	2.043 (.796)	3

3b) In my country in 2020, universities' research` agendas are determined in close interaction with external stakeholders.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	26	103	22	4	2.000 (.645)	2

4a) In Europe 2020, more than 60 per cent of basic research (in terms of full-time equivalent researchers) is conducted outside higher education institutions.

Note: Business and industry are the main sectors performing basic research.

N=161	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	13	43	82	14	2.491 (.782)	9

N=161	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	8	37	79	24	2.578 (.803)	13

Second round:

N=84	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	1	22	52	9	2.821 (.624)	0

N=83	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	2	6	50	24	3.171 (.663)	1

4b) In my country in 2020, more than 60 per cent of basic research (in terms of full-time equivalent researchers) is conducted outside higher education institutions.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	8	30	69	44	2.873 (.848)	6

5a) In Europe 2020, a striking feature of higher education is its strong functional stratification.

Note: There is a striking division between highly selective top-universities employing the best academic staff and having a strong emphasis on research and post-graduate programmes, and a wide range of other higher education institutions.

N=159	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	33	101	22	0	1.893 (.593)	3

N=158	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	20	60	57	9	2.196 (.818)	12

5b) In my country in 2020, a striking feature of higher education is its strong functional stratification.

N=154	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	18	75	56	2	2.234 (.686)	3

6a) In Europe 2020, participation rates in higher education have increased considerably to some 70% of 18-22 year olds.

Note: At present the participation rates in European countries range from around 30% to 55% of this age group.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	28	56	63	9	2.281 (.841)	4

N=158	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	38	62	43	8	2.044 (.862)	7

Second round:

N=83	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	6	45	30	2	2.337 (.649)	0

N=82	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	16	44	19	1	2.063 (.700)	2

6b) In my country in 2020, participation rates in higher education have increased considerably to some 70% of 18-22 year olds.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	30	49	48	26	2.410 (.994)	3

7a) In Europe 2020, research fields that are economically less relevant for business and industry are far weaker than they were in 2000.

Note: Their relative position has weakened when compared to other (economically relevant) research fields in terms of public funding levels, numbers of PhD students and career opportunities for academic staff

N=162	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	28	93	35	2	2.019 (.671)	4

N=161	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	0	24	85	49	3.099 (.666)	3

7b) In my country in 2020, research fields that are economically less relevant for business and industry are far weaker than they were in 2000.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	18	86	44	4	2.153 (.686)	5

8a) In Europe 2020, more than 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) is spent on research, technological development and innovation.

Note: The European Council (Barcelona 2002) goal of Europe spending 3% of GDP on R&D (two-thirds from business and industry and one-third from public sources) has been reached.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	28	87	36	4	2.038 (.716)	5

N=161	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	101	54	3	0	1.354 (.525)	3

Second round:

N=83	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	11	52	19	0	2.098 (.601)	1

N=82	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	48	33	1	0	1.427 (.522)	0

8b) In my country in 2020, more than 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) is spent on research, technological development and innovation.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	31	59	53	10	2.217 (.862)	4

9a) In Europe 2020, regional (both intra-national and cross-border) authorities are responsible for regional innovation clusters.

Note: In regional innovation clusters, companies, municipalities, universities and public research organisations successfully interact in research and innovation.

N=163	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	23	100	22	1	1.816 (.617)	14

N=162	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	41	93	12	1	1.648 (.620)	15

9b) In my country in 2020, regional authorities are responsible for regional innovation clusters.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	22	85	38	3	2.039 (.693)	8

10a) In Europe 2020, only a few 'clusters of excellence' are competitive on a global level in each (multi-)disciplinary research field.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	34	88	29	0	1.856 (.657)	8

N=158	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	7	47	76	12	2.386 (.755)	16

10b) In my country in 2020, only a few 'clusters of excellence' are competitive on a global level in each (multi-)disciplinary research field.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	46	76	26	1	1.795 (.711)	7

11a) In Europe 2020, standardised course modules developed by leading European scholars are widely used (and available online) in many basic disciplines.

N=162	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	27	71	52	5	2.130 (.775)	7

N=162	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	15	76	49	11	2.210 (.780)	11

11b) In my country in 2020, standardised course modules developed by leading European scholars are widely used (and available online) in many basic disciplines.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	12	67	61	10	2.365 (.745)	6

12a) In Europe 2020, more than 10% of students are registered with institutions that have their seat outside Europe.

Note: Prestigious institutions from outside Europe (for example, the USA and Australia) have established a significant number of campuses within Europe.

N=159	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	17	73	57	4	2.201 (.716)	8

N=161	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	52	59	11	2.075 (.886)	30

12b) In my country in 2020, more than 10% of students are registered with institutions that have their seat outside Europe.

N=155	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	11	53	65	20	2.529 (.815)	6

13a) In Europe 2020, more than 25% of first-degree students study in another European country for the full duration of their programme.

N=161	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	5	37	106	10	2.714 (.612)	3

N=161	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	21	90	36	0	1.919 (.643)	14

13b) In my country in 2020, more than 25% of first-degree students study in another European country for the full duration of their programme.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	10	25	85	32	2.840 (.800)	4

II. Funding

14a) In Europe 2020, the European Research Council funds more than 50% of the research projects in higher education institutions.

N=161	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	4	22	107	16	2.689 (.635)	12

N=161	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	17	55	61	11	2.199 (.842)	17

Second round:

N=83	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	0	7	53	20	3.163 (.561)	3

N=83	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	5	28	37	6	2.579 (.735)	7

14b) In my country in 2020, the European Research Council funds more than 50% of the research projects in higher education institutions.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	4	21	90	29	2.752 (.724)	13

15a) In Europe 2020, all national research-funding organisations have opened their competitive grants to applicants from all over Europe.

N=161	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	10	67	64	10	2.335 (.736)	10

N=162	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	30	79	37	4	1.944 (.756)	12

15b) In my country in 2020, all research-funding organisations have opened their competitive grants to applicants from all over Europe.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	10	56	66	17	2.471 (.790)	8

16a) In Europe 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	34	84	34	5	2.025 (.749)	3

N=161	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	23	61	39	26	2.273 (.972)	12

Second round:

N=83	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	14	56	12	0	1.976 (.566)	1

N=83	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	10	33	21	15	2.519 (.945)	4

16b) In my country in 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees.

N=155	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	43	69	36	7	2.045 (.832)	0

17a) In Europe 2020, individual higher education institutions set their own tuition fees.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	30	99	25	2	1.944 (.639)	4

N=161	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	24	54	58	15	2.273 (.888)	10

Second round:

N=82	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	14	61	7	0	1.915 (.502)	0

N=83	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	6	35	29	10	2.538 (.810)	3

17b) In my country in 2020, individual higher education institutions set their own tuition fees.

N=155	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	27	70	44	9	2.161 (.818)	5

18a) In Europe 2020, tuition fees are set on the basis of graduate salaries in each discipline.

N=161	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	10	41	76	15	2.360 (.822)	19

N=155	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	29	79	23	2.555 (.824)	15

18b) In my country in 2020, tuition fees are set on the basis of graduate salaries in each discipline.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	4	32	78	30	2.705 (.769)	12

19a) In Europe 2020, the level of publicly funded financial support for students under 21 years old is dependent on parental income.

Note: Governments have limited grants and scholarships to students under 21 as a result of the growing number of students. Equity considerations have led to parents being expected to contribute to their children's higher education in relation to their income. Mature students rely on loans and their own income.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	21	97	29	5	2.013 (.679)	8

N=160	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	27	64	45	15	2.188 (.892)	9

Second round:

N=83	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	8	67	6	0	1.975 (.418)	2

N=84	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	7	44	20	7	2.346 (.770)	6

19b) In my country in 2020, the level of publicly funded financial support for students under 21 years old is dependent on parental income.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	27	73	41	11	2.179 (.830)	4

20a) In Europe 2020, private higher education institutions that are accredited by recognised accreditation agencies are treated the same way in all respects as accredited public higher education institutions.

Note: The differences between public and private providers have become blurred and there are no convincing arguments to treat private institutions differently from public institutions (in areas such as student financial support, the recognition of degrees, eligibility for public research grants and the public funding institutions receive per student).

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	44	75	33	3	1.906 (.762)	5

N=159	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	45	65	29	12	1.950 (.906)	8

Second round:

N=83	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	8	63	11	0	2.037 (.483)	1

N=83	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	10	54	12	5	2.148 (.709)	2

20b) In my country in 2020, accredited private higher education institutions are treated the same way in all respects as accredited public higher education institutions.

N=155	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	33	61	48	9	2.161 (.857)	4

21) In Europe 2020, the funding of the research (basic, applied and contract) undertaken by higher education institutions will come from the following sources:

	Likely share	Desirable share	Likely country
EC/ERC	22.6%	25.0%	20.8%
National government	31.5%	28.2%	40.0%
Regional government	11.1%	10.6%	10.1%
Business & industry	32.9%	35.1%	27.7%
Other, please specify:	4.2%	4.4%	5.0%
	N=124	N=122	N=123

22a) In Europe 2020, the number of government-subsidised student places in public higher education institutions is demand-driven.

Note: Student demand determines the number of funded places. Governments refrain from setting capacity limits.

N=161	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	15	85	46	7	2.180 (.715)	8

N=159	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	21	74	46	7	2.107 (.775)	11

22b) In my country in 2020, the number of government-subsidised student places in public higher education institutions is demand-driven.

N=154	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	18	69	45	12	2.201 (.821)	10

III. Quality

23a) In Europe 2020, the effective marketing of 'quality' rather than the genuine quality of education and research attracts the brightest students.

Note: The marketing strategies of higher education institutions determine how students are informed (or misinformed) about the places where they might study. Trustworthy, independent and 'hard' indicators of the quality of education are not publicly available.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	16	78	56	4	2.225 (.696)	6

N=159	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	7	10	81	55	3.082 (.765)	6

23b) In my country in 2020, the effective marketing of 'quality' rather than the genuine quality of education and research attracts the brightest students.

N=154	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	14	60	61	12	2.370 (.788)	7

24a) In Europe 2020, all (national as well as European) accreditation schemes have been abandoned.

Note. Accreditation schemes have ceased to exist for a number of reasons including that they did not deliver information useful for students or employers.

N=159	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	3	22	79	42	2.843 (.761)	13

N=160	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	5	28	71	40	2.713 (.841)	16

24b) In my country in 2020, no accreditation schemes are operational.

N=154	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	4	23	70	46	2.883 (.798)	11

25a) In Europe 2020, there is a jungle of accreditation agencies, some linked to national ministries of education, others private and for-profit.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	13	75	59	5	2.250 (.698)	8

N=158	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	4	17	77	46	2.867 (.781)	14

25b) In my country in 2020, there is a jungle of accreditation agencies, some linked to the ministry of education, others private and for-profit.

N=154	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	5	29	70	46	2.968 (.801)	4

26) In Europe 2020, the European Union has a single, centralised accreditation office for higher education, which is part of the EU apparatus.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	35	91	20	2.700 (.744)	5

N=159	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	18	35	60	35	2.566 (.971)	11

Second round:

N=84	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	3	6	56	18	3.072 (.659)	1

N=82	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	3	13	46	19	3.000 (.742)	1

27a) In Europe 2020, most students collect ECTS-credits in a 'supermarket mode' of continuous, life-long education.

Note: The degree or study programme has come to play a less important role - in 2020 the specific courses completed are the most important elements in a graduate curriculum vitae.

N=159	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	14	71	62	3	2.226 (.691)	9

N=159	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	14	69	61	3	2.258 (.726)	9

27b) In my country in 2020, most students collect ECTS-credits in a 'supermarket mode' of continuous, life-long education.

N=153	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	59	64	13	2.425 (.756)	8

28a) In Europe 2020, there is a single European qualification structure that includes all higher education programmes.

Note: The qualification structure describes competencies and levels of educational attainment. The development of a single European qualification structure required international agreement about the structure of labour markets.

N=159	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	12	53	79	9	2.459 (.731)	6

N=158	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	19	73	47	8	2.139 (.779)	11

28b) In my country in 2020, there is a single qualification structure that includes all higher education programmes.

N=152	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	25	62	52	7	2.191 (.808)	6

29a) In Europe 2020, the employability of graduates is used as the main indicator of the quality of study programmes.

N=160	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	12	73	66	6	2.375 (.691)	3

N=159	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	10	55	75	14	2.522 (.749)	5

29b) In my country in 2020, the employability of graduates is used as the main indicator of the quality of study programmes.

N=154	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	11	69	64	8	2.422 (.709)	2

30) In Europe 2020, the quality of study programmes is fairly consistent across all countries – from North to South and from East to West.

N=158	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	6	41	84	24	2.760 (.739)	3

N=155	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	36	83	29	2	1.916 (.703)	5

31) In Europe 2020, the quality of academic research is highly skewed – research is much stronger in the North-West with Southern and Eastern countries lagging significantly behind.

N=159	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	27	87	36	0	1.943 (.658)	9

N=157	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	2	4	94	50	3.134 (.599)	7

IV. Higher Education, Society and Labour Market

32a) In Europe 2020, the most excellent academics work outside the public universities.

Note: It is much more rewarding for excellent researchers and teachers to work for private higher education institutions, consultancy firms and/or business and industry. In addition to higher salaries, they have access to better research facilities.

N=158	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	60	80	5	2.462 (.662)	4

N=156	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	5	11	89	39	2.885 (.729)	12

32b) In my country in 2020, the most excellent academics work outside the public universities.

N=153	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	6	36	89	18	2.725 (.701)	4

33a) In Europe 2020, the proportion of academic staff in higher education with long-term or tenured positions is significantly lower than it was in 2000.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	24	87	38	1	2.013 (.664)	7

N=154	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	15	60	49	16	2.247 (.865)	14

Second round:

N=84	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	62	9	1	2.025 (.524)	3

N=82	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	7	25	44	6	2.598 (.751)	2

33b) In my country in 2020, the proportion of academic staff in higher education with long-term or tenured positions is significantly lower than it was in 2000.

N=149	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	19	62	58	7	2.315 (.771)	3

34a) In Europe 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds societal demand, resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a large scale.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	12	54	73	10	2.414 (.751)	8

N=157	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	1	7	82	61	3.217 (.614)	6

Second round:

N=84	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	3	24	45	9	2.741 (.703)	1

N=82	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	0	2	29	51	3.598 (.541)	2

34b) In my country in 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds societal demand resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a large scale.

N=151	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	14	48	69	15	2.497 (.808)	5

35a) In Europe 2020, the academic staff structure in higher education is standardised across all countries and all higher education and research institutions.

Note: The differences in the categories of academic staff across Europe have disappeared – there is now a common classification with agreed-upon job titles (Europrofessor A, Europrofessor B, etc.), but not necessarily equal salary scales.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	4	40	86	18	2.654 (.695)	8

N=156	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	60	55	17	2.321 (.825)	15

Second round:

N=84	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	0	7	60	17	3.119 (.524)	0

N=83	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	5	19	50	6	2.713 (.697)	3

35b) In my country in 2020, the academic staff structure in higher education is standardised across all higher education and research institutions.

N=149	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	23	55	56	10	2.289 (.838)	5

36) In Europe 2020, vast differences in academic salaries still exist across countries.

N=158	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	49	90	16	1	1.778 (.637)	2

N=156	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	4	36	89	13	2.532 (.690)	14

37a) In Europe 2020, it is common practice in all countries for higher education institutions to select their students at both bachelors and masters levels.

N=158	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	34	76	33	2	1.854 (.740)	13

N=158	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	27	80	29	4	1.835 (.754)	18

Second round:

N=84	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	14	57	10	0	1.951 (.545)	3

N=84	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	16	53	6	5	2.000 (.729)	4

37b) In my country in 2020, it is common practice for higher education institutions to select their students at both bachelors and masters levels.

N=152	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	32	65	37	7	1.980 (.836)	11

38a) In 2020, the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world's most dynamic knowledge economy has clearly failed. The most excellent research is still done elsewhere (e.g. United States, South East Asia, China).

N=158	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	20	79	40	5	2.013 (.745)	14

N=157	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	2	2	70	76	3.312 (.618)	7

38b) In 2020, my country has failed to make its full contribution to meeting the objectives of the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world's most dynamic knowledge economy.

N=154	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	14	63	53	11	2.227 (.804)	13

39a) In Europe 2020, the emphasis in undergraduate studies is much more on broad education ('Bildung') than on the transmission of pragmatic job-relevant knowledge and skills.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	12	68	63	2	2.212 (.678)	11

N=155	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	15	67	55	6	2.181 (.750)	12

39b) In my country in 2020, the emphasis in undergraduate studies is much more on broad education ('Bildung') than on the transmission of pragmatic job-relevant knowledge and skills.

N=151	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	14	63	61	5	2.272 (.725)	8

40a) In Europe 2020, more than 40% of masters students hold a bachelors degree from a different institution (possibly but not necessarily in another country).

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	13	65	66	3	2.263 (.693)	9

N=154	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	34	88	13	0	1.617 (.615)	19

40b) In my country in 2020, more than 40% of masters students hold a bachelors degree from a different institution (possibly but not necessarily in another country).

N=152	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	10	55	70	13	2.513 (.750)	4

41a) In Europe 2020, technological breakthroughs have made 'anytime, anyplace learning' the dominant learning mode.

Note: Lecture hall complexes have become less important although institutions still use laboratories for skills training, and seminar rooms for face-to-face contact in a 'blended learning mode'.

N=158	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	13	53	74	10	2.411 (.759)	8

N=152	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	10	51	70	9	2.355 (.750)	12

41b) In my country in 2020, technological breakthroughs have made 'anytime, anyplace learning' the dominant learning mode.

N=152	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	7	52	73	14	2.539 (.729)	6

42) In Europe 2020, more than 50% of academic journals are e-journals, owned and controlled by academics themselves.

Note: Academics have won the battle with the publisher – the e-journals are prestigious and subscribers pay only a modest subscription.

N=158	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	27	71	42	2	1.918 (.758)	16

N=157	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	46	70	19	2	1.599 (.750)	20

43a) In Europe 2020, only a few universities consider making an independent and critical contribution to intellectual and cultural life to be an important part of their mission.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	6	35	86	24	2.739 (.736)	6

N=156	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	3	6	66	78	3.365 (.670)	3

Second round:

N=84	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	2	19	39	22	2.988 (.778)	2

N=83	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	2	3	26	50	3.531 (.691)	2

43b) In my country in 2020, only a few universities consider making an independent and critical contribution to intellectual and cultural life to be an important part of their mission.

N=151	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	8	32	74	36	2.901 (.816)	1

V. Institutional Governance and Management

44a) In the European university of 2020, there is a clear split between teaching, research and community service functions – this split is reflected in organisational structures, sources of revenue and staffing policies.

Note: The tasks of the university have become more complex and distinct, forcing institutions to set up different organisational structures for different tasks. This has also had consequences for salaries and other conditions of employment.

N=155	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	17	71	53	3	2.219 (.717)	11

N=157	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	42	67	23	2.459 (.855)	16

44b) In my country's universities in 2020, there is a clear split between teaching, research and community service functions – this split is reflected in organisational structures, sources of revenue and staffing policies.

N=150	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	64	57	11	2.347 (.748)	9

45a) In Europe 2020, the typical higher education institution is managed in a business-like way, stressing efficiency and productivity.

Note: Methods of strategic, financial and human resources management are by and large similar to those encountered in the for-profit sector. This does not necessarily mean that higher education is seen or run as a (for-profit) business.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	29	97	26	1	1.943 (.625)	4

N=156	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	18	83	38	8	2.115 (.748)	9

45b) In my country in 2020, the typical higher education institution is managed in a business-like way, stressing efficiency and productivity.

N=152	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	18	85	44	5	2.237 (.698)	0

46a) In Europe 2020, control over educational courses and programmes has shifted to institutional executives and managers and to external stakeholders.

Note: In 2020, the determining influence of professionals (academics) over the content of educational courses and programmes has diminished.

N=157	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	2	54	84	7	2.484 (.617)	10

N=155	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	3	25	79	33	2.723 (.768)	15

46b) In my country in 2020, control over educational courses and programmes has shifted to institutional executives and managers and to external stakeholders.

N=152	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	3	38	89	16	2.697 (.656)	6

47a) In Europe 2020, higher education management has developed into a recognisable professional career.

Note: This 'professionalisation' is evidenced by the fact that it is common practice for institutional executives and managers to move from one institution to another over the course of their careers, that there is an extensive range of educational programmes to prepare higher education managers and to enhance their skills, and that executives and managers are well-paid.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	28	97	21	1	1.853 (.612)	9

N=156	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	42	81	14	5	1.705 (.743)	14

47b) In my country in 2020, higher education management has developed into a recognisable professional career.

N=152	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	19	82	42	1	2.059 (.661)	8

48a) In Europe 2020, well over one-third of all higher education executives are drawn from backgrounds outside higher education.

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	6	69	66	4	2.295 (.648)	11

N=155	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	7	49	58	16	2.213 (.879)	25

48b) In my country in 2020, well over one-third of all higher education executives are drawn from backgrounds outside higher education.

N=150	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	6	45	78	10	2.467 (.704)	11

49a) In Europe 2020, a majority of higher education institutions are amalgamations or federations of previously independent entities.

Note: Mergers and other forms of organisational integration – nationally or cross border– are widespread ('big is beautiful').

N=156	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	17	56	65	5	2.205 (.770)	13

N=155	Very desirable	Desirable	Not desirable	Highly undesirable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	9	56	65	6	2.194 (.754)	19

49b) In my country in 2020, a majority of higher education institutions are amalgamations or federations of previously independent entities.

N=150	Very probable	Probable	Not probable	Highly improbable	Average (standdev)	No opinion
I think this situation is	13	50	67	11	2.387 (.785)	9

Part 2

The CHEPS Scenarios on the European Higher Education and Research Landscape 2020

4 Centralia, the City of the Sun

Don F. Westerheijden, Jasmin Beverwijk, Harry F. de Boer and Marc Kaulisch

> The greater part of the city is built upon a high hill, which rises from an extensive plain, but several of its circles extend for some distance beyond the base of the hill, which is of such a size that the diameter of the city is upward of two miles, so that its circumference becomes about seven. On account of the humped shape of the mountain, however, the diameter of the city is really more than if it were built on a plain.
>
> It is divided into seven rings or huge circles named from the seven planets, and the way from one to the other of these is by four streets and through four gates, that look toward the four points of the compass.
>
> Tomasso Campanella, *The City of the Sun* (1623)

Jolly Old World

Europe in 2020 is the Jolly Old World. There is a greying but rich population with much leisure, living in a patchwork of small and large countries with long histories and many different languages and institutions, even though many of the countries (37 since the accession of Moldova and Belarus in 2018) are united in an increasingly strong European Union. Time travellers from 2004 would easily recognise Europe and most of its higher education and research infrastructure, though perhaps not the names above the entrances. The majority of universities and public research centres have remained as public centres of discovery and knowledge dissemination, but often as sites or campuses that are part of large (national) institutions. The big institutions regularly cooperate in international associations or consortia – often under the friendly but firm guidance of EU civil servants from Brussels.

Students and Structure in a Multi-Level Government Structure

Student numbers have declined in the last years before 2020 due to the demographic shifts already in motion at the end of the 20th century. The reduction only became noticeable in the last couple of years as the participation rate of young people in higher education simultaneously rose to over 60%. The positive trend of the first 15 years of the 21st century was reinforced by the remarkable growth in mature students, since life-long learning became the actual standard in Europe's dynamic knowledge economy. Yet that source of growth also proved to have limits, even though with 'life-long' we now mean learning until two to three years before retirement, which is 71 to 73 in most EU countries, except Italy that is still trying to catch up and stands at 68 at the moment. Yet at the same time, the working week is reduced to 32 hours for every employee above 51–56 (depending on the collective agreements in the different industries). It is this fair share of leisure that makes Old Europe so jolly. Universities

have jumped in with study programmes not only for career-related teaching (usually in cost-covering contracts with employers), but also as social service to 'third age' citizens seeking to use their leisure time intellectually and creatively. In this way the European linguistic and cultural diversity was promoted in this mostly innocent sphere of life, which acted as an outlet for 'neo-arcadianism' (explained below), while most EU support went to economically more relevant areas of study. However, in Jolly Old Europe, that means not only technology and the like, but also 'quality of life' industry (health, (cultural) entertainment, tourism, etc.).

The reduction in student numbers took place notwithstanding the growing demand from students in Southeast Asia, but in the global risk society (a popular euphemism for the never-abating fear for terrorism) the EU has implemented a restrictive visa policy: only accepting students wanting to migrate to Europe permanently in order to fill in jobs in branches of industry where labour shortages are most pressing and cannot be alleviated by further 'technologisation' to increase productivity, but discouraging mobility only for study. Some countries in the North and West (UK, Ireland, Sweden, the Netherlands) are slightly more open, as they have entered Vocational and Higher Education on their EU-list of official state-export products. But that does not show in the aggregate EU statistics. Registration has become necessary in the post-GATS, public, controlled-trade world. Globalisation as such has not ended, of course, but in the global risk society, free movement of persons across 'world blocs' has almost come to a standstill at least to the most integrated 'blocs', i.e. the USA and the EU. Movement of goods and especially information is where the bulk of globalisation since 2000 is to be found – those movements that can be strictly controlled without infringement on the *habeas corpus* principle.

Study programmes are organised in Bachelor, Master and Doctorate levels (B, M and D). After some debate in the first decade of the century, 3+2+3 became the standard structure, although officially it is expressed as 180+120+180 ECTS. The Commission of the European Union as the ultimate authority standardised this structure, but in a brilliant dialectic move (or was it a political compromise?) made the whole $x+y+z$ discussion obsolete at the same time: it is the graduate's competence as shown in the European Graduate Competence Test of the appropriate level (EGCT-B, -M, -D) that determines whether students get the right to be awarded an officially recognised degree. European-wide acceptance by all ministries of education of the EGCT was the main achievement of the Bologna-II process 2010-2015, which was led by the staff of the European Union Commissioner of Knowledge & Innovation Society. The EGCT itself has become another successful 'export product' of the Brussels Directorate-General Knowledge & Innovation Society (DG-KIS) to EU-associated countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Northern Africa from Egypt to Morocco. The DG-KIS is an outstanding example of the new type of government organisation that has emerged: a clear and strong role for government and its programming and planning instruments along with the associated budget mechanisms, regulation and coordination among the many levels of government from the EU down to countries, regions/states and municipalities. But the DG-KIS is also apt to work in partnership with the private sector. Of course, in public-private partnerships the DG-KIS tend to take the leading role even when working with global companies, but they adapt easily to the market

mores and regularly use well-designed price mechanisms as a governance instrument as well. Moreover, as the EGCT example shows, they are quite confident about the quality of their policies and engage in policy export to parties outside the EU.

Most teaching takes place on-campus and face-to-face, although 'blended mode learning' with a strong ICT component is widely used in about half of the EU thanks to the Terabyte Public European Subscription Network that (though not free!) reaches almost every home in the Northern and Western parts of the Union. Students are carefully guided through the programmes. This is not just a consequence of careful module design resulting from prior experience with online course design. With the ever-smaller age cohorts, the European knowledge economy cannot afford to lose any talent and The EU's Talent Programme has stimulated universities in this respect. Moreover, in the standard public-private partnership mode ('standard' meaning with a leading role of the public partner), the EU has enlisted the cooperation of the private sector. Companies can and do give (tax deductible) stipends to promising students. This happens anonymously to ensure fairness. Students are selected for stipends through the national and European Talent banks – online databases of all students' study results, making their study a continuous competition for these generous stipends. Next to the tax deductibility, acceptance of such stipends means that the graduates promise to work for at least three years after graduation with one of the companies in the Talent Stipend Fund. The EU's civil service is one of the main contributors to this Fund, and one of the most popular destinations for the Talent Programme graduates, because of its high salaries, cooperative work atmosphere, and important role in the European society ('you really make a difference to Europe's society', as respondents in the annual EU Graduate Labour Monitor often say).

In some EU countries, which, persisting in their national traditions have few legal barriers against foreign direct investment and foreign university campuses, there are some campuses of non-EU higher education institutions.[1] In these countries, significant portions of students (ca. 15%) take their higher education degrees in foreign operated institutions. Many of those students, once they have graduated from the more prestigious international higher education institutions, start dazzling careers in international businesses. Graduates from public universities more often enter civil service or tertiary industry (private service industry) for the European market – still not bad for a career; a higher education degree and subsequent life-long learning trajectory remains the best gateway to a good career. A minor observation – it is so self-evident: – practically all graduates make a career. In the European knowledge economy everyone finds jobs where their competences come to good use (in other words: there are no problem of unemployment or over-schooling. The career situation is less bright only for those who have fallen for the shrewd marketing of less-reputable

[1] The term 'higher education institution' is only used for foreign institutions of which the university status may be in some doubt. In Europe, all types of higher education institution have been re-baptized 'universities', but as will be shown below, there are significant differences between the classes of B-, M- and D-universities.

non-European private higher education institutions,[2] especially active in the South and East of the EU. While diploma mills have been almost weeded out through strict fraud control and accreditation, some prospective students apparently do not read the official online database. After all, not everyone has access to the Terabyte Network, however much the EU has tried to make it affordable for all even in the poorer regions of its area.

The obligatory semester in another EU country aside,[3] more than 85% of students take their B degree and 70% their M degree in their home country.[4] At the D level, the European Research Council clearinghouse ensures that the best candidates get to the best places all over the EU and that they get appropriate grants or stipends.

Which brings us to the matter of fees. The dazzling international careers of private university graduates make up for the tuition fees that are usually much higher in the foreign private universities than in the public ones – on average. In the EU countries, universities are free to set their own fee levels – within governmentally defined limits. Ranges are rather large in Northern (coming quite a long way since Sweden's 1977 reforms and Network Norway days) and Southern Europe, but narrow remarkably in the Rhinelander democracies of western continental Europe and in the East. Limits to fee ranges are argued on the ground of social justice (no barriers for entry) and to keep the governmental universal student support systems, which were introduced in all countries to facilitate EU-wide 'portability' within limits (the higher the average fee, the higher the average support per student).[5] In 2006, the European Cartel Agency decided that fee levels in any one study programme within a university must be the same for all students: same product, same price principle. European Court cases against fee differences between universities, built on the argument that uniform accreditation means uniform products, hence uniform prices, have however been rejected as they would support collusion. There seems to be a fragile balance between university autonomy, anti-cartel rules and the different governments' roles in upholding social justice. On the other hand, no means-tested exceptions were allowed by the Cartel Agency; the European Court is expected to decide on that in a test case late in 2020. Chances for the plaintiff, a young student of physiotherapy from new EU member country Albania, are expected to be slim but one never knows with the intricate multi-level European legal system.

[2] The reader may have missed private universities from the EU, but this is such a negligible quantity that it can be ignored here. Their already small number has dropped especially since in the Bologna-II process the principle that higher education is a public good has been taken seriously and national governments, with EU subsidies, have bought out most owners and integrated them in their public systems.

[3] Obligatory for EAA accreditation. It is rumoured that the EU Commission required this quality criterion when it agreed to take over 55% of the funding of the EAA (40% being funded by the national governments involved, the remaining 5% coming from industry sources).

[4] What should not be forgotten: although it falls short of the EU target of 50% mobility, it is a tremendous advance over figures at the turn of the century, when in most European countries one counted foreign B and M graduates in fractions of a percent.

[5] Student support portability facilitated greatly the obligatory Semester Abroad Programme.

Quality Issues

Until now, the uniform degree structure did not mean uniform higher education quality. Generally, there is a gradient with high level (D) teaching and most basic research taking place in the North and West of Europe, while universities in the South and East are more frequently limited to B-level teaching. Some universities in this latter region, however, are in higher education tiers; often those situated in national capitals. This is clear from the data of the EU's Aalto-classification.[6]

Many development and innovation laboratories are, however, located in the South and East, because of the cheaper mid-level researchers there; their high-level colleagues in the North and West are daily video-conferencing with their team members through the Terabyte Network and regularly take the (cheap) plane or high-speed train there. Some companies have shifted their R&D capacity to the South and East completely, using the lower costs of living and the pleasant climate to attract even the high-level researchers. For this reason, in recent years the Constantia-Varna Strip on the Black Sea coast of Romania and Bulgaria has become a popular high-tech area.[7]

Formally, the European higher education system has an elite D-university[8] sector with strict academic selection criteria next to an officially equally selective but in practice open higher education sector (B- and M-universities). [9]

The European Accreditation Agency (EAA) tries to impose common standards on its national or regional subsidiaries, focused on employability competences as quality criteria, but with a 20% time for '*Bildung'* requirement in the B-phase (in practice mainly taken up by the training for the obligatory language test for graduates[10]), going down to 12% in M and 8% in D-phases.

But the practice is sometimes harder than the principle. A big group of D-universities from the North and West have petitioned with the Commissioner of Knowledge & Innovation Society – and lobbied in Brussels together with their national governments, which were eager to gain academic prestige for their country in the friendly yet serious

[6] Aalto stands for Academic Accreditation List & Tertiary education Observatory, but it also is the name of a Finnish designer and (university) architect. His name may not be quite as famous as the American Carnegie, but the name for Europe's university classification signals Europe's pride of its culture.

[7] We could have mentioned this example also below, in the paragraph on successful (Eu)regional innovation areas.

[8] A 'D-university' is a university actually teaching at the Doctorate level in at least three disciplines. D-universities have preferential access to European Research Council (ERC) funds.

[9] Compared with D-universities, they use 'equal but different' criteria of selection, more on practical or professional competences of candidates. But in practice this sector is rather open for access as the younger age cohorts have dwindled and the pool of mature students has been fully used since ca. 2017.

[10] Two major European languages (usually English, and German or Spanish – the latter also useful in contacts with the rapidly growing economies of Latin American), next to obligatory introductory courses in Putonghua (Chinese). Only countries with strong foreign language teaching in secondary schools are able to use the '*Bildung*'-compartment for 'general education'.

intra-European competition – for a separate, higher, status, saying that the EU-quality standards 'were not a challenge' for them. They achieved such status in 2014. On the other hand, regional and national authorities in less-privileged areas of the EU and associated countries keep lobbying for local quality criteria to be accepted rather than the strict application of the immense set of EAA criteria. Luckily, only eight of the new-generation DVDs can store all the qualimetric[11] information, which otherwise would take a truckload of paper reports – or almost a whole night of online sending even through the Terabyte Public European Subscription Network (most universities prefer to use the 4thG-DVDs, as the universities' institutional managements are very strict on economy, while data-intensive corporate use of the Terabyte Network is expensive.[12] Interestingly, private accreditation agencies have not made much of an inroad in Eastern Europe, but have been able to gain market share in the more profitable up-end of the market in Western Europe, where they can give highly-esteemed (and highly-priced) additional accreditations to Europe-wide recruiting D-universities, who see the collection of multiple accreditations as a successful strategy in the race for worldwide academic prestige.

Most universities are satisfied with the current state of accrediting all programmes, but only at eight years' intervals. A long cycle proved to be necessary for accreditation agencies to reduce their workload. Originally they advocated an 18-year cycle, but this could be dramatically reduced by the qualimetric revolution and associated semi-automatic renewal of accreditation based on computerised data analysis. Site visits are only added for new programmes and in smartly sampled cases.
After all these years, there still is no clear correlation between accreditation status and student demand for places in individual universities. In the dwindling student market, large sums are therefore spent on marketing universities especially through Personal Communication Aides,[13] the Internet, on Euro-satellite TV and, in some less 'knowledge-economy intensive' regions, even in old-fashioned radio and newspapers. This may seem contradictory in the public sector, but in most national higher education systems, government funding is connected directly or indirectly to student numbers and/or graduates to keep them teaching-focused (not easy with the prospect of dwindling student numbers and the exciting earning opportunities in knowledge-economic research). EU basic grants (not the earmarked project funds, of course) in turn often match national funding algorithms. Marketing is therefore an instrument in governmental budget maximisation games.

[11] As everyone knows, qualimetry was the great contribution of Professor Tatur & associates when the Russian presidency of the Bologna process finally settled the criteria & measurement conflict in ENQA, in 2009. Since the introduction of these HE-specific datasets and procedures, the discussion about ISO9000-2006 in higher education has petered out.
[12] For private use, it is not expensive, through an EU-controlled pricing system. However, the Terabyte Network still is not available in all newer EU countries; works on the dedicated antennae are going on though slowly.
[13] PCAs, integrating mobile phones, personal digital assistants, personal TVs, laptop PCs and the like. As one can personalise them to such an extent, the 'e' in 'aide' was added intentionally.

A little more needs to be said about student access. Next to the access of young students with secondary education diplomas (which have superseded entrance examinations, as they give higher value to social justice), access based on recognition of previously acquired competences has become very important to all universities throughout Europe; again resulting from the smaller pool of young students but also because life-long learning has become such a standard practice. Brussels has organised recognition of prior competences through its European Universal Qualifications Framework (EUQaF). The EUQaF is in 2020 still experimental, as it proved to be extremely complicated to find a common denominator amongst the more than thirty national frameworks. The EU has been working on the EUQaF since 2005, the moment such qualification frameworks had to be introduced nationally according to the Bologna process.

For exchange of individual modules there is a radical extension of ECTS for the integrated sectors of Vocational and Higher Education (ECTS-VHE).[14] This lies at the basis of the obligatory Semester Abroad, mentioned before, but also helped students to 'mix & match' course modules from different universities all across the EU. This now is a widespread practice, and almost 76% of B-students take one or more modules from universities abroad (1.12 on average), even though, again as mentioned already, most degrees are finally taken in the home country. In total 89% take some modules at other universities, including other universities in the home country. Note that in the dominant blended learning mode, taking a module at a foreign university means only a limited time abroad and much work from behind the PCA at home; local particularist value sets are only slightly influenced in this practice. Still, the increased mobility of students (and especially graduates!) clearly has helped the social cohesion within the EU (strengthening the 'neo-arcadian' trend).

But let us get back to education. In quite a few cases, B-universities in the South and East have been successful in reaching EAA accreditation standards by using standardised course modules produced by prestigious public D-universities in the North and West, which are distributed by equally prestigious commercial publishing houses from the same countries. Typically, content is made in Germany; language editing takes place in Ireland; design in Italy; software is made in Bangalore, India; then all is printed in Hong Kong, packed in Vietnam and transported back to Europe by the All-Korean merchant fleet). Still, graduates from these universities do not perform well in the European civil service concourses. These biannual concourses are the *de facto* quality standard in most disciplines, on top of the European Graduate Competence Test, as candidates' concourse results are used not only for access to the EU civil service, but also for other semi-independent European agencies, universities, and even by many private companies to determine eligibility for jobs. Recent educational research (Hendriks *et al.*, 2018) suggests that the face-to-face teaching still in use in those parts of Europe cannot transmit the same type of information-age competences that are being tested in these European concourses (which of course take

[14] A result of the fusion of the Bologna-II and the Copenhagen processes. (The Copenhagen process aimed at enhanced cooperation in vocational education and training.)

place online, through the Terabyte connection). TV journalists when interviewing Hendriks maintained that the large unexplained variance in her research was explained very easily by the corruption in entrance processes and examinations. Hendriks riposted that corruption to gain entrance or degrees, if any, must be on the way out now that higher education is becoming a buyers' market in the new demographic conditions. Some politicians nevertheless have picked up on these research results but been unable to gain political support to investigate corruption due to the combined opposition in the European Parliament of the last remaining populists and the 'new-arcadian parties' that have been on the rise in recent elections.

Interlude: The Neo-Arcadian Political Context

Jolly Old Europe has seen some important political changes in the years before 2020. As the Japanese News Network (JNN) recently said in a documentary about Europe, it is an area that is inward looking and friendly, but difficult to access for outsiders. The 'Neo-arcadian parties' is the label given to the collection of parties (comprising many different ones, from right to left) who have a paternalistic (or maternalistic) view on politics for European societies: focusing on common values, solidarity within Europe, an important steering role for the government, and downplaying the role of global competition (while paying lip service to the belief that competition is good to raise quality of service). 'Neo-arcadian' politics are the next step after harsh populism. Sociologically speaking, it depicts Europe as a *Gemeinschaft* rather than as a *Gesellschaft*. Yet only insiders know that this is mainly rhetoric. Behind the gentle public political façade the 2007-2011 technocrat take-over in Brussels led to silent competition with the USA. But as usual, if two dogs fight for a bone, the third runs away with it, and East Asia is really the economic and knowledge world power by its force in numbers, however much progress the EU has made in top-level quality for the knowledge society.

In higher education and research 'neo-arcadian' politics especially means a focus on the public good character[15] of education and basic research, equal access for all income classes and all EU member state citizens, and barriers for foreigners on the European market. The 'neo-arcadian' trend expresses itself in university management especially in the regular overhaul of universities' mission statements. They all emphasise the critical role of the university in society, but according to the 25th anniversary web site of the EUA Institutional Evaluation Programme (web site accessed in October 2019), its institutional evaluation teams found the phrases were neither connected to the actual EAA quality criteria that define the study programmes, nor to the research programmes

[15] After all these years, economist Professor Jongbloed still has not managed to make clear to any but fellow-economists that only 'collective good' is a well-defined term; 'public good' remains a – popular – rhetoric mess.

in the faculties governing basic research, nor to the University Ethics Committees'[16] control over teaching and research contracts with industry. And behind the scenes strict economy remains the bottom line of institutional management.

The EU has continued its slow but inexorable rise to importance. Around the turn of the century, about 50% of regulations were already influenced by the EU. In 2020 this has risen to more than 75%. The legitimacy in the eyes of the general public of 'Brussels' has risen much after the four-year European Governance Crisis – and rightly so – although quite fitting with the 'neo-arcadian' trend there is simultaneously a strong emotional binding with local values, languages and institutions. This governance crisis was caused by the accession of five Southeastern European countries in 2007 and led to a stalemate in all political forums (the councils of ministers, especially, did not succeed in making a single decision all that time). The crisis ended with the signing of the Dubrovnik Treaty, also called the Croatian European Constitution, because a constitution delineating powers and responsibilities in the EU is what it was, in fact. In the four years of this crisis, the DGs and their civil servants in Brussels actually gained a lot of room to manoeuvre, and they have not given up this power position in or after Dubrovnik. It was all for the benefit of Europe, as the highly-talented civil servants could move much faster when they were not hindered by the political decision-makers who were too busy disagreeing, vetoing, and placating their respective national audiences. Since then, the Bologna and Bologna-II processes picked up speed, the EAA was established, etc.

Organisation of Higher Education and Research Institutions

Most higher education and research organisations have grown much in size since the beginning of the century, such as through mergers – either voluntary or 'stimulated' by national and European governments. Smaller countries now have a single national multi-campus university. In larger countries, regional governments have reached similar solutions (the federal University of Wales became an unexpectedly popular study object, but in most cases the governments preferred more centralised universities). Mergers made economies of scale possible in administration and some in the primary processes of research and teaching, but especially in development of teaching materials, which has become much more elaborate because of the careful blended learning concepts needed for the Talent Programme. The latter move has even gone further, as mentioned before, making some universities specialise in developing materials that are now used all over Europe. Another advantage of merging was that it gave a safer position (larger 'cushion'), which could be useful for global players in the North and West. We mentioned that in some EU countries, higher education and

[16] University Ethics Committees (EUCs) are a structure recommended by the EUA; most universities follow these guidelines. Hard-liners saw in these UECs another sign of 'neo-arcadian' politics, others attacked them for infringing academic freedom, but the majority of academics, students and politicians see them as defenders of academic freedom and institutional autonomy against commercialisation, just like in the 1970s.

research are official export products. For this reason, the Oxbridge merger finally took place in 2013, making the two oldest British universities a powerhouse in research that could take on any competitor from the USA or Asia.

At the same time, their safe inclusion in the public sphere keeps the universities and research institutions relatively simple: enough so to be centrally managed successfully. Relations with external stakeholders are important but the border of the organisation is clear: management is on the inside and stakeholders remain on the outside. Institutional management has developed into a career path, mainly for academics that have taken an additional M degree in higher education management (most from Bath, Kassel or Valencia). Some positions in university management are given to representatives of external stakeholders (industry, but especially governmental agencies from Brussels). The continued emphasis of institutional governance by academics (albeit academics with a management-career outlook) did much to keep academic freedom a major value in the universities. Another development showing the same value orientation was EU subsidies and intellectual freedom regulations (not only education but also knowledge is a public good). The majority of scholarly journals published in Europe have been wrestled out of the control of globalised publishing houses and come back into academic ownership.

Personnel policy has grown in importance for the universities even though civil service status ('tenure') remains the dominant mode of employment. Staff mobility is considerable owing to big salary differences across countries and across universities (D-universities of course pay much more than M-universities, which are still better employers than the poor B-universities in any country), together with the transparent (since 33 of 37 EU member countries use the Euro currency) and barrier-free European labour market.[17]

The bottom-line nevertheless remains the economic viability of the laboratory or university. Public enterprises cannot afford to go bankrupt – Brussels is very strict on that after some hard lessons. Therefore, many institute directors and university presidents are economists, accountants, public administrators, or from similar bottom-line minded backgrounds.

Research

There is a clear distinction between the public-good type research ('basic research', a term back in fashion in the post-Mode-2 research era) in the public research facilities including D- and M-universities on the one hand and private R&D on the other. Private R&D is of an applied nature and focused on the interest of the company. In the last twenty years, patents and other commercial-type indicators have not increased much for university researchers. External stakeholders, the same companies that help

[17] The third factor is language: with every university graduate, let alone university teacher/researcher speaking at least two 'major' European languages and the official right to teach in higher education in a 'major' language, a dialectic synthesis has been reached: language diversity is preserved but overcome at the same time.

set research agendas in public higher education and research institutions, feel somewhat frustrated because EU regulations and (prestigious!) ERC grants, such as those of the 13th Framework Programme-A (Academic; as opposed to Programme-B for Business, in public-private partnership mode) keep higher education and research institutions mostly focused on basic research. The results of this rather strict separation between the public and private spheres have been quite successful in developing some of the most advanced innovations of recent years. Both (merged) universities such as the Technical Universities of Niederdeutschland and the Netherlands (TUNN) and company laboratories such as (in the same countries) the one of Philips-Siemens have made important contributions. 'Every institution its own trade' has proven to be a successful adagio. The example also shows the importance of regional (Niedersachsen and Northrhine-Westphalia, in this case) and national (the Netherlands) governments overcoming state boundaries: cross-national mergers had not been successful before 2011. As in many cases since that time, the direct intervention of Brussels (through re-invigorated Euregios) has been a key factor in this success.

The Lisbon agenda, operationalised in the 3%-target of 2002, was partially successful. The target was reached in the EU-25 in 2012 (the newer members were not counted in the statistics for this process, but they are on a rapid catch-up track well-funded by Brussels). The European economies have become quite knowledge-intensive; the societies caught up soon after by reducing the cohesion gaps between regions and classes. An important instrument in reaching the 3%-target has been the European Research Council (ERC), which disburses large subsidies for international research projects, networks and institutions. The subordinated national research councils provide mid- and small-size subsidies for research at the national level. These national research council subsidies are only open to foreign researchers in consortia with national universities. National and sub-national governments still pay the highest share of public research (in all kinds of public research institutions), some 45% of the total research budget. The total ERC and EU contribution is about 25%. Industry contracts make up for the remainder (30%), which is a constant source of tension as industries claim they pay too much. They also have to contribute to research through the substantial taxes they pay to national and European governments.

The positive picture sketched just now should not hide the fact that much R&D has gone out of Europe to cheap academic labour countries. These countries are in Asia, of course, but Latin America is not to be forgotten. The Southern African Development Council area is said to harbour the 'tigers of the 2020s'. The Lisbon-2000 aim to make Europe the most competitive knowledge economy proved to be too ambitious. Accordingly, since 2011 attention has been geared more to minimising the information gap within Europe than on remaining competitive in the 'mass innovation' areas. Investing in the 'quality of life' areas proved to be a more successful strategy, especially given the amount of leisure of the most wealthy age cohorts in the European population. After all, we are talking about Jolly Old Europe, here.

5 Octavia, the Spider-Web City

Jürgen Enders, Frans Kaiser, Henno Theisens and Hans Vossensteyn

> Now I will tell how Octavia, the spider-web city, is made. There is a precipice between two steep mountains: the city is over the void, bound to the two crests with ropes and chains and catwalks. You walk on the little wooden ties, careful not to set your foot in the open spaces, or you cling to the hempen strands. Below there is nothing for hundreds and hundreds of feet: a few clouds glide past; farther down you can glimpse the chasm's bed. This is the foundation of the city: a net which serves as passage and as support. All the rest, instead of rising up, is hung below: rope ladders, hammocks, houses made like sacks, clothes hangers, terraces like gondolas, skins of water, gas jets, spits, baskets on strings, dumb-waiters, showers, trapezes and rings for children's games, cable cars, chandeliers, pots with trailing plants. Suspended over the abyss, the life of Octavia's inhabitants is less uncertain than in other cities. They know the net will last only so long.
>
> Italo Calvino: *The Invisible Cities* (1972)

In 2020, the idea of the University (with a capital U) as a single concept has diminished in the face of multiple missions and visions of higher education and research that have stimulated further institutional differentiation and diffusion. This unbinding of the university has strengthened the many tangible hands of networks that have become the main modes of coordination within universities as well as between institutions and other providers and consumers. True, the visible hand of the state and the invisible hand of the market have their role to play but 'networking' is now the name of the game. Today's society is not characterised by the triumph of one rationality over others – whether it is the 'market' that has metaphorically diffused everywhere, the 'welfare state' that has lost control while gaining in interconnectedness, scientific rationality or socio-technological relevance that are increasingly interwoven with each other and with society. What typifies society is the blurring of the boundaries between previously functionally differentiated subsystems that now search for new forms of horizontal and vertical integration via the web.

Simply speaking, universities are as much driven by these co-evolutionary processes[1] as they are drivers of them. These processes are themselves interwoven with the globalisation of the economy and the individualisation of the life course. It is this complex social dynamic that pushes universities to seek and create nodes that will link them with each other and with society in manifold 'elasticities'.

[1] The concept of 'co-evolution' precisely refers to a set of simultaneous developments where it is unclear which is the cause and which the effect, or if they are causally linked at all.

The European Policy Landscape

The EC (European Consortium) of 2020 consists of 37 member countries (including new members Belarus, Moldavia, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) and 10 associate world-wide partners (including Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Mozambique and South Africa).[2] Political responsibility for higher education and research is integrated into the overall policy networks for socio-economic development and innovation, and spread over a multi-layered web of local, (inter-)regional and (multi-)national institutions. This integrated approach to open coordination helped enormously in overcoming traditional sectoral departmentalism and the fragmentation of education, research, science and technology policies. Numerous ways of involving experts and stakeholders in a more systematic and participatory manner added to the legitimacy of these policy networks. However, the sheer number and shifting composition of the various networks, task forces and working groups for Strategic Development and Innovation (SDI) and Socio-Technological Inventions (STI)[3] make it difficult for the observer (and the actors involved) to identify where authority and responsibility are actually located.[4]

The Skyline of the Knowledge Economy

On first sight, the skyline of the knowledge economy seems to be more simply structured than in earlier decades with the few big towers of global companies clearly dominant. These companies show little commitment to national or regional affairs in higher education and research. Closer to the ground the nodes and links between SMEs and the local and regional working units of global companies form the back-bone of knowledge-intensive production, service and consumption – and of the labour market for knowledge workers. The globalisation of knowledge formation and transfer and the individualisation of the life course (with shifting and multi-faceted group identities) have had a profound impact on labour markets and on forms of work. 'Standard employment' has eroded to such an extent that yesterday's exception (part-time, temporary and self- employment; movement between sectors, employers, and types of work) is today's rule. Network technologies such as the Internet under-pinned the construction of information and social webs across companies and countries. On this labour market for knowledge workers the 'credentials' of 'graduates' are just the first step in the validation of competencies in the workplace. What really counts (and

[2] The end of the Pan-European approach came as a relief to many, especially to those critical of the inward-looking character of inter-European cooperation (establishing cooperation amongst neighbours to counteract pressure from other parts of the world).

[3] Socio-technological inventions as used here are not matters of simple probabilities, rationally calculated by experts with the cold arithmetic of cost-benefit analysis. Rather they are woven into the very fabric of innovation within a world society that is inevitably 'at risk'.

[4] This concern is found mainly amongst political analysts. Most people are quite satisfied with the recent statement of the European Commissioner for Innovation (who is responsible for education and research): 'We do not know exactly how it works, but it works'.

differentiates members of network elites from the mass of net-workers) is social capital, cognitive mobility, qualifications for network sustainability and symbolic production.[5]

The Institutional Landscape

In such conditions of hyper-complexity, successful universities capitalise on the traditional capacities of academic and scientific networks as well as on inter- and intra-organisational networks that are based on reciprocity, trust, and long-term commitment. 'Small units, thick information and multiple webs' is a popular slogan originally coined by the University of Trullala. This metropolitan comprehensive university has de-departmentalised its structures into a holding-like matrix that comprises public, semi-public and private entities for teaching, research and service. Some (jealous) observers call it 'the spider in the web'. For example, its undergraduate teaching is integrated into the European Open University (EOU), a non-profit consortium of on-line providers from 12 countries spread all over Europe. EOU is affiliated with on-line providers on other continents with whom it shares on-campus facilities for international students. Trullala offers courseware and tutorials within the dual-mode approach of the EOU. This combines information and communication technology capacities with elements of face-to-face interaction between teachers and their (probably) more than 400,000 students.[6] The three big science & technology research units of Trullala are affiliated with the Ford-Renault Institute of Technology, a private for-profit institution that works with different basic research units to promote knowledge and technology up-take. The Institute for Metropolitan Innovation at Trullala connects a shifting number of its faculty to regional business and other public and private stakeholders interested in socio-technological inventions.

Cooperation can also lead to new institutional forms within bigger but strongly differentiated organisations. Some universities have disappeared from the landscape altogether following mergers with other universities and/or private R&D organisations. The Technical University of the Netherlands and the Bio-Medical Alps University are two examples of the conglomeration of a number of once 'stand-alone' universities with the private laboratories of multi-national companies. In this construction companies were able to outsource their R&D function without loosening their ties to related innovation capacities. In contrast other universities have decided to organise themselves around more selected disciplinary or professional clusters. The Budapest School of Governance, the Springer-Lingua University and the Institute of Cognitive Science are among the more-well known examples for such multi-disciplinary specialisations in postgraduate training and research.

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[5] Symbolic knowledge workers manipulate words, numbers, images and sounds in order to broker and analyse information and to provide meaning to information so that it can unfold its symbolic-analytical problem-solving capacities.

[6] It is now common wisdom that on-line 'stand alone' courses with all their e-learning facilities are best placed to cater for the diversified needs of a diversified international student body. By blending this approach with face-to-face interaction with teachers and (even more important) other students the EOU and others have realised further learning advantages that flow from social exchange.

In the teaching industry much attention has been given to the rise of the virtual mega-universities such as the EOU, the Anglo-Asian Academy (AAA) and the Delphi-Phoenix Program (DEPP) that operate on a global level with virtual multi-language programmes.[7] The AAA has major home bases in the UK, Australia, China and India and serves more than 600,000 students while DEPP with some 500,000 students has its largest sites in the US, Greece and Egypt.[8] Recent figures confirm, however, that across Europe most undergraduate students still study in national or regional universities. These too offer mixed-programmes based on face-to-face teaching with some ICT-support based on interactive learning and communication. Their major competitive advantage lies in experience-based learning programmes for contextualised knowledge applications that are strongly linked to the local embeddedness of the global knowledge economy. Inter-university alliances between these universities and the many local low cost providers of tertiary education are a widespread phenomenon. Such agreements regulate the cooperation and division of work between the institutions; student, staff and programme exchange; as well as contractual relationships with companies who recruit staff on the university's turf and send employees for further training on a regular basis.

In 2020, the themes of 'change' and 'diversity' dominate any analysis of the horizontally (division of work) and vertically (reputation) stratified European university landscape with its approximately 3,500 universities. A core of more visible and prestigious institutions that see themselves as European Universities are surrounded by a growing number of usually smaller more localised 'Universities in Europe'. Stratification was inevitable. Driven by quantitative (massification and internationalisation) and qualitative (complexity and interconnectedness) growth, it led to increased levels of volatility and fuzziness in the system. The fuzziness encouraged much finer-grain and flexible differentiation of institutions than those of the age of higher education institutional 'types'. Nowadays universities bundle and un-bundle their tasks in teaching, research and service, their (multi-)disciplinary profile, their geographical outreach and their embeddedness in a web of shifting organisational configurations within and beyond the institution.

Obviously, academic leadership and institutional management mean different things and assume different forms according to specific organisational profiles and context. The development and dissemination of professional and ethical standards as well as basic principles and tools for university leadership and management are two of the

[7] All courses and material are made available in English, Spanish, Chinese and Hindi – the latter language was introduced over the protest of Indian academics who argued that English fitted perfectly well with their goals. Many students make use of the Intelligent Interpretation Generator which provides electronic tools for all the possible translation permutations between over 400 major languages and dialects.

[8] The biggest 'university' in the world is probably the Boundaryless Institute of Non-Governmental Organisations (BINGO) although its exact size is uncertain. Its virtual campus and several regional knowledge sites around the globe offer no credit courses or degrees but provide an enormous amount of up-to-date knowledge and know-how. (Many academics who argue that BINGO quality control is quite dubious are known to make use of it themselves).

functions of FLUXUS, the global network of university managers.[9] 'Leadership for change' and 'management of flows' (knowledge and capital) are the names of the governance game in higher education and research – the art of sailing a ship under permanent reconstruction. Consequently, leaders and managers find themselves more involved with people than with structures that will change anyway and are perceived more as temporary enablers.[10] In this context strategic leadership (following the principles of 'distance, morality, responsibility and reform'), network management ('bring the right people together') and personnel policy ('I know my people') form the building blocks for universities' advocacy coalitions and linkages.

Learning-Working Pathways: Students and Structures

Student numbers have not changed dramatically over the first two decades of the 21st century but the composition of the student body certainly has. In Europe's greying societies, the number of younger traditional students has declined and is counter-balanced by a growing number of international students (with the most dramatic increase in postgraduate training[11]), part-timers and life-long learners. Most undergraduate students gather their credits and credentials over the course of a cross-organisational and cross-national learning journey – which makes it no simple task to count student numbers and to ascribe them to an institutional home-base.[12] ICT-networks between universities and other knowledge providers and every-day physical mobility around the globe allow students to mix face-to-face classes with online courses at universities across regions and countries. These patterns of multi-organisational affiliation characterise large parts of the academic professions as well. Public-private researchers, for example, hold shifting contractual relationships with different organisations within the knowledge cycle and wandering academic gypsies (part-time teachers) are usually affiliated to a number of local and regional low cost (and low salary) institutions.[13]

[9] FLUXUS is financed mainly via its 'brain hunting' activities – recruiting academic leaders and mangers 'across the board of knowledge networks'.

[10] The fight between the two schools of thinking in FLUXUS – the Matthew school ('To those who have will be given') and the Robin Hood school ('Take from the rich and give to the poor') is more about the use of financial incentives in universities.

[11] It is estimated that about one-quarter of Europe's Masters-graduates and one-half of its PhD-graduates come from a non-European home country. A first tide of Asian students was followed by a wave of Latin-American students and increasingly students from Africa and the US are adding to the flood.

[12] The most reliable data and information on student numbers is found in the European Higher Education and Research Observatory founded by Professor Frans Kaiser. His data simulation model is based on the premise that you cannot know at the same time the exact numbers and the exact locations of students, graduates and staff.

[13] All organisations, however, are required to follow the basic standards agreed upon between the European Trade Union of Knowledge Workers and the European Association of Knowledge Producers.

In 2020, some kind of Bachelor-Master structure has been implemented in all European countries and for all degrees – you cannot live without it. To enable mutual recognition, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements have been concluded to provide an overview of the bewildering variety of programmes and degrees that has developed within the Ba-Ma structure (3+2 years, 3+1+1 year, 4+1 year) and beyond. Short cycle programmes in under-graduate and post-graduate studies are widespread. Many of them are designed for graduates with work experience and other knowledge workers with a need for further training. Some serve a growing student body of 'life-long learners' whose interest goes beyond the more immediate purposes of the job market. Others are designed to give an innovative push to the labour market to create jobs and positions that do not yet exist but that are predicted to play an important role in the near future. Information and certification services to assist (potential) students to select their 'menu à la carte' and transform it into a readable degree have become a mature business in the learning industry. The recognition of prior learning and (work) experience is also common practice and is coordinated by the International Student Selection and Placement Partner Organisation. Further selection is organised by the universities themselves who adopt different strategies. Some universities have opted to be highly selective to retain their institutions 'small and prestigious' status while others have chosen a strategy of attracting as many students as possible – aiming to become 'big and prestigious'.

At first glance the structures for the 2-year professional doctorate and the 4-year research PhD (usually organised in inter-university doctoral schools) look more straightforward. But the growing international and disciplinary mobility of doctoral students, students moving between professional and research tracks and between different research organisations, and the phenomenon of the so-called mid-career doctorate have all combined to create a much more colourful PhD journey.

All in all, the universities of 2020 are diversified structurally and in terms of modes of study and courses provided. Greater attention is devoted to generic competencies, social skills, and the lifelong learning function. Modular programmes designed for better integration into learning-working pathways, and practical learning beyond the class room have tended to blur the distinction between initial and continuing degree studies as well as between young adult, mid-career, and post-working life training. This trend towards 'life-span' training also reflects the enormous immigration of younger knowledge workers from Asia, Latin-America and increasingly Africa and the US, and the growing demand for the validation of competences (rather than credentials) from the flourishing network economy. In general graduates do well on the European labour market – and increasingly in careers beyond Europe. The growing virtual and physical mobility of students within global university partnerships and networks facilitates not only greater workplace mobility between Europe and the other continents, but also mobility on more equal terms.

Quality Assurance

'Quality' thus stands for supporting a diversified student body to acquire a mixture of skills and knowledge adaptable to new and changing configurations in the workplace and beyond. The European Accreditation Network (that is linked to its counterparts in other regions) works directly with the universities to assure common standards (some call them 'the smallest common denominator'). These are supplemented by international private accreditation agencies (mainly active in business studies, law and medicine where they interact with international professional organisations) some of which employ more selective criteria and promise more prestigious rewards. Many observers believe that the rise of internal quality assessment procedures has had an even stronger influence on the 'culture of quality' within the universities. Periodic reviews by inter-departmental and inter-university bodies together with the widespread use of student assessments and post-graduate labour market surveys provide rich tools for ongoing internal discussions on how to maintain or improve the quality of education.

A number of organisations provide guides with quality rankings based on information provided by the universities themselves or by expert assessors in other institutions. Among these are the bi-annual rankings of undergraduate programmes conducted and published by the magazine *International Higher Education*, and the ranking of doctoral schools every four years by the European Research Council. The most widely used information source is provided by students and academics themselves. The Virtual University Observer is facilitated and fuelled by international student and staff associations. This platform gathers and compares statistical information and university rankings provided by the various higher education and research portals. More importantly, it provides and systematises first hand information on the profile and quality of institutions, services and workplaces in terms of criteria beyond traditional 'academic excellence'.

Funding of Learning

The system of funding for universities has certainly encouraged the various developments in higher education sketched earlier. Government remains the dominant sponsor of higher education institutions but public money now derives from heterogeneous sources for equally heterogeneous purposes. Regional, national and European governmental entities and their arm's length agencies provide some direct subsidies, in many cases designed as matching funds based on contractual relationships. The bulk of public money enters higher education via a European voucher system that covers the right of all citizens to a four- to five-year study period.[14] The vouchers can be used in any EU member state for full cycles of

[14] This funding system came just in time for the (student and teaching intense) social sciences and humanities disciplines that found themselves in a precarious situation during the period when innovation was perceived to be a matter of science & technology only - with all the consequences this had for university funding.

Bachelor- or Master-programmes as well as for certain training modules across the full post-secondary spectrum.[15] The ESB (European Student Bank affiliated with the European Central Bank) organises the money flow and provides further loans to those students who choose more costly study programmes or longer periods of post-secondary training, and to the intake of international students.

Research Funding and Structures

Research is funded separately from teaching via the national research councils, the European Research Council (ERC, established in 2006) and various public-private sponsors and foundations. Most of the research funds are allocated to research programmes. The bargaining about research priorities is a major area of political debate between scientific elites, regional and national governments, research councils, the ERC and the European Commission. These programmes are intended 'to support research projects in designated areas of strategic relevance for innovation and global competitiveness based on peer review for scientific relevance' – a compromise formulated after the establishment of the ERC in order to integrate research money from 'Brussels' into its portfolio. The bulk of research funding for universities derives from national sources based on (another political compromise) 'semi-open' national systems of research funding. Foreign scholars from within the EU are eligible for funding provided a 'home-based' researcher functions as the principal investigator. Equally importantly, European and National Research Councils assess applications not only on scientific or technical merit but also on their wider social application – thus giving greater prominence to social utility.[16] Another problem concerning research funding arose after the achievement of the so-called 3%-target (3% of GDP on R&D spending in the former EU by 2010). While the target had already been achieved by 2009 it became clear that it was too modest to provide sufficient financial backbone for a 'Europe of Knowledge' to become the world's leading player. Various policies were adopted to increase support from public sources but the key breakthrough was only achieved when major companies changed their practices (and perceptions of investment in R&D as being a 'private loss') and started to invest in international research consortia. As importantly, access to finance became easier for SMEs as increasing numbers of regional public-private innovation networks were established to link the various actors in their clusters. The increase in private investment has been of major benefit to the research-intense universities who had already started opening their doors (and budgets) to joint industry-university activities.

Most have organised their research in inter-faculty and inter-university units that are comprised of flexible and semi-permanent teams in self-organised centres with control over, and responsibility for, costs and revenues. Face-to-face contact with partners

[15] Different agreements regulate if and to what extent former students will have to cover the costs of the used vouchers after graduation. Fellowship programmes for the special support of low income groups are fairly common adjuncts to vouchers.

[16] Extended peer review involving not only scientists but also stakeholders affected by the use of science is now common practice and is integrated into overall accountability frameworks that extend beyond traditional quality control procedures.

interested in knowledge transfer forms the basis for cooperation with business and increasingly with other organisations and interest groups. Strategic alliances, the in-sourcing of private R&D, and mixed university-company campuses are organisational responses to the new mix of funding opportunities, changing university research missions and novel research technologies. Academics themselves are the major players and drivers of these developments towards a greater overlap between the realms of academia and the commercial world. The major generation change within academe brought more faculty into universities who are able to balance the self-dynamics of scientific discovery with those of academic entrepreneurialism. Significantly, research-active academics now gain a considerable part of their personal income from capitalising on their know-how. (The 'money for value' declaration of the 2012 Warsaw conference of European Ministers of Innovation finally opened the door for this policy.)

Nodes and Holes in Network Europe

In this brave new world of network Europe, the struggle for hegemony has certainly not been abandoned – and it has many faces. Regional disparities across Europe are an enduring problem for institutions and policy-makers. Such disparities have only been partly overcome by the EU-subsidies for the further development of a more balanced landscape for European higher education and research. (Resources have been reallocated from the agricultural sector to knowledge-producing industries.) Major concern remains over the gap between the so-called 'teaching intensive' South and East of Europe and the 'research-intensive' North and West. This concern overlaps with the realisation that some small countries (such as Finland and the Netherlands) and some cross-national regional clusters (like the 'golden triangle' on the Belgian/Dutch/German border) still get far higher returns from R&D and knowledge industries than others. By starting earlier and investing in a flexible and cooperative way in infrastructure and networks for education and research these areas of Europe were able to leave some of the 'big tanks' in Europe behind. Finally, the potentials and limits of inter-university alliances are on the agenda as well. The recent decision of the European Cartel Office not to allow a consortium agreement between the Max Planck Institutes, the Centre National de Recherché Scientific, the Ford-Renault Institute of Technology and a consortium of leading research universities (led by Oxbridge) has been widely debated. Some accept the argument of the Office that such a consortium would constitute a 'monopoly of excellence' that would harm competition within Europe. Others argue that such cooperation is a prerequisite for competition with other consortia on a global level.

In this debate, most academics who are not confined to local or national settings consider themselves cosmopolitan rather than European. Their main thrust in transcending the academic's traditional national emphasis is global rather than European. The policies and infrastructures chosen by universities seldom make clear conceptual or pragmatic distinctions between the European on the one hand and the international or global on the other. In the many worlds of academe, happily networking scholars search for partners wherever the knowledge is to be found.

6 Vitis Vinifera, the City of Traders and Micro-Climates

Jon File, Eric Beerkens, Liudvika Leišytė and Carlo Salerno

Vitis Vinifera is renowned for its trading and for the diversity of its products. Travellers come from miles around to purchase goods and services that are widely believed to enhance future prosperity and the quality of life. It has no central market as its producer-merchants prefer to trade from their homes across the city. Curiously, while bustling back and forth across Vitis Vinifera in search of the right product at the right price, the first-time visitor is only fleetingly struck by the notion of being in a city at all.

There is little that seems to hold the city together as an entity – the roofs are made of tiles of different hues and textures; the cobbles paving the divergently dimensioned streets seem cut from geological formations from the four ends of the earth – so as one turns each corner it feels as if one has entered another city; gardens display a bewildering array of botanical growth and colour – from arid desert cactus to steamy jungle undergrowth; through open windows can be glimpsed rooms, decoration and furniture that could belong to one hundred different tribes and territories; the dwellings themselves (each with their own stall or shop-front) are built from such dissimilar materials and of such contradictory design – polymer tent, log cabin, stone church, glass house, icy igloo, sand castle, steel tower, thatched hut – and of such varying dimensions – thirty metres high, barely above ground, stretching across a full city 'block', crammed next to each other on a postage stamp plot – that it is clear that Vitis (as it is known colloquially to its residents) has no city planning committee, nor a hegemonic architectural practice.

On reflection, and after the initial disorientation of the first visit, the underlying reality begins to make itself clear. It seems that the diversity of the visual experience initially blunts the other senses – for as one walks through the city one's body alternately freezes and bakes, is drenched in rain, blown off course, enters twilight and emerges steps later with the sun at high noon. Vitis is a city of micro-climates, a triumph of terroir, where each household produces and trades in a niche customised meticulously to its own environment.

With stylistic debt to Italo Calvino's *Invisible Cities* (1972)

Europe 2020

Europe 2020 is not dramatically different to the Europe of 2004 – geographically and politically. The UK has not drifted continentally across the Atlantic,[1] and the ongoing EU accession process has not altered the fundamental political dynamics of Europe: an uneasy cohabitation of national sovereignty and shared supra-national interests and coordination. In terms of economic strategy the optimism of the early years of the

[1] Although its relationship with the rest of Europe remains intriguing: the BBC still reports that the continent is cut off when thick fog descends over the channel.

century has been tempered by more realism about the limits to what can be achieved by joint pronouncement, about the fact that fundamental socio-economic change requires a long period of gestation, and the recognition that the lead established by Europe's major competitors in the global economy would not be clawed back in a decade. Europe 2020 is not the world's leading knowledge economy – it remains a very serious player but has not caught up with, let alone overtaken, the USA and Japan and the economic growth of China has surprised all three.

The socio-political agenda has however changed significantly – while innovation and the knowledge economy remain important priorities they have lost some of their iconic and 'only show in town' status. The newer shows in the towns of Europe are more focused on the quality of life – longer (working) lives, travel and leisure, the environment, paramedical therapies, media and design, cross-cultural relationships, critical consumerism, urban social cohesion.[2] The economic base (largely service and knowledge based, but with significant primary and secondary production in the far North, East and South) has proved robust enough – Europeans don't wish to be wealthier than everybody else – those that do have moved to the more entrepreneurial shores of San Francisco, Sydney, Shanghai or Sao Paulo.

Higher Education Policy Research 2020

The market, moving like the Lord in mysterious ways, is better understood and its hand is sighted on the occasional clear day. Path breaking social science theory and research in the early years of the century has led to a far more nuanced analytical appreciation of *markets* as well as different economic, social, regional and geographical dimensions to them.

In a similar vein, a series of monographs produced in 2011 by CHEPPS[3] of the Universiteit Eenentwintig[4] helped many move away from some of the blunter analytical concepts in higher education policy analysis: CHEPPS staff and an increasing number of fellow thinkers no longer use terms like *the* university, *the* higher education sector, *the* market, and *the* academic profession let alone try to describe any characteristics these may have. While some may privately mourn the passing of an era when universities were universities, professors professed and students were seen and heard – it is now accepted that higher education in practice (if not always in policy) encompasses all post-school education and training. This is an enormously diverse field and most of what happens is driven by *markets.* Nevertheless educationalists,

[2] One illustrative indicator: in 2017 for the first time Bonsai trees outsold Personal Communication Aides (PCAs).

[3] The Centre for Higher Education Policy Studies with two Ps - a famous Dutch author like Charles Dikkens with two Ks. (See Monty Python: *The Bookshop Sketch*).

[4] The Technological and Social Science legs of the University of Twente split (painfully and irreparably) in 2009 with the social science part taking the next available name: the University of Twenty-One.

trainers, programme developers and researchers[5] are seldom driven to market easily and even less frequently via the shortest route.[6] It is not just these complex relationships between markets and the higher education sector that have made higher education policy studies such an interesting, challenging and respected field – for the key third triangular player, national and supranational authority, has in no sense retreated (defeated) from the field.

What did happen however was that national governments and the European Commission became more realistic and more selective about what could be achieved in a highly diverse and complex field of social life where governments have limited steering capacity and a restricted set of steering instruments at their disposal[7].

Broad Trends in European Higher Education

While there remains considerable variability across different European countries and different national higher education policy histories make fascinating reading, the trends are clear:

- higher education programmes[8] are now being offered more flexibly by a wider set of institutions to a broader range of learners (in terms of age and socio-economic background);
- higher education programmes are more responsive to the needs of learners and different economic sectors;
- institutions have more autonomy than they had 20 years ago particularly in terms of student selection, programme development and curriculum content (most national quality assurance and accreditation systems stepped back from programme level accreditation and licensing in the period 2007 – 2010);[9]
- the share of higher education accounted for by private providers[10] has increased significantly, as has the proportion of private funding within public institutions;

[5] These are four of the 27 (EUFO) job descriptions introduced across the EU in 2009 to enable a sensible discussion about what had hitherto been described as academic staff.

[6] An experienced mid-western cattle farmer advises that the first and crucial stage in any attempt at herding buffalo is to make sure that you have a pretty darn good idea of where the buffalo wish to go.

[7] Governments and the EC appear to have accepted CHEPPS first law: Higher education institutions are by definition smarter than Ministries and coordinating agencies so effective steering is always difficult, and its corollary: Where the first law does not apply, the capacity problems in higher education make steering a hopeless cause to begin with.

[8] 'Programme' is used here in a very neutral way: most programmes are now flexible combinations of courses, modules and often work experience. Purists argue that most are not programmed at all.

[9] Apart from buffalo characteristics and the first law of CHEPPS mentioned above, programme level accreditation was defeated by logistics (100,000 programmes) and by strong arguments from the market that it was incompatible with innovation, responsiveness, renewal and mass individualisation.

[10] In most countries the line between public and private providers has become more permeable. One third of European governments now finance undergraduate studies in accredited private institutions. Ten countries have passed 'Chalmers' legislation allowing public institutions to step out of the public sector and become private foundations. On average 8 public universities declare bankruptcy each year with governments declining to bail them out - rather preferring to sell them off to the private sector, in some notable cases via management buy-outs.

- public (teaching) funding of higher education programmes at public institutions is increasingly based on (targeted and competitive) student enrolment at the undergraduate level – postgraduate programmes are predominantly funded only through tuition fees;
- public research funding (including that for PhDs) is highly competitive and selective – benefiting research groups that are very good and/or strategically relevant. The share of research funding distributed by national research councils has diminished as the role of the European Research Council has expanded;
- in one way or another the great majority of students now pay tuition fees, and most, if not all, institutions have the ability to set their own differential fees (within limits that vary nationally in the amount of discretion they allow);
- student support grants increasingly target the first degree level, are income contingent and only the very talented and the very poor have their full costs covered – student loans are an accepted reality across Europe and are offered by public, private and mixed 'student banks'.

Students and Study Programmes

Student participation has grown remarkably over the past two decades but the effective broadening of 'higher education' to incorporate most of the further education sector and much of the training industry makes it difficult to precisely quantify the change.[11] In this broader definition most European countries now have participation rates exceeding 70% of the traditional age cohort but the most pronounced growth has been in 'adult', 'mature' or 'life-long' learners.

The age range of students has also increased enormously – major groups include the immediate post-school cohort (for Certificate, Diploma and Bachelor programmes – typically publicly funded but with a high loan component), early and mid-career working people (for second Certificate, Diploma or Bachelor programmes or a Master – typically self or company funded) and increasing numbers of post 45-year-olds for interest or for second career purposes (self funded, but with some government retraining funding and increasingly tax credits). The recognition of prior learning is common place in the majority of HEIs other than the few 'collegiate' institutions that have retained the development of a critical and responsible citizenry (from 18-21 year old young adults) as a core part of their mission.

Higher education institutions, Brussels and EU member states all recognised that a minimum level of shared understanding of qualifications was essential if a diverse higher education market place was to be effective in meeting the diverse higher education and training needs of a diverse Europe and its diverse markets. The Bologna process was expanded to include sub-degree qualifications. The Certificate, Diploma, Bachelor, Postgraduate Diploma, Master and (research and professional) Doctor structure of 1, 2, 3, 1, 2 and minimum 2 years duration, sub-divided into 60 ECTS

[11] Professor Kaiser of CHEPPS estimates the full-time equivalent growth in Bachelor registrations in EU member states at 18% over the period 2007 to 2017, and that for Masters candidates at 25%.

credits per year is now standard across the EU, and almost standard in other European and neighbouring countries. Training programmes of less than a year, but of at least 10 credits, are also registered by the EU's Higher Education and Training Authority (HETA). Although it is not mandatory for them to do so, it is estimated that 98% of public institutions and 80% of private and non-European providers register their qualifications voluntarily given the extensive use of the HETA database in the market places for 'graduates'.[12]

HETA is neither an accreditation nor a quality assurance agency. Rather it is a data-warehouse for HE programmes with a limited audit capacity to verify the information provided via random checks (mainly on programme duration and entrance requirements). HETA is widely perceived in the HE industry as a body not to be messed with: the sanctions for fraudulent reporting are severe. Beyond this rudimentary system of registration, quality and relevance are widely believed to be matters best left to the markets to assess. A minority of member states have national accreditation procedures for public HE programmes but the dominant model is one of multiple accreditation possibilities that are chosen strategically by HE providers – often on the advice of highly paid marketing professionals.[13] The diverse markets for Europe's HE 'graduate output' have surprisingly sophisticated methods of assessing the skills and competencies of graduates, and the 'quality' of programmes – these vary enormously by economic sector, 'profession' and region.[14]

There is however increasing public concern about declining and/or differential higher education standards across Europe. Political leaders and higher education executives have been fairly pragmatic about this – conceding that there is more variety in the system by design, arguing that more information is available to prospective students and pointing to comparative international research by the University of Malta that suggests the 'aggregate quality range' within European higher education has increased enormously but still remains less diverse than in the USA.

Student Mobility and Internationalisation

Despite all of the hopes of the Socrates and Erasmus programmes and some of the underlying motivation of the Bologna process, cross-border student mobility at the first degree level within Europe remains limited – some 10% of students complete a Bachelor's degree in another European country and a further 10% take a semester

[12] The nice Anglo-Saxon distinction between *graduates* and holders of lesser qualifications has fallen into such disuse that *diplomate* can no longer be found in the Complete Oxford Dictionary.
[13] Governments without their 'own' accreditation agencies decide which agencies they will accept for institutions to qualify for public funding.
[14] See the guides published periodically by 'WHICH' – particularly instructive are it's *Where to find the best training in…* Floristry (May 2009), Tourism from China (June 2009), Green Architecture (July 2009), Feng Shui (April 2010) and Polymer Engineering (Sept 2010). Note the emphasis given to inter-personal and life skills in each case. CHEPPS researchers have found that guides of this nature and Lonely Planet's 'Best European student cities' are far more influential among prospective students than HEIs own marketing materials and the various 'university rankings' published annually by major European newspaper groups.

away. Most analysts attribute this to the persistence of mother tongue instruction at the undergraduate level and the unexpected social trend in the 2010s of late adolescents wanting to remain in their parental home. Mobility at the Masters level is far greater both within and across countries (almost half of Masters students take their degrees at a different university – and a third of these in a different country) reflecting the trend of more and more Masters programmes being taught in English and European parents drawing a line under extending hospitality to their offspring.

Higher education has become one of Europe's most important trading commodities. While the pattern varies across different countries, higher education is one of the top ten service sectors in many European economies. The UK, Netherlands, Sweden and (northern) Italy are the most successful, but the levels of flexibility and international responsiveness shown by sectors of the Polish, French and German university systems would have been unimaginable a decade ago. Europe continues to attract more and more international students and is cutting significantly into the market shares of both the USA and Australia.[15] Within countries, internationalisation has become one of the most important dimensions of system diversity – some institutions have embraced it to the point of specialisation while others have deliberately excluded the international dimension from their niche.

Institutional Landscape

Most countries have abandoned institutional differentiation by type (university, college and polytechnic) and only philosophers and historians retain any real interest in the question of what a university is. Politicians, prospective students, the general public and markets are content with the pragmatic position that a university is what it does. Europe's universities (and alternatively baptised HEIs) do very different things.
Europe's 6,000 higher education providers have considerably more than 100,000 programmes registered with HETA. Of these providers fewer than 800 would be recognisable to a 1990s alumnus as traditional comprehensive universities, and fewer than 400 offer PhDs in more than five fields. The modal HEI offers 10 study programmes at the C, D, B and M levels in two or three broad fields of study.

The diversity across Europe's universities is as vast in terms of focus as it is in programme offerings. Most have opted to be (or have accepted a compelling business case to remain) a combination of national, regional and local institutions with close relationships to proximate stakeholders and their needs. Only a minority aim to be international and trans-European centres of (mainly English language) learning and scholarship. Research is increasingly concentrated in (Western and Northern) Europe's elite universities – claimed to include four of the ten best in the world – but surprisingly these elite institutions seldom have their undergraduate programmes assessed as being the best. The most selective programmes (with the exception of

[15] Saatchi and Saatchi's celebrated advertising campaign 'We have culture, we have no flies and you can drink the world's best beer and wine at 18!' is seen by many to have been a decisive intervention.

Doctorates) tend to be at small specialised institutions, both public and private. The different niches that higher education institutions have chosen are reflected in their student bodies (age, national origin, full or part time, contact or distance mode), in the accreditation they seek, in their language policies, in the tuition fees they charge, in their mix of funding sources and in their staff profiles and reward systems (see below).

One-third of higher education providers are private but most focus on shorter cycle certificate and Diploma programmes, often at the post-graduate level. Only a minority operate in the first Bachelor degree market. These are mainly in Eastern and Southern Europe. The trend has been for this minority to receive public financial support for Bachelor (and often Certificate and Diploma) students provided that they are nationally accredited. The private university sector has grown significantly particularly in the MBA and ICT fields, many new providers (and more and more traditional ones) offer educational services via broadband interactive web-streaming technologies, while the market share of the European campuses of US and Australian universities has dropped significantly from its 2005 high of 2%.

Funding

The funding mix varies according to institutional profile and (decreasingly) its public or private status. Most public institutions are dependent primarily on government grants linked to student enrolments at the initial Certificate, Diploma and Bachelor levels and on tuition fees. Fewer and fewer governments fund institutions at the same level for all of the students they enrol. The most talented, those in areas perceived to be strategically important and under-represented groups tend to come with higher prices attached thus making targeted student recruitment a very competitive and potentially lucrative business. The average public university now receives 57% of its funding through direct grants from national government but the range is considerable. The entrepreneurial University of Warwick receives 15% from this source whereas many locally orientated non-technological universities continue to receive over 80% of their funding via this channel. In general terms, most governments now see their subsidies to institutions in 'prices for services' terms and not as 'contributions towards actual costs incurred'.

Tuition fees vary from 280 to 28000 Euro per year for a Bachelors degree.[16] Higher education institutions decide for themselves what tuition fee levels to set for each programme but national framework legislation sometimes sets limits on this, as do national student financial aid policies which have maximum tuition fee levels for loan/grant recipients. CHEPPS research indicates that most institutions charge what they think the market will bear but that the popularity of the programme (some receive over 100 applicants for each available place) and the perceived level of competition with other programmes (and the fees charged) are important factors. Tuition fees are paid through a wide variety of sources – students, parents, employers and the

[16] The cheapest is a Norwegian Regional University near Tromso while Switzerland's leading hotel school is the most expensive (*The Economist*, March 23, 2019).

government itself for some first degree students (the very talented, students in undersubscribed but important fields, and the very poor) in some countries.
Less than one in ten HEIs receive public (basic) research funding (see below). More than 50% receive contract R&D and/or training and consultancy funding from public and/or private sources, including regional innovation and development agencies and (crucially) service sectors of the economy in which the HEI is active as a player in education and training. (Between 2007 and 2017 there was a significant reduction in the proportion of private and public sector[17] training and R&D resources spent in house – this has been the major new source of income for the HEIs.)

One interesting new development has been the launching of effective alumni associations and professional fund raising campaigns by a number of small prestigious universities. While it is too early to tell what degree of success will be achieved, there is far more talk and far more action in the area of donations and endowments for universities than there has ever been in Europe.

Research

On average Europe's expenditure on research, technological development and innovation comfortably exceeds the 3% of GDP target set two decades ago. This can be partially explained by rising private sector expenditures (often contracted to higher education institutions) and partly because Europe's shifting socio-economic priorities and its changing markets for goods and services have broadened the range of fields where these resources are spent. Innovation in particular is highly valued and is no longer a wholly owned subsidiary of the science and technology disciplines. Many of HE's major research role models are not Nobel prize winners but innovators, and the programmes they contribute to are some of the most selective in Europe.

As was indicated earlier fully half of Europe's higher education institutions receive significant 'third stream' applied R&D funding and the sector is now responsible for much of the R&D activity previously undertaken by government, business and industry themselves. These developments have had a major impact on the 'applied research landscape' and on the mix of activities within the higher education sector.

Research and (research) PhD funding is highly selective at the European level – some 35% of Europe's total public basic and strategic research funds are distributed by the European Research Council and at the national level (where national research councils have developed innovative ways to enhance national capacity and priorities in a context of competitive Europe-wide tendering). While each nation state possesses at least one research 'flagship' there is no doubt that a substantial research function is now the preserve of the few, and that the few are not evenly distributed across Europe – the Western and Northern European universities house most of Europe's leading research centres. 'Big science' is increasingly undertaken by cross-national tailor-made consortia that draw on top university based researchers and their counterparts from the

[17] Government ministries, public service sectors and state research institutes.

public and private sectors. Despite a number of expensive ERC programmes to encourage European research networks, the self-perception and scientific practice of Europe's leading centres continues to be unashamedly international. Exclusive European networks are seldom those at the cutting edge.

Most national ministries have introduced targeted funding to help train, recruit and secure the next generations of university based researchers – but these are now recognised to constitute only a small proportion of the nation's 'academic profession'. The modal 'academic' is an expert in a particular field: a skilled teacher, entrepreneurial in outlook, a talented team member in joint projects with external stakeholders, not active in fundamental research and does not wish to be.[18]

In retrospect it is clear that the research agenda of the past two decades has increasingly been developed in consultation with external stakeholders (who fund most of it). This has meant that research fields not relevant for business and industry are weaker than they were in 2005 although once again Europe's changed socio-economic priorities have meant that business and industry's own interests are far broader than they were.

Higher Education Leadership and Management

European higher education institutions operate in an environment far less stable than that of only a few decades ago. They enjoy more independence from government. Student selection, determining tuition fee levels, setting staff salary policies and deciding independently which programmes to offer are all now routine aspects of the inner business life of universities. The range of strategic choice and possible activities to focus on has broadened. Levels of competition for students, staff and contracts have increased fairly dramatically. More liberal operating regulations entail greater financial autonomy, wider opportunities and deeper risks. Flexibility and responsiveness are expected by a wider range of stakeholders.

The typical higher education institution is managed in a business-like way, stressing efficiency and productivity. Methods of strategic, financial and human resource management are by and large similar to those encountered in the private sector. Higher education management in general and its 'sub-disciplines' in particular[19] have developed into recognisable professional careers. This professionalisation is evidenced

[18] Many were liberated from the burden of unfulfilled research expectations by the major changes in HRM and salary policies that swept across the European higher education space in 2008 and 2009. Academic salaries continue to differ vastly across countries, but within countries a wider range of performance areas are rewarded. More and more staff see themselves primarily as members of the teaching profession – long holidays with no associated research requirement are attractive. Part-time studies by HEI staff in androgogics and project acquisition are both growth areas.

[19] The European Association of Higher Education Managers has thirty professional tracks at its annual conferences grouped into twelve major fields: academic management, research management, HRM, marketing and corporate communications, scholarships and student recruitment, assets and real estate, law and contracts, governmental relations and lobbying, strategic planning and risk management, student life and Brussels scouts.

by the fact that it is common practice for institutional executives and managers to move from one institution to another over the course of their careers. There is an extensive range of educational programmes to prepare higher educational mangers and to enhance their skills. Moreover, executives and managers are well paid (at least in higher education terms). As always there are distinct national flavours and differences relating to the nature of the institutional mission. Regional education, training and consultancy-focused institutions are more likely to have a chief executive drawn from outside the HE sector (there is far greater job movement in and out of higher education) while leading research institutions tend to have presidents with a traditional academic background but supported by highly professional management teams.

After a period at the end of the last century when the higher education sector seemed gripped by merger fever some spectacular failures of mega-institutions around 2010 have noticeably dampened enthusiasm for mergers and amalgamations. If big was once beautiful, European higher education in 2020 has real doubts about the manoeuvrability of university super tankers (let alone fleets of them) and many of the most successful institutions are small and specialised.

Postscript: on the Loss of a Sector

Like our imaginary Vitis Vinifera,[20] European higher education 2020 has a coherence problem. It feels less and less like a sector and more and more like a loose collection of institutions with a shared common denominator no more significant than having one or more of the words teaching, learning, research and development in their mission statements. In terms of governance and of the big interrelations of state, market and academia this is more than a feeling. Sector-wide organisations are struggling to deal with higher educational diversity, Rectors Conferences are ridden by factionalism and competing interests, European consortia and clubs of similarly visioned institutions have proliferated, (a) higher education policy is becoming a contradiction in terms and the would-be developers of the European Carnegie classification have gone into early retirement muttering that some things are just unclassifiable.

By 2030 historians will have demonstrated that the loss of sectoral coherence was a trend with origins extending way into the previous century when Europe took its first faltering steps down the road from elite to mass higher education. A seminal work by CHEPPS on the occasion of its 50th anniversary will conclude that the alternative scenario – a harmonised, homogenised higher education system with near universal access – would have been, like wooded chardonnay for all in a Europe rich in terroir, a future too ghastly to contemplate.

[20] This is the botanical name for the vine species, native to Europe and Central Asia, from which all of the world's finest wines are made - including those of California and Australia. (Admittedly it had some help from Vitis Labrusca, the American vine, whose resistant rootstocks enabled Europe's vines to recover from the phylloxera epidemic at the end of the 19th century.)

7 A Tale of Three Cities: Highlights and Problems of Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera

Don F. Westerheijden, Leo Goedegebuure, Jeroen Huisman & Ben Jongbloed

In this brief chapter, some of the most salient characteristics of each of the three scenarios are highlighted using four main themes: system diversity, governance, funding and quality.[1] These were not necessarily the dimensions across which the scenarios were first designed. On the contrary, we aimed at a critical reflection on what came out of the scenario design exercise from independent points of view. We especially draw attention, therefore, to some inherent tensions and contradictions in each of the scenarios, as a counterbalance to the positive tone of the previous chapters in which the scenarios were presented. Let us remind the reader that the Centralia scenario largely evolved (though systematised and 'enlarged') from the majority opinions of our respondents to the Delphi study, whilst the two other scenarios contrasted with this by making use of patterns of opinions (in a few cases majorities) in the Delphi-study response. There was quite a bit of 'science fiction' in those chapters and some intentional polishing to make each scenario appear attractive in as many respects as possible. Therefore before turning to external comments, we wish to qualify that rosy picture.

Diversity in the Higher Education Systems

In the Centralia scenario the main emphasis was on organised diversity with regards to degree structures, with the emphasis on *organised*. The three-stage 'Bachelor, Master and Doctor' model was spreading across the continent and a fairly common interpretation of that structure had emerged, so there was a large degree of harmonisation, even uniformity, of higher education degrees across Europe. It was suggested that this uniformity had emerged spontaneously, pointing to the fact that in their desire to be 'European', actors at different levels and in different regions may go

[1] These were of course not all the themes addressed in the scenarios (other themes included student composition, internationalisation of study careers, character of education and 'post-mode-2' research) but for brevity we will not address all of them in this chapter.

beyond the letter of European agreements – it does not always take the 'muscles from Brussels' to (over-)achieve European policy goals. The other two scenarios showed more diversity in this respect. Octavia spoke of organic diversity of degree types and lengths, emerging out of a host of temporary bilateral and multilateral agreements at different levels. Everything remained in flux. This made for a much higher degree of uncertainty than in the Centralia scenario, but on the other hand it added flexibility and adaptability to regional and temporal circumstances. In the Vitis Vinifera scenario the variety and uncertainty was taken to the extreme by stressing that higher education (seamlessly connected with further education and vocational training) was unclassifiable. The values of institutional autonomy and adaptability were given full play, in contrast to Centralia that gave more predictability to life (a condition for investing in long-term behaviour[2]) but was, perhaps much more rigid and resistant to (needed) change.

Regarding institutional diversity, Centralia was characterised by its lack thereof; the typical higher education institution was large and predominantly publicly funded. Education in these institutions was blended mode learning with a strong emphasis on life-long learning. The latter was mostly due to the higher education institutions' adaptation to the 'greying' demographic situation in Europe – an important assumption underlying all three scenarios.

The argument of economies of scale was taken up in a case-by-case approach in Octavia, leading to different networks for different tasks rather than full-scale mergers, although mergers were not ruled out in the event of regular and intense cooperation among higher education institutions. Institutional types were not expected to be harmonised across Europe; the current multitude ('jungle'?) would persist. The multitude of institutional forms would probably even increase rather than just persist, as the role of private partners of different types was expected to grow in the networked economy. The same effect was expected in Vitis Vinifera where the range from small niche players to mega-universities was clearly illustrated. Along with this, in Vitis Vinifera about one-third of higher education institutions were purely private. The assumption of that scenario was certainly not that governments would retreat from higher education and research completely but private market forces, 'real' as opposed to government-induced 'quasi' markets, were expected to play a much more prominent role than at the turn of the century, thus adding to the diversity of institutions and their motivations (some being profit-driven).

Institutional diversity also extended to the main tasks of the higher education institutions: education and research. In Centralia the large institutions were practically all engaged in both, albeit in different ways. With regards to research and teaching, one noted basic, curiosity-driven variants as well as application-oriented variants. In the other two scenarios there was much more diversity among higher education institutions on this dimension. In Vitis Vinifera the emphasis was on specialised institutions

[2] On the other hand, in Vitis Vinifera the (short-term) incentives for investment behaviour may be larger than in publicly-controlled Centralia. As a further consequence, this might lead to more rent-seeking behaviour in Vitis Vinifera.

interacting with each other in markets, that is on a case by case and rather anonymous basis. In Octavia the interaction mechanism was again the network, with its underscoring of longer-term though still fluctuating relationships.

Another remarkable difference between the three scenarios was institutional diversity on a European scale. Centralia saw higher education across Europe characterised by a clear stratification, with the more prestigious doctoral-level teaching mostly concentrated in the Northern and Western Europe, while institutions in the south and east were mainly limited to teaching at the bachelor-level. In Octavia, the same North-West to South-East gradient of prestige appeared, but then with the South-East concentrating on 'teaching-only' higher education institutions and the North-West enjoying 'research universities'. The Vitis Vinifera scenario emphasised that the diversity on different dimensions *within* each country was remarkably large, while diversity across Europe was much less striking.

With regards to research, in Centralia it was suggested that the invention of the term 'post-mode-2' research was in fact a return to a 'pre-mode-2' situation; (public) universities had gone back to basic research while the newly separated R&D function took place in the (public-private or private) company laboratories. In Octavia, on the contrary, mode-2 research had become all-pervasive in its public-private university-industry networks. The political question not addressed was who in those networks *really* set the research agendas and accordingly who decided on the type of research, research subjects and who reaped the benefits (knowledge or products)? The answer to these questions was also not explicitly provided in the Vitis Vinifera scenario, although the answer was hinted at. The new role models for researchers were innovators, no longer the Nobelists. In this, Vitis Vinifera sketched a mirror image of Centralia and one might wonder if in such a scenario any solid mode-1 research would be left at all?

Governance & Management

When it comes to the governance of higher education systems and institutions, the situations and problems in the three scenarios can be illustrated by the (pseudo-)scientific law invented in Vitis Vinifera:

- **CHEPPS first law**: Higher education institutions are by definition smarter than Ministries and co-ordinating agencies, so effective steering is always difficult. *And its corollary*: Where the first law does not apply, the capacity problems in higher education make steering a hopeless cause to begin with.

System governance in Centralia depended heavily on European-level policy-making (colloquially terned strong 'Brussels'). Europe ensured system coordination, it made the regulations and provided a large proportion of the higher education and research budget. The scenario relied heavily on technology, massive data transfer and decision-support software in order to overcome the second law. The (bureau-)politics of interorganisational relationships, amongst other factors, prevented technology from being fully effective in that respect; under the surface there were span-of-control problems. Moreover the higher education institutions were characterised by

professional institutional management (supported by similar technological advances) thus re-applying the first law, only at a higher level of sophistication than at present. When institutional management[3] is mentioned it should be emphasised that in the Centralia scenario it was forecast that even though more professionalised, control over higher education institutions would remain firmly in the academics' hands.

In Octavia system governance was more complicated, with full-scale application of multi-level governance ideas. Authority was divided over – and shared by – actors at supra-national, national as well as regional levels. It is doubtful that such a complex governance arrangement could be realised as it would exponentially increase the coordination problems among the different actors, even before the CHEPPS laws come into play. If the multi-level governance system could work, it would alleviate some capacity problems by limiting the range of control mostly to individual networks or regions within Europe (sometimes nations, sometimes federal states, and sometimes sub-state regions). With regard to institutional leadership, Octavia forecasted it would focus on leadership for change in ever-changing networks. The magic words were 'management of flows' (knowledge and capital) rather than of facilities or personnel. This would seem to put high demands on institutional leadership.

The demands on institutional leadership would be even higher in the extreme number of fluctuating extra-organisational relationships that characterised the Vitis Vinifera scenario, and in that sense it may be (even) less realistic than Octavia. On the positive side, as far as Vitis Vinifera is concerned, the first CHEPPS law was not much of a danger here, as there was very little large scale system governance.

Funding, Competition and Markets

The issue of resources was at the core of many differences between the three scenarios.

The issue in Centralia was that the 'public' was put back into higher education, more so than at the turn of the century. This implied mainly public systems under (supra-national) state regulation: the EU regulated competition and ensured protection in the public system. Public funding of higher education institutions (supply funding) was based on student numbers. Public regulation in Centralia also extended to private contributions: tuition fees (which had been introduced across Europe) were kept within government-imposed bounds though they were not uniformly prescribed. In response to the demographic decline in Europe in combination with the fees charged in public higher education institutions, measures were needed to ensure access to higher education for all income groups. Centralia accordingly introduced the EU 'Talent Stipend Fund'.

[3] Interestingly, in the perhaps over-organised, bureaucratic discourse of the Centralia scenario the term consistently used is 'management' of higher education institutions. In the other two scenarios the term 'leadership' is used as well.

The core term in Octavia was public-private partnerships: funding sources were both public and private for different purposes (using differently-targeted incentive structures such as formulas). The public part of higher education funding – from different public agencies – focused on the teaching function, using vouchers for students (demand funding) that could be used flexibly by students for different course units at different moments in time and at different (higher) education institutions across Europe. Students in this scenario were 'protected' mainly by the multitude of access options they had – a trust in large numbers of market parties rather than in market regulation.

The market as the main coordination mechanism emerged most clearly in the Vitis Vinifera scenario. This model emphasised the private parties and their business-like approach towards higher education. Higher education was seen here as a private good: a marketable commodity. This private character applied more to higher levels; it was accepted that undergraduate higher education still had sufficient externalities to warrant some public intervention. Accordingly, even in this scenario, in order not to depart too far from respondents' opinions in the Delphi study, the public role was not completely eliminated. Public funding, such as there was, funded teaching on the basis of undergraduate enrolment. The legal status of institutions (public or private) was becoming unimportant for funding purposes. Tuition fees varied enormously across institutions within wide national bounds (if any). Public support for students was basically limited to the first degree level, with scholarships based on both need and merit.

The Lisbon-related 3% target of funding for research and innovation was reached in the Centralia scenario in 2012 thanks to funding from Europe. In Octavia, the target was already reached by 2009, thanks to public-private partnership funding. In the Vitis Vinifera scenario the 3% aim was 'comfortably' exceeded by 2020 thanks to private investment in research and innovation.

Another market-related theme included in all three scenarios was an enlargement of the set of providers and programmes in higher education. The offer of education was increasingly transparent thanks to registers and/or accreditation in the Centralia and Octavia scenarios. Only in Vitis Vinifera was a decrease in transparency forecast due to the proliferation of market niches. Consumer sovereignty was increased in all three scenarios thanks to the introduction of (differentiated) fees – there was more to choose from and the market signals for choice were clearer than at the turn of the century. At the same time producer sovereignty was influenced as well; in some respects in the same direction in all scenarios: higher education institutions would acquire more autonomy in financing, programme supply and staffing ('HRM') policy and they would be much freer than at present to work in alliances or partnerships with other actors. One of the differences across the scenarios was the issue of market protection: in Centralia there were more barriers to entry for private and foreign providers than in the other two scenarios though not so many as to exclude them completely.

Quality Matters

The topic of higher education and research quality remained high on the agenda in all three scenarios. But which aspects of quality were affected in the different scenarios?

The degree structure, a framing element for quality, has already been mentioned in the discussion on diversity. In the Centralia scenario, a uniform 3+2+3 structure (defined in a more sophisticated manner in ECTS-modules was implemented. On the other hand, it was not the length of study but graduates' competences that counted. Accordingly one might wonder what was the *real* determinant of graduating and if the uniform structure was as uniform as the labels seemed to say. In Octavia the theme of complexity and uncertainty regarding quality could be illustrated by the degree structure too, but that was topped by the Vitis Vinifera scenario with its statement that 'some things are just unclassifiable'. How could European society make sense of such a chaotic 'jungle'?

In the Centralia scenario, students were carefully guided to minimise talent loss. Taking a different view on this worthy quality principle that drop-out ('wastage') is to be avoided, academics might object that in this way students would be pampered too much rather than becoming well-educated adults. Also if you cannot fail students anymore at examinations, what is left of academic freedom? The main problem in the Octavia scenario was different, namely: How could the coherence of students' learning experiences be checked when their study was best described as a cross-institutional, cross-national journey with diversified, modular programmes? This lack of coherence also surfaced in Octavia in the descriptions given of the concept of quality, namely 'supporting a diversified student body to acquire a mixture of skills and knowledge…' Similarly, education was defined in a way that also implied hard times for coherent learning: 'experience-based learning programmes for contextualised knowledge applications that are strongly linked to the local embeddedness of the global knowledge economy'. No wonder then that social actors could not take higher education degrees at face value and therefore installed their own continuous tests of graduate employees in the workplaces against ever-changing criteria due to changing relationships and needs making the uncertainty even bigger. Already in Centralia it appeared that to design a harmonious system responding to many stakeholders' needs required a very complex system of quality assurance. Centralia sported accreditation plus Graduate Competence Tests plus EU Civil Service Concourses. The main difference with Octavia were that (public) tests carried value and trust to other actors and they did not have a 'sell-by' date.

The coherence issue was relevant to the Vitis Vinifera scenario as well. Here, however, the cause lay mainly in the fragmentation of institutions and especially in the fact that at least the private higher education sector to a large extent relied on web-based education. Web-based education is currently seen as rather complicated for quality control, but maybe that will have been solved by 2020.

Standardised course modules were another feature of the Centralia scenario. Taking the division of academic labour a step further by using well-designed curriculum and study materials even if they were 'not invented here' might benefit the equal dispersion of curriculum quality across Europe. Yet a cultural bias was introduced at the same time as teaching modules were mostly designed in the North-Western part of Europe.

Regarding external quality assurance, the range of solutions were numerous throughout the scenarios. At one extreme Centralia described a system with obligatory European accreditation. A technical and conceptual advance foreshadowed at the turn of the century by some countries, the emphasis in accreditation progressed from input and process factors to output, albeit in a utilitarian manner. Employability of graduates became the main accreditation criterion. The focus on competences should mean accreditation was a 'light' procedure, not focusing on input and process data. Still, the data demands seemed to be very heavy; it was not a 'slim audit'. Slimness was more visible in the re-accreditation that took place once every eight years and was semi-automatic, based on monitoring data without heavy evaluation processes. However, in accreditation the cracks in the varnish of harmony appeared too: there were purportedly uniform European Accreditation Agency (EAA) quality standards but universities lobbied for exceptions. The upshot was quality standards were higher in the North-West than in the South-East of Europe. Again an issue of cultural bias surfaced.

The opposite position was taken in the Vitis Vinifera scenario, where most national quality assurance or accreditation schemes had been abandoned. Vitis Vinifera gave up on assessing quality. Nearly all that was left at the supra-institutional level was the European Higher Education and Training Authority (HETA), which only registered study programmes from providers. Apparently this register gave a minimal assurance that programmes offered were 'genuine', for it had legitimacy in the marketplace and was therefore popular amongst most private and public higher education institutions. For the rest, the markets were trusted to assess quality. In our minds markets increasingly demand innovation, responsiveness, renewal and mass individualisation. The emphasis is on changing things quickly. This leaves no stability for developing quality or even assessing education effects that need time (often many years) to become visible. That the markets were not completely effective was hinted at in the Vitis Vinifera scenario where there was growing public concern about declining or at least differential quality. It was hardly reassuring to read that by 2020 the diversity of quality was not yet as large as in USA.

It should not be forgotten, however, that in Vitis Vinifera there also existed some collegiate institutions educating for a 'critical and responsible citizenry'. This scenario left room for almost anything, as long as some people demanded it. Not all was bad there, which could be said of each scenario. The rosy picture provided by the three 'tales of a city' in the previous chapters may have been overdone, but the criticisms in the tale of three cities in this chapter are an equally intentional overstatement of the bleak sides of those higher education cityscapes.

8 On Prophets and Metaphors: Devices for Coping in Times of Change

Guy Neave

> A prophet doesn't have to have any brains. They are good to have, of course, for the ordinary exigencies of life, but they are no use in professional work. It is the restfulest vocation there is. When the spirit of prophecy comes upon you, you merely take your intellect off and lay it somewhere in a cool place for a rest, and unship your jaw and leave it alone; it will work by itself. The result is prophecy.
>
> Mark Twain (1835 – 1910) *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court.*

Introduction

If we believe Mark Twain, prophecy is not a particularly arduous activity, nor an overly cerebral one. Yet, even if one disagrees with this opinion, no one – not even Mr. Clemens – would deny that prophecy involves a certain element of risk.[1] Nor is it immune to professional hazard. Of all the professional hazards – and they are many, obloquy, incredulity and the crown of martyrdom not least – the greatest that stands in wait for the prophet is his – rather rarer, her – very own prophet's version of Hubris. Hubris – the Fate that in the Antique world swiftly followed upon the sins of pride and above all presumption – comes less from being convinced by one's own utterances so much as the complacency that comes with having made them in the first place. And then there is the terrible burden of knowing one possesses the Truth. This is the greatest risk of all because all too often it tempts others to furious heights in seeking to cut the prophet down to size. The upshot generates unexpected dialogue, which even if it ends in martyrdom for some, is beneficial for others. CHEPS does not claim to be in unique possession of the Truth. Prophets are not without honour save only in their own country, and since our utterances were made precisely on our own turf, clearly what we have done is to explore possibilities, rather than foretelling what will be. Our purpose was to stimulate debate. And in this no risk is too great. That CHEPS should mark its two decades of achievement by taking such a risk is, surely, what one would expect from a Centre, located in an establishment, itself singled out not so long ago by one of higher education's leading spirits as a prototype of the 'Entrepreneurial University' (Clark, 1998).

Prophecy as the Art of Risk-taking

Nevertheless, the exploration of scenarios has some similarity with the art of prophecy, which is risky for other reasons and they are more substantial and substantive. The first of these is that those who indulge in divination's noble art tend to work in the very

[1] Mr. Clemens' view on the matter was 'Prophecy is a good line of business, but it is full of risks.'

long term. There are, not surprisingly, exceptions to this general rule. The Sport of Kings – betting on horses, and its more demotic edition, betting on dogs – is one. It is short-term and, from this perspective, may perhaps be seen as applied divination. Like most things that migrate from theory to application, the risk as one does so rises enormously. For this reason, the natural operative span of the prophet lies in the long-term. If the original utterance is remembered, so much the better. But the passing of *anno domini* serves all too often to absolve the utterer of all responsibility. This it does in two ways. First, there is the Ultimate Absolution of Responsibility that follows upon the utterer's passing on to spheres higher – or lower – depending on one's personal theology and the chaos particular utterances brought about. This is the secret of economic forecasting, as John Maynard Keynes (1923) knew full well. Death is the saving grace of the economist, if not always of his ideas – alas.

The second saving grace for the prophet comes from within the corporation of prophets itself. Others have come along in the meantime and by grabbing the aforementioned obloquy, incredulity and martyrdom for themselves, lift them from the shoulders of the giants who precede them. In the world of academe, this is called 'advancing the theory'. And from the perspective of the corporation of prophets, it is vital to ensuring the prophetic equivalence of a 'high audience rating'. Those brought up in an earlier age will remember Elijah's handing over his cloak to Elisha, which in a less God-fearing and more evaluation, assessment and quality-conscious time will doubtless be construed as the young prophet's being accredited by due authority to 'go forth and prophesy'.

Still, there are many gambits available to those active in the 'vision business', methods which, in the *argot* of the horse-racing man, allow them to 'hedge their bets'. One gambit is to be downright apocalyptic. This is sometimes known in the trade as the 'Patmos Strategy' so named after Saint John of Patmos. It is sometimes known as the 'Tactic Divine' for Saint John was that as well. The second gambit is to construct impossible – or in default of impossibility, inspiring – utopias. If the first two fail, there is always a third; that is, to take refuge in a language that is down right obscure and leave the burden of interpretation to the individual who has been so incautious as to lend his or her ears. This latter has a familiar ring to those of a Classical education. It is the old scam – the Antique World's edition of the confidence trick – perfected over centuries by the Pythonesse at Delphi whose trademark and some would say, methodology have been loaned for the occasion.

Prophecy as a Serious Business

If prophecy is a risky business, it is also from the prophet's view of the world a serious one. All too often, prophecy is driven by deep discontent and by a sense of outrage. The shape of things to come – whether one turns to Isiah as a classic example of the prophet in residence or H.G. Wells as a latter-day fellow-traveller – is not simply an exercise in projective techniques, though as scholars, statisticians, futurologists or even policy analysts we can call upon a far greater range in the armoury of sophistication and techniques than Isiah had at his disposal, just as we may go beyond those techniques – rhetorical in the main – that Mark Twain so cuttingly dismissed. What

distinguishes the type of prophecy undertaken in celebration of CHEPS' 20th summer from the rantings Twain savaged is precisely that CHEPS 'brings the brain back in'. But this does not explain why prophecies have been made and needed throughout the ages. Still less their purpose.

Prophecies tend to be made in strange spots and, as the Book says, by 'voices, crying in the wilderness'. But they have a purpose and they have a context. Prophecies fulfill a number of important tasks. The first and most obvious is to break out of the routine constraints of the present, to move beyond those limitations of historic contingency, path dependency (to revert to some of our jargon), to step beyond from the geological pace of adaptation that structures, procedures – and let it be said, democracy as well – place upon the pure vision or the ultimate end toward which our efforts should be tending. This is prophecy as clarification – a term itself largely anachronistic, it is true – but that is one of the drawbacks of sustained metaphor, namely having to work across two domains which in appearance have only a tenuous relationship between them. Prophecy acting as clarification – or as revelation which makes it part of the Patmos gambit – serves to strengthen resolve amongst the Faithful, to inspire them to labour more strenuously for the clear and inspiring rewards that must come if only the Faithful persist. In this setting, the purpose of revelation lies most assuredly in the present, not the future. Goals are sharpened, resolve strengthened and hopefully one pushes forward a little:

> Through the night of doubt and sorrow
> Onward goes the pilgrim band,
> Singing songs of expectation
> Onward to the Promised Land

But the 'revelatory tradition' of prophecy has another side to it. Rallying the Faithful through inspiration – what psychologists would term 'positive reinforcement'– is not its only dimension. There is another *genre* and it has to do with 'negative reinforcement', effectively amending the error of one's ways by projecting into the future what will happen if one continues to persist with present praxis. The first face of the 'revelatory tradition' drives by inspiration, literally enthusiasm – that is, in the literal meaning of the original Greek, infusing the individual with the divine spirit, with the presence of the gods. The second drives by fear. This particular *genre* is somewhat rarer in higher education policy, though some may care to debate the point whether it might indeed be less rare than one might think as the basic psychological instrument in the culture of evaluation, for example. It is far from being rare in other domains: for instance, in environmental affairs, where negative reinforcement is largely the predominant discourse. One has only to think of climate warming, the greenhouse effect and the use of fossil fuels to grasp that this prophetic style – the secular edition of the 'Hellfire Sermon' – is very far from dead.

Prophecy as negative reinforcement is to be seen in higher education policy from time to time, largely in the form of opinion that dissents from policy during the phase of negotiation and implementation. Statements about the deterioration in the conditions of academic work, lamentations about the loss of national competitiveness, and – to make the obvious *jeu de mots* – jeremiads about the ravages of managerialism tend to fall

into this category though the luridness of the consequences more often than not tends to be implicit rather than painting an explicit vision of what flows from them. Such representations rest upon the imperative that policy should be amended to avoid the vision unspeakable. They are an interesting instance of prophecy acting in the short term. Indeed, the very shortness of the time intervening between the prediction and the realisation of the unspeakable is often seen by those having recourse to such arguments as justifying in the first place the call for the rapid amending of ways or changing of policy.

Prophecy and Utopia

There is, however, a third variant, which falls into the second of the three categories I outlined earlier. This has to do with 'inspiring Utopias'. Now the essential feature of Utopias in higher education, as Sheldon Rothblatt has argued with his customary brilliance and sparkle (Rothblatt, 2002) is their function as a social critique. In general, utopias are set in far-away places, largely isolated from the outside world. They are also explorations less of the way the present social order could be reconstructed so much as a vehicle for criticizing those particular features of it that the writer – or the prophet – deems undesirable or insufficiently underscored in the present. Thus, for instance, in the original of the *genre*, Thomas More's *Utopia*, one of the main sources of its inspiration, was More's abiding dislike of the acquisitive behaviour that marked 16th century England. Amongst the other critiques that higher education's equivalent of Utopias have developed have been gender relations, manpower planning, social structure and genetics, the classic form of the latter being Aldus Huxley's *Brave New World*, and that other theme, that runs across the centuries from Plato to Newman – namely, the role of learning in securing social stability (Rothblatt, 2002). Utopias have less to do with direct predictions or approximations as to what will or might happen. They are in the literal sense of the word, inconsequential: they have no outcome. Rather their purpose is to pose questions that have not yet been broached. In doing so, they posit a situation and a frame so alien that they are not to be attained, nor are they attainable. Rather they may be seen as 'thought experiments' that draw attention to particular issues. Whether these issues are taken up subsequently, whether they then become part of that eternal question of change 'How to move from what is to what ought to be', is no concern of the seer, though it may become so for those for whom the vision appeals.

The Place of the Pythonesse and Delphi

The final strain in the functions of prophecy – the Delphic School – by contrast, does involve decisions and choice, whereas the Patmos strategy does not. If one looks carefully at the Patmos strategy, irrespective of whether it is grounded in positive reinforcement or negative reinforcement, it is not about choice between different courses of action – or options – so much as making sure that the Faithful follow the line the prophet has revealed.

The Pythonesse of Delphi, however, was nothing if not subtle. Prophecy in this mode was essentially ambiguous. It could be interpreted in many ways. Accordingly, the onus of deciding which interpretation was valid, rested with the supplicant, once he had puzzled out the different meanings and reviewed his own situation. Man might not be master of his own Fate, for the gods were nothing if not capricious. But the application of intelligence, rather than obedience, might sometimes serve to double-guess and out-smart the worst of their intentions. The Pythonesse put a premium not just on self-awareness, but also on cunning.

The Place of Celebration

When one places CHEPS' celebratory romp against this backdrop of the various schools of divination and their purposes, clearly the fit is not an easy one. The scenarios are very far from being utopic in the sense that Rothblatt suggested. They are located in time, situated in place and though inventive in their imagination and imaginings, they provide a plausible connection between where we are and the paths, decisions and marker points that lie along the roads to Centralia, the City of the Sun, to Octavia the Spider-web City and to Vitis Vinifera, the City of Traders and Micro-Climates. Suggestions are made, though they are more explicit in the first scenario than in the second and third about how we reached Jolly Old Europe. In the literature of Utopias, as Rothblatt pointed out, how Paradise is constructed over time, remains a mystery. It is there. How it got there is immaterial. It is this difference that makes the CHEPS scenarios marginal to the Utopian tradition, though it does not wholly exclude them from it. There is a second element that places a distance between the two. The scenarios do not contain an explicit critique of our present condition. They are, to put matters bluntly, an extrapolation from an accepted situation. They are neither a critique nor a *problematique*. And though one could indeed pore over the text to extract a critique from the social values and political assumptions that are set out in each scenario, this would be to place an interpretation on the exercise that it neither bears nor was meant to bear.

It is no coincidence that of the four prophetic schools I mentioned, the closest correspondence both in purpose as well as the name of the methodology employed in this exercise lies with the school of Delphi. CHEPS' scenarios can have no claim – and it has to be said that they never made in it the first place – to be considered as having even remote ties with the Tactic Divine in its purest form, though there are purposes which it fulfils that have a certain kinship with it. There is a very good reason for placing a considerable distance between the Patmos strategy and the European Higher Education and Research Landscape. This is because in academia, there is no place for revealed knowledge. Even so, these visions – all three of them – in varying degrees do have Utopic under-currents in the sense that they are, if not removed from reality, then recognizable as an extreme extrapolation of it. Still, though projected forward, certain dimensions – modes of course delivery, stratification between different types of university, the central place of management and the somewhat fragmented – which is less brutal than battered – place of teaching staff, remain recognizable on the basis of what we know of current trends. Purists and those who do not look upon such developments with great gladness of heart, will point out of course that some of these

projected developments are strictly speaking better qualified as 'dystopic' rather than 'utopic'; that is, they anticipate not a happy scene so much as a distressing one (Rothblatt, 2003). Each to his – or her – own opinion.

The Significance of Scenarios

There is much that is of value in such an exercise, even if as scholars and students of higher education we know all too well that the road even to relatively simple visions of a near future is never straight and rarely turns out as the prophet – or those having power – would have it. And there we have a clue to the appeal that lies in drawing up what is best described as a series of 'idealised alternatives'. For although the Delphi technique does not make a complete break with quantification – indeed, it is to some degree built on it – it is nevertheless a step beyond quantification. It has recourse to those elements of scholarship that, if not to the fore in the way we go about our work, are nevertheless present. Those elements are intuition, insight, the post-rational even. A number of arguments can be adduced for using this unusual approach. A particularly good case could be built which takes as its point of departure the speed of change itself. We have still to ascertain how well higher education institutions cope with change as a constant feature though the lesser prophets of the hour have predicted that if universities do not cope, they will not survive (Duderstadt, 1999).

As a Centre, we have looked at the individual dimensions – governance, management, finance, student costs, academic work, institutional performance and output, to mention some of our feats of arms. But these have been studied largely in an immediate context either to enable others to narrow their options with a view toward acting later or to show what the consequences are or the outcome is, plotted against the original intent. As an alternative, we contribute to the instrumentality for scrutinizing the ability of institutions to meet change and weigh the sensitivity of these proposed indicators. We have yet to express any studied opinion about the effects these changes will have when they operate in conjunction. We tend to examine each aspect separately. And, furthermore, we also tend to leave aside the conditions of their sustainability when set against the sustained performance of the institution. We assume somehow that higher education will cope with change and that those which do not pay the price of an unidentified and generally presumed incompetence. Though it has to be said that the study of 'failing institutions' could well furnish interesting insights into the general issue of adaptation to change as our study of those successful – perhaps more so.

Change, Prophecy and the Higher Education Community

The logic of the acceleration of change – and leaving aside the acceleration of knowledge itself, poses a certain number of – shall we say, 'existential problems' – for the higher education research community. The first and obvious point is that as change speeds up so as scholars in the field we may know more about higher education, but what we know is more rapidly dated. Certainly, our techniques and analyses advance our knowledge and the knowledge of others who rely on us. And in that sense, both we – and they – progress in understanding. But the question remains whether such

advance serves to close the gap between what we analyse and what is taking place before our eyes. Or whether the pace of change serves to make the gap wider. In conditions such as these, forward projection – prophecy by another name – serves a number of purposes. First of all, it provides the opportunity of setting the 'tyranny of the present' in perspective. By projecting forward, we oblige ourselves to undertake a species of synthesis, which is very often denied when working within the conventions that accompany our various disciplines, domains or fields of expertise. In effect, when we embark on long-range scenario building, we stand the interplay between expertise, the corpus of our special knowledge and imagination on their heads. Working within the canons of a particular body of knowledge demands that we limit our imagination and hold it in reign to the techniques and methodologies of our particular personal discipline. Forward projection, by contrast, invites us to place those same techniques and methodologies at the service of our imagination. That is the condition of the intuitive great leap forward. Thus, in reply to Mr. Clemens' bromides, the CHEPS version of prophecy engages the brain very actively – and indeed many brains. It may not be the same part of the brain as those regions where analytic capacity is located. Imagination, some hold, dwells in the left hemisphere rather than the right. But the organ plays its part, even so.

Benefits Bestowed by Building Scenarios

There are also other benefits to be had. In scenario-building, we set ourselves the task of creating a coherence into our different fields, juxtaposing them one against the other. The act of constructing both coherence and synthesis for the future has a 'fall out' on the present. We see how our different disciplines and fields contribute to the constitution of a whole vision, as opposed to our daily use of them to examine the individual facets it contains. By building 'a whole vision', we obtain some insight about the way different disciplinary perspectives may fit together or act in complement to one another. Creating a 'rounded vision' is arguably of especial importance, given the natural trend of 'disciplines' to fragment – a process that Walter Metzger (1987) termed 'subject parturition'. Projecting coherence into the future is then of special significance to the domain that studies higher education. It is important because that domain is already so deeply fragmented that exercises in cohesion – even if projected – provide a counterweight to the fragmentation that is our daily lot and on that account have an indispensable part in creating an awareness of the scope of the domain when different disciplines and perspectives are brought together. Paradoxically, scenario-building thus serves – and here I too am 'hedging my bets'– to improve what the military call 'situational awareness' in the present. Seen from this perspective – which attends less to the nature of the prophetic utterance or to the specific image or vision it entails than to the function it performs for those carrying it out – forward projection contributes to reaffirming both the significance of what one is doing as well as reinforcing the common identity of those doing it.

The Immediate Significance of the Three Cities

In this sense therefore, the very creation of the three Cities of Learning itself fulfils a role not greatly dissimilar to that of the Tactic Divine, in its positive capacity. It reinforces both the collective determination as well as the place of the individual as a practitioner and exponent of a particular discipline or as actor in a particular domain. Forward projection is not simply about how we see the future. It is also a statement of how we view ourselves today, how we work together. The scenario of the future is at the same time a statement of present identity.

This latent function of 'vision-building' in higher education is, or so I consider it, of very special importance for the fields of study that bear on higher education and on higher education policy. The reasons for this assertion are both structural and conjunctural. In the structural domain, the study of higher education stands as the supreme example of multi-disciplinarity. Fifteen years ago, Tony Becher (1992) identified some twenty 'feeder' fields. Others have evolved since. With such a wealth of perspectives on which to draw and, which are also characterised by the rapid development of new ones – evaluation studies, internationalisation, accreditation, to mention but a few – the sheer variety is often an obstacle to being able to claim a specific and recognised intellectual identity. The second reason is simply to re-state the same thing but drawing on a different area of representation and depiction to justify it. This second area has to do with the depth in the changes that are settling around the institution of higher education.

Moving the Metaphor: or, Beyond Statistics

It is the basic and constant belief of every generation in industrial society that it lives through changes more radical and far-reaching than its parents ever did. And much of the effort of scholarship in the social sciences has been directed towards devising ways of testing, plotting and substantiating that claim. Higher education is no exception. Today, many of the most powerful ways of registering change are based on quantification and they have varying degrees of appropriateness, sensitivity and relevance. There are, however, other indicative forms apart from statistical indicators. One of the most interesting, though very little used, is the shift in metaphor to illustrate changes in social perception. It is an approach rarely used in higher education for the obvious fact that if linguistic analysis is certainly part of those fields that may occasionally shed light on our quasi-penumbra, it is not in the mainstream of the social sciences and rarely is to be seen wandering around our neck of the woods in Academe.

We are all aware of this shift in metaphor if only because we deal with it and are engaged in analysing the very changes that have brought it about and which, in its turn, it brings about. No-one in higher education can fail to be aware of 'metaphor shift' even though it tends to parade under different flags. Metaphor shift is seen in the re-designation of Vice Chancellors and Rectors as Chief Executive Officers, of students as 'consumers', administrators as 'managers', with everyone from governments through to alumni and sponsors lumped together as 'Stakeholders'. Perhaps most

wounding of all is the metamorphosis, fragmentation and forcible ejection of Faculty or academic staff from the heights of Donnish Dominion down into a general, quasi-proletarian and definitely subterranean category described as 'knowledge workers', the whole accompanied by a mealy-mouthed jargon, variously culled from writings on 'Human Resources', private business practice and management gobbledegook (Fuller, in press). The shift can be described in terms many and various: as part of that long-drawn-out historical process that has been going on for the best part of two centuries or more in Europe – namely the *désacralisation* of knowledge and of its institutions; or in more immediate and contemporary terms, as the central process in the drive towards the so-called Knowledge Economy; alternatively, as one of the stages that mark higher education's assimilation into 'the market' and the subsequent commodification of knowledge. You pays your money and you takes your perspective.

Balancing Metaphors Ancient and Modern

Given the power that changes in terminology have in shaping the way activities and functions are perceived and understood, the basic metaphor on which the three CHEPS scenarios have been erected, it is of more than passing interest. The vision CHEPS builds is not simply a projection forward of current trends already rooted in the new imagining and in the new 'human resources' discourse. It is also grounded in a very traditional 'framing metaphor' – that of the City. The use of the City as a metaphor for the university – and, by extension, for the higher education system – is a very old and respectable literary conceit. In choosing it, CHEPS reminds us that the City – like the university itself – was from the earliest times the symbol of freedom. One has only to recall to mind the German proverb '*Stadtluft macht frei*' for this particular association to be born out. The City was also the place where two contradictory forces in human affairs – continuity and change – were played out, shaped the polity and did so in ways occasionally urbane (Neave, 2005).

Interesting debates can be had over the precise moment when the purpose of the university was re-defined less in terms of 'continuity *and* change' which contains a number of very specific presumptions about the university's role in society, and the moment when that basic vision moved on to the no less subtle combination of 'continuity *in the midst of* change' which has equally fundamental consequences for the purpose of both system and institution.[2] What we can say with little fear of contradiction is that these self-same forces of continuity combined with change also brought the university down from its status as 'the City on the Hill' – itself a metaphor striking on account of its overt religious connotations – and, as Clark Kerr noted with insight and eloquence more than forty years ago, brought the university into the City and imposed on the university the industrialised form of the multi-versity (Kerr, 1964).

[2] I have explored the interplay between these two conditions in the seminar dedicated to celebrating the life work of our good friend, Maurice Kogan (Neave, 2005).

The Garden of Delight

The City is not the only enduring metaphor. There is another. It too is variously woven into the three scenarios. It was singularly influential in shaping the 18th and 19th century university both in the United Kingdom and the United States. It is a theme that once again has been pursued with deftness and sensitivity by Sheldon Rothblatt (1998). This is the horticultural metaphor of the university and its functions. Indeed, the University as a Garden of Delight, which is what Eden signifies in the Hebrew, brings together both the most ancient images – prelapsarian – in both theology and in education (for Paradise Lost was nothing if not a supremely pedagogic experience, indeed it was the very first in an infinite trail of moral tales) which subsequently made its way into the history of the University (Ruegg and De Ridder Simoens, 1992). The horticultural metaphor played its particular part in shaping both the vision of higher learning and very often, its physical siting. The green field campus which is in effect a Lapalissade – an oxymoron – since campus in Latin means field – has been immensely influential shaping those systems of higher education where students are seen as adolescents – as young people in need of protection from the wiles and temptations of this world (Rothblatt, 1998). By the same token, those cultures in which students were held to be fully mature and self guided – in a word, autonomous – tended to place their universities in the heart of cities, on the contrary assumption that it was necessary for future leaders to be in direct contact with the society they would eventually lead. Whether by endorsement or denial, however, the horticultural metaphor – symbolic of an enclosed, organic, self-sustaining community – has long been used to describe ideal institutional and organisational forms from the Old Testament through to Hieronymus Bosche and beyond.

As an aside, it is surely paradoxical to say the least that CHEPS' should so resolutely woo the urban metaphor for in truth, the University of Twente is the only Dutch university to be set in a garden. We can then, like Falstaff, 'babble of green fields' and do so with considerable justification. And though these scenarios have been constructed around the urban metaphor, it is also a matter of record that an earlier episode in scenario-building on the future of higher education in the Netherlands saw CHEPS cultivating the horticultural metaphor with equal vigour (Huisman, Westerheijden & de Boer, 2001).

Expropriating the Garden

Whilst the garden remained a symbol of purity and innocence, it was also a symbol of detachment from the things of this world. The Garden beyond the City – or even the Garden within the City for that matter – has, to all intents and purposes, vanished as a symbol of the university in mainland Europe. It still retains its power, however, in what is perhaps erroneously called the 'Anglo-Saxon world' where today it plays a slightly different role – that of being a final expression confirming another version of institutional stratification. In a world where the relationship between University and Society is increasingly based on the principle of integration, of closer links between the two, the horticultural metaphor can apply only to certain establishments. Thus, the Garden becomes not a shared construct so much as a construct that sets those grounded in it, apart from the rest. It is no longer a shared ideal but a statement of difference.

More to the point, the metaphor is knowingly used to uphold that difference and very particularly so when it combines with an elite status. Thus, the outward constancy of the metaphor itself hides a shift in the associations, *sous-entendus* and connotations within it.

The shift within the metaphor is most evident in precisely those systems where the 'marketisation' of higher education stands at its most advanced – that is, in the Anglo-Saxon systems – the United States, the United Kingdom and above all, as an example of the offspring overtaking its ancestors – Australia. In a world where competition is fought out through images and symbols, that of the Campus as Garden assumes a new weight in projecting a specific elite appeal, setting those able to sustain it, off and apart from the urbanised and universal segments of the higher education system that the three scenarios anticipate, though developing along different paths. The symbol of the university qua Garden is then an interesting pointer to the changing function of a particular metaphor, which outwardly seems to derive from continuity between certain modern elite universities and the stereotype of a pre-industrial Arcadia, but in fact serves a very different purpose. Hence, whilst there are neo-Arcadians as a political party in Centralia, the City of bureaucracy triumphant, I am by no means sure that Arcadia as an image for 'selling' high quality learning will either desert Academia, still less be relegated to irrelevance. Quite the contrary.

Leaning on the Ivory Tower

Yet, the Garden metaphor is not the only one to suffer from 'epistemic drift'. That trusty cliché – which is a metaphor worn down to the bleeding gums – of academia as an Ivory Tower has been subject to similar reworking since its first usage by Wilhelm von Humboldt (Nybom, 2003) as indeed, in certain quarters has the notion of the 'Humboldtian University' (Varia, 2004). Rather than being conditions to ensure the impartial and sceptical nature of academic work – of distance and time placed between the individual academic and outside society – these very same expressions are today associated with overtones of detachment qua institutional irresponsibility, of individual self-indulgence, social futility, pedagogic irrelevance and undesirable on all those counts. Indeed, if we look very closely at the situation portrayed in all three of our scenarios, it is clear that we have, in a manner of speaking, come full cycle. For just as the Ivory Tower no longer stands as an expression of the desirable – quite the contrary, it is more often than not highly pejorative in its current usage – so the city has changed its status. In all three of the CHEPS scenarios, the city and the university are inseparable. Effectively, in Vitis Vinifera, the former has wholly engulfed the latter. Its singularities have been absorbed and dispersed across an immense, ephemeral and basically anarchic social construct. The University is no longer the city come down from the hill. Rather, it has been ingested by the city. It has become symbiote of service to the city rather than an institution possessing a particular and definite identity.

Envoi

It is precisely when long-accepted metaphors begin to acquire different overlays, to convey an image and a meaning at odds with what was previously conveyed that we need to have some idea where we may be going. Or at the very least to have some insight into the range of probable alternatives that deserve scrutiny. Precisely why higher education stands to benefit from this perhaps more than other domains, I have argued earlier. Presenting such alternatives – however idealised they are – serves another purpose and that is to show very precisely that policy ought not to rely on single track solutions – or to take refuge in the cry of the unimaginative that there is in essence, no alternative. We may not be clear about where we are going and even less sure about how we will get there. But the willingness to contemplate alternatives that could arise from our present condition makes us aware that accepting today's orthodox account is in all probability neither necessary nor very wise. In short, it is precisely when metaphors begin to change their inner reference points that prophets come into their own. They force us to go beyond the routine of the moment. Even if their visions are apocalyptic, an exaggeration or even a pastiche of what we perceive as possible from our own appreciation of the condition in which we find ourselves, we find ourselves obliged to contemplate alternative possibilities. And that is indeed the serious business if not of prophesying then very certainly of scenario-building.

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Part 3

A Europe of Regions: Responses to the Scenarios from within Europe

9 Scenarios for Policy in a Knowledge Society

Frans Dijkstra, Yanti Mamahit, Renk Roborgh and Jan van Velsen

Scenarios for Policy

How should scenario writers put down on paper their vision of the future for higher education to ensure policymakers are irresistibly tempted to incorporate this vision in their policy documents? This is the question we want to explore in this chapter.

Compilers of future scenarios get a great deal of creative satisfaction from them. The way in which the events in Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera were presented at the CHEPS anniversary in September 2004 is a good example. It is an intellectual challenge to consider the consequences of developments, some of which you can already see happening and some of which are to be expected. The science of devising scenarios has developed considerably in the past decades. This is apparent if we re-read past scenarios and compare them with current reality:

- In 1965 the Rand Corporation asked the opinion of 150 experts as to expected scientific breakthroughs (Gorton & Helmer, 1965). Some of them have happened (such as the moon landings), whilst others failed to materialise (like the Mars landing in 1984 and operational nuclear fusion as a source of energy between 1980 and 2000), and many long-term predictions now only serve to bring a smile to our lips.
- In 1972 the Club of Rome published scenarios for raw materials, the environment and overpopulation, which suggested the world would be in a disastrous state by the year 2005 if current developments continued unhampered (Meadow, et al., 1972).

Scenario thinkers no longer work in this way. Generally they do not just present us with one particular future but a series of alternatives, all of which have a certain plausibility. This applies quite clearly to the CHEPS scenarios. Do such creative

products help us in formulating new policies? Does it suffice to say that, on the whole, all of the options are possible and current policy is already taking them into account these possibilities?

Links for Policy

A vision of the future which clearly offers something for policymakers to consider, in this case university administrators, can be found in an article entitled *Dealing With the Future Now* by Alan Guskin and Mary Marcy (2003). They work out a number of principles for a vital university campus in a climate of restricted financial resources. Their scenario is very simple: university budgets are under pressure and this is not a temporary problem. The economic boom around the turn of the century disguised this fact for a few years, but recession has again exposed the problems: society needs and will continue to need a lot of money for things other than higher education, such as health care, while tax revenue is diminishing. Universities can respond by muddling through, the motto being 'this too will pass'. But universities can also realise that it is a long-term problem that needs a long-term solution and reform themselves accordingly. It is for those who realise this that Guskin and Marcy present three organisational principles and seven transformational actions for providing a first-rate education at less expense per student using new technology, abandoning the idea that education involves a teacher standing in front of a class.

- Organising Principle I: Create a clear and coherent vision of the future focused on student learning, quality of faculty work life and reduced cost per student.
- Organising Principle II: Transform the educational delivery system consistent with the vision of the future:
  - Transformative action 1: establish and assess institution-wide common student learning outcomes as a basis for the undergraduate degree
  - Transformative action 2: restructure the role of faculty to include faculty members and other campus professionals as partners in student learning, while integrating technology
  - Transformative action 3: recognise and integrate student learning from all sources
  - Transformative action 4: audit and restructure curricula to focus on essential academic programmes and curricular offering
- Organising principle III: transform the organisational systems consistent with the vision of the future:
  - Transformative action 5: utilize zero-based budgeting to audit and redesign the budget allocation process, involving faculty and staff as responsible partners
  - Transformative action 6: audit and restructure administrative and student services systems, using technology and integrated staffing arrangements to reduce costs
  - Transformative action 7: audit and redesign technological and staff infrastructure to support transformational change.

This is an example of a simple scenario with a high degree of probability which results in a number of specific recommendations for universities that do not wish to simply muddle through. A scenario for higher education which is of help to policymakers in their work will give tentative answers to the questions confronting them. Such a scenario might indicate adequate organisational principles and actions for a national government to undertake in order to develop a system of higher education that satisfies the need for a well-educated workforce, without additional strains being placed on public funds.

Scenarios for Higher Education: a Small Tour

A scenario is not a forecast but a description of how the world could look if certain already observable developments were to continue in a certain way. With the knowledge we already have, some scenarios can be regarded as being less likely than others, but that knowledge can become rapidly outdated. Some scenarios may be less desirable than others in the current political constellation, but this constellation could change within a few years.

Literature and the internet are full of scenarios on how the world will look in general and on the role of universities in society. The power of scenarios lies in thinking through trends and providing footholds to thwart or reduce the effects of certain trends through policy. The weakness of scenarios lies in the near impossibility of anticipating trend-breaking developments. This is obvious when we re-read past scenarios (Dijkstra, 2002). Twenty years ago scenarios were already dominated by the repercussions of information technology. Even so, those scenarios failed to forecast the developments happening right now. The far-reaching possibilities of combining computers and telecommunications were not foreseen. People talked about IT, but not about ICT and despite many IT scenarios the development of the internet took the world completely by surprise within the space of five years.

Intermezzo: Trends in the Naming of Scenarios

Up to a few years ago there was often a clear connection between the name of a scenario and the principles on which it was based. Names such as ‘Divided Europe’, ‘European coordination’ or ‘Global competition’ (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek & Centraal Planbureau, 1997) left no-one in any doubt. The scenarios encountered in current literature have more creative names, as the following list illustrates.

Names of recent scenarios

- Warehouse A&M (National Education Association, 2005)
- MacCollege Inc. (National Education Association, 2005)
- Cutting Edge University. (National Education Association, 2005)
- Pax Americana (National Intelligence Council, 2004)
- A new caliphate (National Intelligence Council, 2004)
- Cycle of fear (National Intelligence Council, 2004)
- Centralia, the City of the Sun (see chapter 4)
- Octavia, the Spider-web City (see chapter 5)
- Vitis Vinifera, the City of Traders and Micro-Climates (see chapter 6)

- Common Ground (Mowat, Purdy & Adams, 2003)
- Survival of the fittest (Mowat, Purdy & Adams, 2003)
- Tempestuous times (Mowat, Purdy & Adams, 2003)
- Worlds apart (Mowat, Purdy & Adams, 2003)
- The golden Triangle (www.futurestudies.co.uk)
- On the Edge (www.futurestudies.co.uk)
- The last Castle (www.futurestudies.co.uk)
- Drowning Spires (www.futurestudies.co.uk)

The general scenarios for global development are above all concerned with the contrast between an open and liberalised world market on the one hand and protectionism and government regulation on the other. Other items of interest to scenario writers are technological progress, economic growth, the worldwide distribution of wealth and developments in the field of energy supply, climate and the environment.

Higher Education

Market forces mass participation, quality and excellence, and the impact of ICT currently dominate scenario studies on higher education.

Market Forces

Many scenarios are based on a development towards less public money for higher education, a lower share of the national income and government policy driven more by the philosophy of usefulness and legitimacy, so that higher education will become more dependent on other sources of finance. These are matters one reads about in scenarios dating back ten or twenty years. With the knowledge we now have these still maintain a high reality content. The growing costs of health care, safety and pensions mean higher education is encountering serious competition from other demands on the government budget. But let's not exaggerate. The budget for higher education in the Netherlands in real terms has not fallen in the last twenty years as much as some think. In the current governing agreement one can even see an increase of investment in the knowledge infrastructure. It is also a distinct possibility future European governments will also see the importance of knowledge to the economies of their countries, especially now so much production has relocated to low wage countries.

Mass Participation

Governments in many different European countries are aiming to increase higher education participation. The Dutch Governments' Higher Education and Research Plan 2004, following in the wake of Sweden and the UK, aims at 50% participation by 2010. This is the figure on which many scenarios are based. The combination of expected budgetary restrictions and quality improvement necessitated by global competition makes innovative improvements in education indispensable. ICT is the key to this.

Quality and Excellence

Higher education in the Netherlands has traditionally been a landscape where one did not refer to institutions which stood out above the rest, if there were any. The probability of the development of leading institutions has consequently been relatively underestimated in scenario studies in the last twenty years and even now attempts to rank excellence in higher education provoke strong reactions in university circles.

The Impact of ICT

Most scenario writers and the respondents on whom they base their findings are convinced the nature of education and research will change dramatically now higher education is becoming less tied to time and place, resulting in universities becoming both physical and virtual campuses. Nevertheless, the desirability of this development is not always appreciated. Should universities remain the physical place where teaching staff and students meet, creating, in mutual interaction, the foundations for the knowledge society?

Policymakers of Today and Higher Education in 2020

There are enough scenarios for higher education in 2012 or 2020 but what can policymakers do with them?

In the last section of this contribution we want to explore the obstacles they encounter in drafting long term policies. The main obstacles are the dominance of the short term (that is to say, the period for which a governing agreement applies) and the dominance of existing policy or ideas. The scenario maker who wants to exert an influence would do well to realise this and make recommendations policymakers can use within the term of a governing agreement, and which are so well-founded that given existing ideas they cannot be peremptorily disregarded.

Dominance of the Short Term

A governing agreement is drawn up for a period of four years after the elections have taken place. The outcome of the elections cannot be predicted several years in advance nor be directly influenced by policymakers. Consequently the governing agreement drafted after elections is not predictable either. The impact of policymakers on the governing agreement is very limited. In the months prior to forming a government civil servants make recommendations, files are compiled and priorities and lesser priorities are proposed, but the ultimate impact of these on a governing agreement is very much a moot point. So although a governing agreement only covers a period of four years it is expected that both the government and its policymakers look much further ahead, and this is in fact what happens. Virtually every government arranges a number of structural matters for higher education, the impact of which is felt much longer than the four years during which that government is in office. The implementation of the bachelor/master structure by the then Education minister Mr Hermans in 2002 was

intended to affect the structure of higher education for several decades and to link up with a broad development throughout Europe. The new Higher Education Act, on which the present government is working, will also determine higher education development for many years to come. A subsequent government may introduce further pieces of legislation but the main points are expected to become law in 2007.

Dominance of Existing Policy and Existing Ideas

There is a tendency to take a defensive attitude towards new information and come up with reasons why the information should not result in changes to existing policy. This can be done through showing the new information is not relevant to existing policy, disputing its quality or mentioning factors which have not been taken into account, through suggesting the research is based on obsolete data (on the assumption the world has changed completely), that methods are not described, justification is lacking, sources are not mentioned, etc. New information is always viewed against the background of information already known and on which current policy has been based. Information is only very rarely really new. Usually there is a great deal of information about related subjects and it is hardly ever identical and without controversy. Arguments for ignoring new information therefore are legion.

Getting beyond the Issues of the Day

We can see from the above that a government is indeed capable of having an impact on higher education for a period of time longer than its term of office. With a future vision, supported by scenarios based on thorough research which cannot be dismissed out of hand on the basis of existing ideas, a scenario writer can help the policymaker confront the longer term in a realistic way. A combination of the CHEPS approach to the scenarios and policy recommendations made by Guskin and Mary could very well be useful to our policymakers.

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10 A Response to the CHEPS Scenarios on Higher Education and Research in 2020

Guy Haug

I have been invited to react to the three scenarios for European higher education and research in 2020 designed by CHEPS. I am pleased to do so, not officially on behalf of the European Commission, but more modestly as an expert who has been involved for some time in the process of prospective analysis and change planning in these areas and may therefore have some insight on the issue.

Let me first thank CHEPS for offering us a new, different, specific and refreshing approach to the issues involved. I think we need these kind of studies, with a clearly prospective dimension, but without too prescriptive conclusions. CHEPS sketches three different ways into the medium term (2020) future, but leaves the choice between them rather open.

The CHEPS Scenarios in Context

There is one specific reason why the CHEPS scenarios are particularly interesting. I read them in combination with the outcomes of the consultation of stakeholders launched by the Commission's Communication on 'The role of universities in the Europe of knowledge' (Communication of the European Commission, 2003) of last year. The more than 150 responses from European and national associations and institutions cover in essence the same questions as the CHEPS research but from a different perspective.

It seems to me also interesting – and important – to read the CHEPS scenarios together with the EU policy agenda with respect to higher education and research – naturally in full compliance with the subsidiarity principle. In addition to the intergovernmental Bologna process, there is now also an agenda for change in higher education, research and innovation as part of the EU's overall Lisbon Strategy. The decisive role of

universities has been acknowledged ever more clearly in recent years and we now have in the EU context, for the first time ever, a situation where national educational authorities are committed to make their policies converge towards a number of shared European goals. This is bound to shape the future scenarios – probably all of them – at least to a certain extent.

Specific Comments on the Three Scenarios

How Mutually Exclusive are the Three Scenarios?

In my reading of the three scenarios, the first one is centred on the role of the state (with questions about the extent of the deregulation, which in many European countries is unlikely to go beyond certain limits), the second is mainly focused on higher education institutions (HEI) and stresses the balance between the forces of tradition and those of change, and the third is mainly shaped by the market.

I appreciate that for the sake of identifying and differentiating scenarios this kind of 'trichotomy' may intellectually be very tempting and illustrative. Yet, the most likely seems to me that the future will be shaped precisely by the power game between these three poles. This interaction will almost certainly be different in different countries or even regions in Europe, as well as over time (I can easily imagine that after a period of change in one of the three directions, there will be a reaction resulting in a move to one of the other poles). I also believe all scenarios will be influenced by the overall pace and direction of the process of European integration in the years ahead. I would have liked to see a clearer reference to this specifically European background – whereas the three basic scenarios as they stand could have been designed and could apply in any continent or country in the world. Another angle from which this could be expressed would be to say the transition from the current situation to any of those envisaged for 2020 is likely to be a rather chaotic process, not a straight move in the direction of any of the three scenarios.

The Scenarios have much in Common – even though these Common Trends or Factors would of course Apply in different Contexts and to Varying Degrees.

Trend towards diversification/stratification:

This trend is likely to be a common feature in all scenarios, even though it may be acknowledged or organised in many different ways. For example, the way in which quality assurance and/or accreditation are organised could push or inhibit this trend in each of the scenarios. Other factors that may shape differentiation are the role and status of the non-university (colleges/polytechnic) sector, language policies emphasising diversity or favouring English as a common denominator, and the more or less strong push and support for Bologna reforms in government and university circles.

HEI management:

The importance of HEI management is another dimension common to all three scenarios; coping with state and market is an important function with an immediate impact on quality, relevance and responsiveness, differentiation in terms of mission and priorities, management of change and of communication, development of talent and of leadership, etc.

Multiple source funding:

It seems to me very likely that whatever the dominant scenario over the next 10-15 years becomes, the trend towards a much greater diversification of funding will be unavoidable; the current dependency on state funding of universities in many European countries is likely to become less and less viable, while at the same time the contribution of industry, foundations, families is likely to grow in all scenarios for economic as well as social and political reasons.

Importance of networks:

This is another factor likely to be common to all scenarios; networking in the European higher education area is – and will in all probability remain – key for quality and excellence as well as for integration in the mainstream of modernisation in European higher education.

Internationalisation:

The trends towards Europeanisation and internationalisation has been a dominant feature in European higher education over the last decade; it will not stop and should in my view have been taken into account more clearly in the definition of all three scenarios.

Regional imbalance:

The already quite concerning imbalance in the development and 'level' of higher education between countries and regions in Europe is almost certain to increase in the years ahead. Even strong political will and investment will find it difficult to counteract this deep-rooted trend. I also believe we will see stronger competition, not only between HEIs, but between systems and sub-systems of higher education.

Comparison of the Scenarios with the outcomes of the Consultation

I would like to briefly underline three quite conspicuous differences in emphasis of the scenarios and the stakeholders consultation.

Higher education as a 'public good', or in a smoother way as a 'public responsibility', is much more strongly emphasised in the consultation than the scenarios, including Centralia; this may be just a consequence of the limited importance paid in the scenarios to what is specifically European.
Strong expectations from Europe: one of the strongest messages emerging from the consultation of stakeholders (as well as from more recent discussions at European level) is that universities expect a great deal from Europe; they call for more initiatives and support (in terms of policy and funding) from the EU, and this call is usually coupled with a demand for less inhibiting national regulations; such regulations tend to be seen more and more as holding universities back in their efforts to adapt to new circumstances and prepare for the future. I think it would have been interesting for the scenarios to pay attention to this, and maybe to distinguish in Centralia between the various 'state' circles (regions, countries, EU). In the same way, in the other two scenarios, this leads back to HEI governance as a key issue.
In the opposite direction, I have the impression that *competition with the US,* which tends to be overstated in the consultation and maybe the Communication itself, is not present in any of the three scenarios; one explanation might be the scenarios do not really consider the specifically European dimension of the issues involved (global competition, brain drain, impact of universities on growth, etc); another that the global challenges are more diffused (with mounting challenges coming e.g. from Asia) than assumed in the Commission's Communication of 2003.

A Useful and Timely Prospective View

The above comments are not meant to diminish the value or timeliness of the study carried out by CHEPS or of the conclusions that can be drawn from it. The scenarios cast light on some fundamental trends that will be at play in European higher education and research in the coming years and possibly decades that lie ahead. My main purpose is to comment on the interpretation of the scenarios and the possibilities to use them for policy making and shaping. From this perspective, I would like to emphasise that the CHEPS study and its three scenarios will provide a useful and timely input to the indispensable policy debate that needs to underpin the creation of the European Higher Education Area and the European Research Area.

I mentioned in my introduction that policy making at European level would be well inspired to have a close look at the scenarios (all of them) in parallel with other prospective studies such as on the research and innovation function of universities (STRATA-ETAN Group, 2002; High Level Expert Group, 2003), on the development of 'human capital' for the knowledge society and the globalisation era, or on funding issues.

I am quite convinced the scenarios will be useful for informing the ongoing discussions on such key issues as quality/attractiveness, HEI and system governance, the consequences of under-funding and the importance of mobilising new sources of funding (see European Commission, 2005).

For this exercise, as well as for similar analyses and policy considerations at national, regional and institutional level, the CHEPS research is likely to provide useful food for thought for quite some time to come. Paradoxically, the highest value may be found not so much in the three scenarios, which are by necessity an over-simplified representation of fundamental trends, but in the facts gathered to draw them up: in addition to the scenarios, the CHEPS study also served to identify and to illustrate a number of situations and developments which European universities find desirable, which they fear and which they expect. These observations are directly relevant to policy thinking and making. I was in particular fascinated by the analysis of those areas where there are huge differences between how desirable or threatening and how likely certain developments are seen by the higher education community (see chapter 3).

To conclude, let me express my appreciation and my gratitude to all those who contributed to the CHEPS scenarios.

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11 Two Rival Forms of Scenario

Ronald Barnett

Constrained and Constraining

What might be plausible scenarios for the European higher education and research landscapes in 2020? We should, of course, distinguish two kinds of scenario: those that fall within a *horizon of expectations*; and those that fall within a *horizon of aspirations*. These two horizons may or may not overlap. Our expectations and hopes may coincide to a large extent; or there may be clear water between them: what we expect to happen may offer us no succour for our ideals. But then a challenge opens up: can we so formulate our ideals that they may turn into feasible possibilities; so that they may even come into view within the horizon of our expectations?

A related reflection here is that, if we are not careful, our scenarios may be unduly influenced by contemporary frames of thought and policy-making; to borrow a phrase, what MacIntyre termed in a somewhat different context 'the self-images of our age'. Scenario formation in turn may not be a neutral exercise but work in support of bringing into being its own creations; scenarios may become a self-fulfilling set of prophecies. It is understandable, for instance, if scenario formation in higher education in today's context, begins with dominant concepts and concerns of the relationships between state and institutions, the relationships between the institutions themselves, student fees, research selectivity, relationships between higher education and the business world, frameworks for validation and accreditation of courses, entrepreneurialism and lifelong learning. Even if different positions are identified on any of these dimensions so as to differentiate different scenarios, there will still be a large degree of correspondence between the scenarios. They will be variants on a set of themes. Certainly, individual scenarios will be seen to welcome additional thematic visitors – such as higher education as leisure, or universities as networks or private organisations; but the sense of the scenarios fitting into a dominant set of presuppositions and thereby being unduly constrained will remain.

More than that, such a set of scenarios could be accused not merely of being unduly narrow but also of being ideological. Their ideological character would turn on their being vehicles for the furthering of a 'modernising' project. This involves links between institutions at all manner of levels, universities – through both their research and teaching functions – orienting themselves towards the world of work, knowledge itself having a performative character, the state playing a limited (though not insignificant) role in the financing of higher education and institutions taking on an increasing role in that respect, and students also taking on a significant level of responsibility for the financing of their education.

Such a framework for comprehending higher education is a mix of 'neo-liberalism' and pan-Europeanism. If something like this is taken as a set of pre-suppositions for scenario planning, then the scenarios that emerge are going to be ideological in that they pretend to be different but are variants of a common model. As such, they are liable to diminish debate and limit the range of thinking rather than open it up. Such scenarios here are not only constrained; they will also constrain.

It may even be felt in the course of an exercise of this kind that reflection on 'the idea of a university' is outmoded for, surely, the thinking would run there can be no single idea of a university that will carry us forward well into the twenty-first century. In the future, we shall need to be as open as possible and not fetter ourselves with ideas as might emerge by reflection on the idea of the university. 'Only philosophers and historians (will) retain any real interest in the question of what a university is.' (Vitis Vinifera.) There is, of course, an irony here: presumably, our scenario imaginings are supposed to set us free to think the impossible. Our scenarios have a rhetorical justification in that they may help us to see our present into the future, and so glimpse in the present quite new possibilities. Scenario creation is supposed to be emancipatory. But, as it turns out in practice, scenarios that emerge in practice may 'cabin, crib and confine' us.

Scenarios of Difference

Suppose that we were to set out to develop some scenarios of universities that were mutually distinct. Here are a few embryonic scenarios, and scenarios that fall outside the dominant framework:

Critical Conscience of Society

This university understands that it is engaged with the wider society as such there is a relationship of mutual accountability. The university is accountable to society and the wider society is also accountable to the university. The wider society opens a space for such a university since it, the host society, understands that to have such an institution in its midst offers an added value to society. This is not an economic added value directly but a discursive added value. Through such a university presence in its midst, the wider society is aided in becoming an ever more open society.

What might such a university look like? A university that has in its mission a responsibility to be part of the critical conscience of society. Such a role could work in all of the main activities of the university. In its study programmes, students would be invited to critically reflect on the character of their chosen discipline or profession. They would inquire into its potential ideological leanings. In its research, academics would be sensitive to the potentially critical force of their projects and findings. In turn this means academics would take on the role of public intellectuals and engage, on the basis of their expertise, with the wider society, offering critical commentaries on contemporary institutions and practices in society and also suggesting alternative possibilities. In their income-generating activities, academics would not just competently fulfil the expectations of their clients but would also have an eye to the public good and seek at the same time to offer – however gently and subtlety, and even surreptitiously – a critical commentary on the client's practices.

Such a set of critical postures, we may note, could not be described as oppositional for they are essentially positive in character, seeking to identify plausible alternative understandings and practices. These critical postures, after all, are a consciousness within society: they remind the wider society of its own hopes and dreams; they work towards realistic but imaginary scenarios that may help to better realise the wider society's own declared values.

University for the Public Good

In the university for the public good, there would be an element in every course of study in which students would be required to be active in the community. For professional courses such as law or design, such links would be organic, in which students could either offer – under strict professional control – their services to 'clients' or could 'peer tutor' in schools; in other areas they could act as interns, supporting the work of professionals in say medicine or politics.

The university for the public good would characteristically be an open university; and literally so. Its doors would be largely open: it would be a community resource, hosting and providing facilities for all manner of cultural and social events. Deals would be struck with local and regional community groups who would be able to use its resources at reduced rates.

Such a university would also be open in other senses. It would identify and make available – even for a level of fees – the expertise of its staff. But it would not be content with listing such interests and expertise on its web pages to allow others to make overtures for those services; this university would be pro-active in projecting its intellectual resources and in being active in the community identifying where positive links might be made.

The university for the public good would require its staff to communicate their research to wide audiences, that they not only give public lectures but use all their ingenuity to project their ideas and findings to the wider society. Its staff, in other words, would be required to be public intellectuals and this would hold across all disciplines.

A University for Human Good

In the university for human good, students would be centre stage. Here, 'higher education' would be understood to be a formative and developmental process. In other words, *Bildung* would be taken seriously: it would be worked at deliberately and not just assumed to be present. In particular, pedagogy would be at least as important as curricula: the pedagogical relationship would be understood to be crucial to the student's progress. The nurturing of the student's being would be given attention; space would be accorded in curricula for each student to become herself and himself more fully.

Higher education here would be a process of unfolding and increasing authenticity, in which students would be encouraged to formulate and advance their own ideas. But such a process of personal creativity and projection would be practised not just intellectually and epistemologically but as a matter of the development of self. This higher education would be a particularly ontological process.

Curricula here would, as remarked, be less a matter of filling units with particular experiences and more a matter of the imaginative design of (structured) spaces. In this university, it will be understood that only by according students spaces, albeit structured spaces, can students gain the autonomy and, indeed, self-confidence for fully authentic achievements. Here, inspirational teaching will not be unusual but commonplace; for it will be understood the inspiring of students, the imparting of new life, new energies, new states of being, is a necessary condition of a higher education as a human good.

This ethos will be carried over into the life of this university as a whole. Imaginative ways will be found of developing a sense of community. In a complex multi-faculty university, there will be many communities; but this university strives to enable all its members to feel they have a stake in it. Strategic review processes will attempt to be inclusive, such that everyone feels they are part of such processes and their views are not just welcomed but will count. Hierarchy will not be abolished but its most evident forms will be diminished.

University for the Learning Society

The university for the learning society will not just include a mention of 'the learning society' in its mission statement, but will define and structure itself around the idea. The preposition 'for' is critical here. The UK 1997 National Inquiry into higher education led to a report entitled 'Higher Education *in* the Learning Society', whereas

this university is *for* the learning society. That is, it understands its key mission is to help to bring about a learning society; it does not take for granted that the learning society is already extant.

This university interprets its key task at different levels. Curricula are shaped so as to help students develop the potential not merely productively to survive in a complex world but to add to that world. Such students would have the will to go on learning throughout their lives and would be moulded into critical citizens who can assist the institutions in which they find themselves – and even the wider society – also to go on learning. Two desiderata flow immediately from this requirement as far as the students' programmes of study are concerned. *Firstly*, their curricula would have to be multidisciplinary. This does not mean there should not be some central theme or 'subject'; what it does mean is any key theme or subject is set in a wider context. In that way, students might be furnished with the larger intellectual capacities to frame professional and societal issues in larger contexts that they are typically presented. *Secondly*, the pedagogical processes should be both open and (yet) prompting of criticality. Only through this are students going to acquire the fortitude and critical spirit necessary to be able to bring critical and yet positive stances to bear on their future professional and social experiences.

The university that works for the learning society is also turned directly outwards. Its academics in their roles as researchers understand they have a responsibility to offer up to the wider society their thoughts and findings in such ways that they can be taken on board by wide audiences. In addition, its academics understand they themselves have a direct responsibility to be making informed contributions to public debates: every academic here is a public intellectual. In this way the university acts directly to help the wider society learn about itself and so advance its own self-steering mechanisms. This university assists the wider society to become more rational: it may be that the world is so complex that it cannot fully be brought under rational control, but at least the university for the learning society can play its part in assisting society to become more reflexive and enlightened about its options. This university for the learning society helps society to learn about itself.

Plausibility and Feasibility

Against the background of these four sketches of possible scenarios, we can return to our opening question and put it even more sharply. What are scenarios? Are they plausible projections of a situation in which we find ourselves today? Or might they be imaginative projections of new worlds, daring ideas, dreams even? The equivocation in the use of the term 'projection' will be apparent. On the one hand, projection stands for an elongation, a furthering of a present structure. Another floor is added to the building that is already standing. We contain ourselves, confine ourselves, within our present-day structures. On the other hand, projection stands for a project, and an imaginative project at that. Here, we escape the confines of our present positionings, our present structures. This escape isn't easily achieved. It calls for courage, persistence and struggle.

Both kinds of projection are worthwhile but their differences are huge. In the first kind of projection, in projecting forward largely from where we are, we would be working within dominant contemporary assumptions – for example, as to the desirability of the continuing modernisation and integration of Europe and of the role of higher education in the construction of a knowledge economy. This kind of exercise has a dual value. Firstly, we may glimpse a range of options that open up. Even within our present assumptions there will be a range of variables open and that may play themselves out differently in the complex system that is higher education in the contemporary world. (Might there be more of a market? Could there be a trans-European credit accumulation system? Are teaching-led 'universities' a possible option? What might 'networks' look like?) Secondly, and even more importantly, by observing the kinds of scenarios that could plausibly flow from today's dominant assumptions, we shall be in a better position to critique such models and so open the way for the second form of projection building.

In building the second form of projection, however, we would be deliberately setting up scenarios that would *rival* those produced in the first set of exercises. These new scenarios would, in themselves, provide a tacit critique of those issuing from the first assumption-led exercise. They would be counter-scenarios, where 'counter' stands for a political agenda with a small 'p'.

Such counter scenarios might, and indeed should, herald counter values, counter hopes, counter ideals. Projects of citizenship, or the public good, or students as human beings, or criticality, or universities *for* the learning society, may not be much on the public agenda and so fall outside the scenarios that flow from our contemporary structures and policies. Scenarios built on such projects would be scenarios that *contend* with the dominant self-images of our age. That is to say they purchase part of their force precisely by their playing in part an oppositional role. They would be counter scenarios.

But their being counter scenarios should not mean they are entirely separated from contemporary understandings and structures. If they are to gain legitimacy, there should be a sense the counter scenarios have a degree of plausibility. That they are not within the range of dominant models and policies is part of their make-up. But unless some links can be seen to contemporary understandings, they will be devoid of legitimacy: they will face their own legitimation crisis before even getting off the ground. Counter scenarios, therefore, are positioned awkwardly. They refuse to kow-tow to conventional wisdom but they cannot leave 'the real world' so far behind that they come to lack any credibility. They reach out into imaginary worlds, new worlds, even magical worlds; but there has to be a sense that some interpretations of the visions that they offer may just be within reach, with good will, effort and a little luck.

The counter scenarios offered here, therefore, face a stern test. Are they plausible? Could they ever find a constituency for their implementation? Are they feasible? Could the scenarios conceivable *ever* be realised?

Plausibility and feasibility are, of course, themselves slippery concepts. Both lend themselves to systems and structures: do contemporary systems and structures offers *spaces* for such counter scenarios to be brought off? But both concepts – plausibility and feasibility – speak also to ideas, senses, values and even, to call up further awkward terms, culture and modes of being. We may distinguish the two terms: 'plausibility' relates more to ideas and values and 'feasibility' more to systems and structures. But both take in each other's washing to some extent; after all, ideas and values are located in systems and structures, and systems and structures reflect ideas and values. So both plausibility and feasibility, as demanding tests of acceptance of imaginative scenarios, fly in together.

Conclusion

Fortunately, I can duck the twin challenges – of plausibility and feasibility – here. The counter scenarios I tentatively put up are just that: tentative offerings. they would require more work, more imaginative design work and more detailed filling out of those designs before they would deserve to be subjected to those two tests (of plausibility and feasibility). At least space must be accorded for that hard work, of creative imagination and appropriate infilling, to take place. Not too much infilling, though: imaginative and constructive scenarios are distinguished by the extent to which they deliberately leave matters open and themselves open up spaces for imaginative improvisation on the part of individuals.

We can note here, by way of conclusion, two further sets of inter-related matters.

Firstly, we may note, the phrase 'public intellectual' appears in no less than three of the four scenarios and is not far from the sense of the fourth ('A university for human good'.) How might we make sense of that presence? It is that the dominant self-images of the university are surely hinged around a sense of a university that is self-centred. The university that is emerging will be looking out for itself, ensuring not just that it is solvent, but that it is generating a profit it can plough back into its own activities. Even if this university is engaged in collaborations with other partners – possibly across the world – this is a university intent on its own promotion and positioning.

Old-fashioned academe could have been accused of being overly internal in its positioning: the academic community (if it existed) had its own boundaries with the world. At least the new university-in-the-academic-marketplace can proclaim its determination to engage with the wider world; but it does so in virtue of market relationships. What is lost from view is the idea of 'responsibility', especially the responsibility of academics to play their part in the growth of the public sphere. Unless the idea of 'the public intellectual' comes into our vocabulary and scenarios, our shaping of the universities in the future will surely be impoverished.

Secondly, the ideals behind the scenarios offered here are embedded in the self-understandings of higher education in the Western world. Those ideals connect with such terms as *Bildung*, emancipation, criticality, openness and freedom. The scenarios offered here, therefore, may run counter to the dominant discourses of our age but they

link with older discursive regimes. The question opens up, therefore, as to whether those older regimes and their associated concepts and ideas – and hopes and imaginings – are lost forever. What would it mean to say they are lost forever? That the contemporary structures and systems forbid them? That the contemporary power structures would oppose them? That they conflict with large current interests? Or that the energy and even imagination for their realisation has now gone for ever? Or that our willingness to seriously contest, in creative and politically sensitive ways, the dominant thinking of our age has dissipated? I do not think the time has yet come when we should or need to assume uncritically any of these forlorn eventualities.

12 European Higher Education in 2020: Freedom, between the Necessity and Utopia

Voldemar Tomusk

When everything is Power, Power is nothing

A Hungarian postmodern proverb

In trying to understand the intentions of the current volume's editors I developed a vague feeling that what is expected from me is to comment on the three CHEPS scenarios of European Higher Education in 2020 from the perspective of my part of Europe. That is the part that once gravitated around the Kremlin in Moscow and the big red star on the top of it. I do not, however, think that discussing such a perspective in 2005 is any longer meaningful and will be even less so by 2020. By that time it may well be the case that all that remains of the once great, though evil Bolshevik empire is the Great Duchy of Muscovia, ruled by Grand Duke Vladmir Vladimirovich III, the remainder, and its satellites, being divided in a friendly manner between the United States of Europe and the Peoples' Republic of China. This of course is speculation and as the author is a former citizen of the former Soviet Union, not a most gracious one.

Despite the respect I hold for the friends and colleagues who developed the scenarios, I still do not see much use in juxtaposing Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera, laying, as I guess the expectation may be, out my preference and arguments pro and contra. For a lazy person such as myself, this appears too technical a task, with too much time having to be spent on isolating the dimensions and comparing the details. For the reasons discussed below, I also have a few ethical and philosophical reservations approaching the task in such a manner. Therefore the largest part of this modest contribution focuses on the meta-level. I am not so much going to scrutinise the outcomes of the CHEPS' colleagues' thinking as to explore the foundations of it. I believe that my remaining memories of the state – its socialist past in Europe and the allegedly scientifically planned society – provide me with a particular edge to undertake such a task. Finally, I also suggest that taking just a slightly different angle from that of the CHEPS colleagues by looking at social and political functions of higher learning may display considerably less attractive possible worlds than we discuss in the current volume. This modest contribution raises one major question. In my view, the work CHEPS colleagues have accomplished seems to be based on the assumption they know what a university is for or that, for the purposes of such the tasks at hand, we do not need to waste too much time and resources discussing what is, if not entirely then at least almost obvious. I do not agree with such a position. As a person of a somewhat philosophical, if not melancholy, mind I find no big issue is ever fully understood. I try to elaborate in this on the pages that follow.

The Sin of Fortune-Telling

It is always tempting to know the future. Although in most societies witches and sorcerers are no longer stoned or burned, exploring the future still constitutes a risky epistemological strategy. Each attempt is based on a number of often tacit premises that not everybody necessarily agrees with. It appears to me that in trying to tell the future one would assume relative independence in the course of history from our own will and acts. This, as 20th century history has shown, constitutes a somewhat dangerous position. In any case there would almost immediately emerge a number of prophets (mostly false), sorcerers, fortune tellers and scientists who claim to have understood the will of gods or the laws of nature, which structurally do not differ that much from each other. The next step is also known; shortly thereafter power mobilises the prophecy for its own purposes and the causal connection gets blurred. No longer can we be sure which comes first – prophecy or a political programme. Being bound by objective laws of history we are denied the political discourse on the world acceptable and unacceptable. Although the issue of free will is a complex one, giving it up would mean a fundamental revision of our understanding about who we are as humans. Moving the discussion to the grounds of statistics, arguing for example that with certain probability certain things will happen, does not reduce in any significant manner the deterministic nature of that thinking. It still subjects human freedom to shape our society to a certain objectively given course of history and thus any attempt to describe the future includes an element of restriction of free will and possibly its manipulation to the benefit of priests of one religion or another. After all, as we have been told, the best way to make the future happen is to convince a large enough number of individuals on the inevitability of certain course of events. Then *they* will make it happen. The prophecy will fulfil itself as humans see their freedom in terms of a perceived necessity, like the following may easily exemplify:

> Imagine a university without buildings or classrooms or even a library, 10,000 miles away from its students, delivering online programmes or courses through franchise institutions overseas. Imagine a university without academic departments, without required courses or majors or grades, issuing degrees valid for only five years after graduation. Imagine a higher education system where institutions are ranked not by the quality of teaching, but by the intensity of electronic wiring and the degree of Internet connectivity. Imagine a country whose main export earnings come from the sale of higher education services (Salmi, 1999).

While many of us agree it is likely that humans will still be around in the year 2020 and many of the current institutions will continue their existence with more or less significant changes, one of the lessons former students of communism can teach the rest of the world is the need to be extremely cautious about developing any *scientific* scenarios of the future. There is always a threat present in somebody taking it too seriously. One may well agree with Appiah (2005) that, 'theories of politics aren't like theories of celestial mechanics: in the realm of the political, theories have a tendency to become a part of what they theorise'. Unlike the natural sciences, in the realm of the social sciences we do not have a clear difference between the formula and independent variables that go into it. Anything we create by means of thoughts, theories, stories and so on, shapes the world we inhabit. Although it would be entirely futile to mention

moral responsibility here, to argue that there is no moral responsibility involved in creating the world we live in sounds utterly ridiculous. First and foremost does that concern those who put in the public sphere knowledge products which Princeton philosopher Harry Frankfurt discusses in his recent book (Frankfurt 2005).

As it looks to me, there are two ways to think of the future – scientific and utopian. Scientists would try to isolate from the infinite amount of information available to us the basic laws that regulate the social world, and based on that draw a picture on what the future may look like in 15, 25 or 50 years. There seems to be a rather significant school of thought suggesting that with the recent progress in science the ultimate theory of everything is almost within reach (see e.g. Barrow, 1991). That would allow us to see any future state as precisely as we wish. While still far from the final goal of precise prediction, the CHEPS exercise to envision European higher education in 2020 for me constitutes an imperfect attempt at doing science in the way individuals like John Barrow, Roger Penrose or Frank Tipler understand it. Needless to say, there is no shortage of philosophers (see e.g. Newton-Smith, 2000) who have mobilised all of their wit to ridicule such use of science.

A utopian does not care about science. He is developing a vision of the world as a perfect dwelling place of the perfect creature. A utopian project, as Kolnai suggests is about:

> heaping-up and insatiable gathering-in, and unbounded cumulation of advantages, which implies a reckless the counterpart of balancing and circumscribing drawbacks shut out, extruded from the field of consciousness (Kolnai, 1960/1999).

With this, the problem of a utopia is that:

> It is not that the utopian bliss cannot be satisfactorily put into practice: the trouble is that it cannot be thought out consistently in the theorist's study (Kolnai, 1960/1999).

While one may think that there is an unbridgeable gap separating the scientific vision of future from the utopian, most often this is not the case. Immanuel Wallerstein knows the reason:

> The problem, of course, is that there is no such thing as a disinterested scholar; there cannot be. Our values are an integral component of our science; in this sense, science is always philosophy (Wallerstein, 2004).

There are many ways scholars' values, interests and expectations shape the results of their work, bridging the gap. The process works in both ways. The utopian vision may shape both the data as well as the analysis applied to it, or the process may reach such a level of complexity that almost any outcome can arbitrarily be attached to the analysis of any set of data. The CHEPS scenarios discussed in the current volume at least offer some evidence for the latter, though which of the scenarios are to be labelled as utopia and which as dystopia I would rather leave to the reader to decide.

Which is which depends on the ideological and political preferences of the discussants that are always present in such situations.

Wolf Lepenies, (1992) offers a somewhat deeper explanation not entirely foreign to our times and regimes of knowledge production, for the intellectuals, that is people of a melancholic disposition once referred to as the free-floating intelligentsia but later absorbed by the expanding sector of higher learning, to switch the sides, suddenly starting producing utopia instead of lamenting the miserable state of human affairs:

> Utopia emerges from melancholy with the world and from the world's inadequacy and ends with the impossibility of reflection, the prohibition of melancholy, and the redeeming promise of a stable happiness within a manageable space.

This should, however, by no means prevent us from discussing the future and expressing what kind of a world we think would be desirable for us to have. Therefore a more positive and ethically acceptable approach to dealing with the future would in my view be to study carefully the current state of affairs, the mechanisms and processes in place shaping it and critically explore possible threats rising from this for the humanity as we understand it and our for fundamental values. The use of *science* will not be universal but remain limited to studying the current state of affairs and processes in place, while philosophy would lend us the means of discussing desirable and undesirable conditions of human existence and politics would allow debating over what kind of world we would like to live in. One of the major threats in the contemporary world is that the rising expectations for science to serve the goals of unhindered economic growth undermine both philosophy and politics. Bauman (2004) writes:

> On the repoliticisation of the economy, Lepenies insisted, depends the survival of democracy. In all probability, we may add, it is not only the survival of democracy, but also the continuing existence of the species that created it and found it good, …

While agreeing with Bauman on the need to repoliticise the economy and society as a whole, an issue I have with him is that I find his suggestion to continue seeking the impossible and think of our future in terms of a utopia at least as dangerous as the scientists' universalistic claims.

While one may, on emotional grounds, sympathise with the desire to free mankind from insecurity by means of scientific predictability, closing the horizons of future by what science may or may not know, or even worse – what its shareholders may expect to hear from their paid prophets – constitutes more a threat than accepting the radical openness of human existence. If I remember correctly, it was Mikhail Bakhtin who said the words that translate into English language roughly as follows: *The world is free and open. Everything is still ahead, everything is yet to come*. Saying that certainly required a degree of courage in the Soviet Union. But it also requires courage in the world where people like Francis Fukuyama preach a doctrine not radically different from that of the communists – the world of after the end of history, where technocrats solve problems in a world that has rid itself of non-scientific desires and expectations,

that is – of politics. It is of little surprise then that both streams of thought trace back to the same source: Hegel. The theme itself however is much older and relates to humans' longing for security, the price of which is always their freedom.

The End of History and Doom of Politics

Wiktor Stockowski (2002) demonstrates in his marvellous book how much in contrary to contemporary understanding of progress in science, physical anthropology is dominated by ideas that have been around ever since antiquity. Francis Fukuyama with his widely popular article 'The End of History?' that appeared in the summer 1989 issue of the magazine 'The National Interest' and was three years later followed with a book bearing the same title, this time already without a question mark, fully confirms Stockowski's thesis that mythology and folklore can often take the form of an apparently scientific discourse. What, however, makes Fukuyama's prophecy special is the fact that he does not place the 'ten thousand years of happiness' that constitutes a compulsory element of many schools of religious and philosophical thought in both East and West beyond the reach of verification in the distant future but declares that together with the fall of communism it had just arrived. History had ended and mankind, having solved all the big issues and found an optimal way of co-existence, had entered the final phase of its existence – that of technical refinement and narrowly technological development. Fukuyama (1989) writes:

> What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

With the death of communism all major questions were solved. It turned out to be the case that the 'second way' was not really an alternative to the first one – 'liberal capitalism'. To those looking for the 'third way' one should perhaps suggest that this is nothing else than the very same old 'first way', and that since the end of history there has been no viable alternative.

It seems to be that in this age when the imperatives of scientific progress and economic development have assumed roles formerly occupied by unearthly gods and man-made idols, it is a particularly important task for intellectuals to stand against any possible attempt to close the discourse. One can possibly agree with Laclau (1996), who declares:

> Democratic society is not one in which the 'best' content dominates unchallenged but, rather, one in which nothing is definitely acquired and there is always a possibility of challenge.

Fukuyama senses the obvious – that the only thing to wait for after *final solution* is death. That casts the shadow of irreversible loss over his ruminations:

> The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of the technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual care taking of the museum of human history.

Constructing his prophecy Fukuyama had not noticed that his own fellow countryman had a generation earlier, although in a less dramatic way, expressed the very same idea. In the inaugural 1965 issue of the journal 'The Public Interest' Daniel Patrick Moynihan presented the end of World War II as the turning point that led to the state similar to Fukuyama's 'end of the history':

> it is the fact that for two decades now, since the end of World War II, the industrial democracies of the world have been able to operate their economies steadily expanding level of production and employment. Nothing like it has ever happened before in history (Moynihan, 1965).

Moynihan talked about the professionalisation of reform, a society where through the leadership of well-trained technocrats politics is rendered redundant. These are the technocrats who take care of production as well as the distribution of goods and political struggles find their shameful end:

> The day when mile-long petitions and mass rallies were required to persuade a government that a popular demand existed that things be done differently is clearly drawing to a close (ibid. p. 16).

For a society to accept such technocratic rule it should, one may think, have developed an understanding of the meaning of the 'good life' that is shared by the entire society. This then allows technocrats to enter and facilitate it by rational means, within the limits of available resources. This is nothing but exactly Fukuyama's end of the history situation – no more big problems to be solved, no more struggles and idealism – nothing left but technocratic applications and technical refinement of the works of the last philosopher. Randall Collins (1998) argued that such a situation, when it occurs, not necessarily marks the peak of intellectual activity, but is a sign of intellectual stagnation. Hellström and Jacob (2000) argue that the position similar to Moynihan's and others' is not exactly what it pretends to be – scientification of politics – but merely *'politics co-opting the language of science'*, an aspect of politicisation of science. Perhaps using science to legitimise politics also qualifies as intellectual stagnation. If we cannot call politics by its right name, corruption certainly follows in many ways.

The Intellectual history of the 20th century appears to be as rich in final solutions as it is rich in cataclysmic events. Nikolai Bukharin, the intellectual among the first generation of Bolsheviks was, six years before his own comrades killed him, as certain as Daniel P. Moynihan in 1965 and Francis Fukuyama in 1989 that history had ended. For him, however, it happened as a result of the 1917 communist revolution in Russia. Bukharin, in his paper presented at the International Conference of the History of

Science and Technology in London in 1931, mades it abundantly clear that Marxism offered the only and final philosophical source of science, fully proved by the *practice:*

> It is relevant here to record, first of all, that *Marxism*, weighed on the balance of history, has been verified therein in the most varied directions. Marxism foretold the war; Marxism foretold the period of revolutions and the whole character of the epoch we are going through; Marxism foretold the dictatorship of the proletariat and the rise of a Socialist order; even earlier had been brilliantly justified the theory of the concentration and centralisation of capital, etc. (Bukharin, 1931).

What follows is a fully scientific, planned management of the society:

> But the plan of Socialist construction is not only a plan of economy: the process of the *rationalisation of life*, beginning with the suppression of irrationality in the economic sphere, wins away from it one position after another: the principle of planning invades the sphere of 'mental production,' the sphere of science, the sphere of *theory*. Thus there arises here a new and much more complex problem: the problem of the rationalisation not only of the material-economic basis of society, but also of the relations between the sphere of material labour and spiritual 'labour,' … (ibid. p. 30).

Technocratic skills and technical competences, while vitally important for the establishment of modern economies, are not sufficient to avoid closing society, by or on behalf of the prophets of necessity, or any final social utopia. Touraine (2000) succinctly summarises the above concerns:

> Democracy is in danger whenever we feel that our personal and collective lives are dominated by necessity, irrespective of whether that necessity takes the form of the nature of things, human nature, a revealed law or reason, the international economic situation or the essence of national culture.

Europe and her Higher Learning in 2020

If Europe continues expanding as many anticipate it will until 2020, it will grow by that time much larger than it is today, including Turkey, Ukraine, Romania and several smaller countries in the Balkans, Moldova and perhaps even Belorus. An additional 150 million people in comparison with her population today will, by that time, live under the rule of the united Europe. Geographical expansion of the European Union however is not our primary interest here. What is more important is the meaning attributed to the expansion of the European Union. I think that it is not entirely mistaken to argue that, for a significant segment of the Brussels' technocrats, Europe's expanding horizon signifies the horizon of the Fukuyamese end of history; the countries within it having entered the non-political life of technical refinement of the ten thousand years of happiness, while peoples beyond the horizon struggle against barbarian realities and the curses of history. Jean Monnet's suggested way of gradual building Europe without having a politically negotiated blueprint for this but instead 'bringing together men and practical matters' (Monnet, 1978) may justify such

argumentation on the low or non-importance of politics in Europe being built by practical men, that is technocrats, around practical matters. The same, as Olsen (2005) argues, applies to higher education:

> The (European) Commission also claims that the time of 'heated debates' over university organisation have come to an end (…), thereby framing reforms as technical questions of finding efficient organisational forms consistent with necessities and shared goals.

It appears perfectly sensible to me to see the CHEPS scenarios of European higher education in 2020 in the context of the expanding horizon of history's ending. While perfectly understandable, I still believe that such an approach is both substantively wrong and ethically unacceptable for the reasons discussed above. I believe that without a political dimension to each of the scenarios these are of little use, but instead constitute a potential source of harm, particularly in case a major international player such as the European Commission, the World Bank or even the Soros Foundation decides to support any of the envisioned scenarios for reasons sacred or profane.

The scenarios assume that for the coming fifteen years or so the course of history in Europe will remain linear, as only linear history can be seen as the lack of it, with gradual progress by means of technical refinement. This may or may not be the case. It was linear for the past half a century across much of Europe and may remain like that for a while, but it will not certainly last forever. Sooner or later a turn will come, although this does not necessarily need to happen by another Franco-German war or Balkan upheaval. Europe's expansion assumes a steady economic growth, both to satisfy the expectations of the newly joining nations as well as to maintain the liberal democratic order. Without economic growth many things dear to us, including liberal democracies will start collapsing. As Gellner (1994) suggests:

> Only in conditions of overall growth, when social life is a plus-sum, not a zero-sum game, can a majority have an interest in conforming even without intimidation.

Immanuel Wallerstein (2004), however, suggests, the time for the plus-sum game is running out, with the margin of profits extracted from poor countries diminishing. His forecast is that of continuity breaking in the coming 25-50 year period:

> I believe there exists today, as a result of long secular trends that have been moving away from the equilibrium, a massive policy squeeze that will block the continuation of an endless accumulation of capital, the motor of capitalist development.

Welfare achieved in the western world is more fragile than often thought of and does not necessarily exist thanks to values we try to follow in our own societies. It may be approaching a breaking point and the chances that rationality will prevail remain limited. What is, however, ironic is the self-destructive nature of expanding liberal democracy. It has to expand to exist, and by expanding it erodes its own roots.

Higher education has an extremely important role to play in the world of the plus-sum game. Wide spread belief that the expansion of higher education relates to more knowledgeable societies remains a myth for me. There is a significant body of literature, starting with Ronald Dore and Randall Collins in 1970s, arguing that the diploma disease may not necessarily relate to more highly qualified jobs for graduates. There is a good reason to see expanding higher education as a part of expanding liberal democratic world. The possibility for upward social mobility is a fundamental condition of democratic order. The world of developing technologies offers a good pretext for establishing an order where people of higher qualifications move up and those of lower qualifications down. As long as total wealth continues growing, the plus-sum game assures that most people moving down will not get hurt too badly to threaten the order significantly, while those occupying lower positions maintain a hope in education's emancipatory powers.

Serving such an order, higher education systems in the western world have grown enormously during the past half century. While the training capacity has expanded, the number of available qualified student candidates has started diminishing. Universities continue manufacturing expectations for upward social mobility among expanding groups, though it is also obvious that when everybody moves up, nobody does. Higher education has become, as Kivinen and Ahola (1999) suggest, a risk capital. In a way higher education has become something like a pyramid investment scheme where the top can collect massive interests only as long as a growing number of investors surrender their life savings, expectations and hopes to the *system* at the bottom. As in the Western world, the local populations are already to the largest extent drawn into higher education for social mobility. Further expansion requires increasingly aggressive competition for foreign students, attracting them with expectations to stay in industrialised countries or to join local elites upon graduation. A more radical solution, however, as Salmi has suggested, would be voiding higher education qualifications within five years after graduation, as a matter of fact forcing everybody to consume educational services throughout their lives. This is what some see as life-long learning. To me such a society is more like a camp of forced labor combined with a camp of forced consumption, than a liberal democracy. Be it as it may, it looks obvious to me that sooner or later the expectations of a significant number or degree holders will be frustrated and the pyramid will collapse as did the Albanian economy in 1997. If this happens, the days of peaceful refinement will be over, the politics will enter like it did when the expectations of many Albanian small investors to become very quickly very rich were not met and they withdrew from the system, leading the investment schemes to a total fall. The result was, as we know, politics by *other means* – war.

Instead of a Conclusion

In Europe, which is expected to enter at any moment the phase of its existence that could in medical terms be described as permanently vegetative, little space is left between necessity and utopia. The space of freedom is being occupied by both scientists manufacturing blueprints for the post-historical world salvaged by knowledge as well as by ideologists backing their grandiose, though interest-driven

visions with the laws of nature. A simple mortal finds himself increasingly lost in the world that, despite all of his degrees of higher learning, makes no sense to him and where the question 'But what sense all of that makes?' remains unheard and unanswered. What was once known as the public sphere is being filled with the salacious details of individuals with high or no prominence. Clouds, though, may already be gathering over the people who, having lost any idea what exactly they signify, become increasingly insignificant. I am afraid that the knowledge industry is going to let us down this time. As far as I am concerned, it does not really matter if one prefers Centralia, Octavia or Vitis Vinifera. The questions we should be discussing are of a quite different order. We should be talking in dynamic terms about a changing university in a changing society. Olsen (2005) asks: *What kind of University for what kind of society?* Expanding the university as a fount of social mobility is, together with stable economic growth, indispensable for maintaining the liberal democratic order. And while some like Bourdieu (1989) have been complaining about breaks societies have set on the limits of mobility between social strata, in a long term such imperfections may not necessarily be a bad thing. The ongoing deep revision to the idea of the university, if not the crisis of the institution of higher learning, caused by its over-extension in the context of slowing economic growth, may well indicate more trouble on the way. But will it reach us by 2020, we do not know.

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13 Scenarios and Metaphors for (Un)thinking Change in Higher Education

Stephen R. Stoer and António M. Magalhães

> I shall conclude these comments by turning to Geertz' claim that 'we have come to such a point in the moral history of the world that we are obliged to think about (cultural) diversity rather differently than we have been used to thinking about it'. He develops this point by saying that 'we are living more and more in the midst of an enormous collage', that 'the world is coming at each of its local points to look more like a Kuwaiti bazaar than like an English gentlemen's club'. These latter descriptions seem right to me…
>
> Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth* (1995)

On the CHEPS Scenarios

Do the three scenarios presented by CHEPS in 2004 celebrate what Fukuyama (1992) has termed the 'end of history'? This is the first thought that occurs to us as we begin writing our contribution. Why? Because the three scenarios presented appear to take for granted that present forms of political regulation and economic development will still be dominant as separate and independent configurations in 15 years time. That is, in the first scenario, the dominant form of regulation will reproduce the logic of the nation-state in the form of Centralia, City of the Sun, a European mega-nation. In a similar way the logic of the 'network society', whose emergence we are now witnessing, will reproduce itself at the European level as Octavia, the Spider-Web City. Finally, Vitis Vinifera appears as the crystallisation of market (de)regulation, whose 'hand is sighted on the occasional clear day'. In other words, as heuristic models the three scenarios appear to echo more what is currently happening than that which will occur in the near future.

At the same time, these scenarios appear to ignore other potential ways to conceive the regulation of the European space. For example, in recent work (Magalhães and Stoer, 2003; Stoer and Magalhães, 2004), we pointed out the way in which *with, against and through* the nation-state, the network society and the market might develop. We have attempted to conceptualise this new form of regulation and its development by using the metaphor of the *bazaar* (hence the notion of *Europe as a bazaar*). Using this as a basis we will develop our thoughts on the CHEPS scenarios.

The starting point for this requires reference to the fact that the nation-state, the network and the market are, at present, part of the process of the reconfiguration of capitalism. Up to the 1970s, capitalism was organised in strict accordance with state regulations. Some economists refer to this harmonious relationship between accumulation and regulation as a 'virtuous circle': mass production was articulated

with mass consumption, the latter being guaranteed by the welfare action of the state. As part of the 'virtuous circle', the state generously funded universities which, in turn, supplied the state, firms and industry with qualified human resources.

The oil crisis of the 1970s was the first to dent this circle. Production ceased being resource-driven and became demand-driven, leading to the now famous forms of 'just-in-time' and 'just-for-you' production. In turn welfare regulation, based on universal rights and duties, gave way to a form of regulation increasingly based on individualisation and the privatisation of social needs. Even citizenship, as it was known under modernity, suffered from these processes, leading to what one may term the ongoing reconfiguration of the social contract (Magalhães and Stoer, 2003). Individuals condemned to remain as such, have increasingly come to demand the return of the sovereignty that they exchanged for state protection. It is in this situation of both 'hard' ('you are nothing but an individual') and 'soft' ('if I am nothing but an individual then I want my sovereignty back') capitalism that economic determination simultaneously becomes more severe and more open to other forms of social action.[1] It is crucial to understand this situation if one wishes to explain why, as the state rolls back, individuals and groups seek university education in order to write their own life stories (as suggested by Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994), rather than having the state or market write it for them.

These are the developments in capitalism and state regulation that the CHEPS scenarios appear to underestimate. Indeed, the scenarios seem to separate things which are currently developing simultaneously: attributed citizenship, the process of individualisation/individuation and the process of identity construction of individuals and groups mediated through consumption. The Octavia scenario characterises society as 'the blurring of boundaries between previously functionally differentiated subsystems'. However, this scenario does not appear to take seriously the implications of such blurring. It is as if the web were the centre of the social link, but in delegating the structuring elements of citizenship and the fluidity of identity construction to the other two scenarios, it empties this scenario of that which is most central to it, the idea that 'society is not characterised by the triumph of one rationality over others'.

Of course we recognise the scenario's authors separated these characteristics in order to explore their heuristic value. However for the sake of our argument, it is vital to be able to distinguish the articulations, or lack there of, between the political (the reconfiguration of citizenship), the economic (the growth of the individualised and privatised society) and the cultural (identity affirmation and construction). In our argument, Europe develops through the web (in the words of Castells, (2001) 'Europe as a network state') in the context of the reconfiguration of production, distribution and consumption articulating, in the process, cultural identities, both individual and group. In other words, the impact of globalisation and the coinciding 'revolution' in information and communication technologies appears to be leading towards a situation

[1] It is this process of 'individualisation' and 'individuation' that is referred to by Beck in *Risk Society* (1992).

where political, economic and cultural processes intertwine to the extent that it is often difficult to distinguish between them (for example, can one separate today the act of consumption – e.g., buying a shirt – from the construction of identity – what kind of shirt should I buy?). It is for this reason that our logic, as opposed to the logic which led to the construction of the three CHEPS scenarios, places more emphasis on that which frames higher education and less on higher education itself. To us it is the framework within which higher education evolves that is central to understanding the nature of higher education itself, including its development and the implications this may have for individuals, groups and society as a whole.

On the Kuwaiti bazaar

With reference to the citation above we agree with both Rorty and Geertz that the world, let alone Europe, is increasingly resembling a *Kuwaiti bazaar* rather than an *exclusive English club*. The latter represents the ultimate incommensurability of local and cultural differences: the 'Portugueseness' of the Portuguese, the 'Englishness' of the English, the 'Arabian character' of the Arabs. In fact, cultural differences affirmed by groups and individuals appear to be reconfiguring the concept of citizenship, to the extent that citizenship is reclaimed not on the basis of that which people hold in common (territory, language, religion, ethnic belonging, etc.) but rather on that which makes them different (also language, religion, ethnic belonging, sexual identity, life style, etc.). It is the network society, as both a medium and mediator, in the context of a reconfigured capitalism where knowledge is increasingly central to the production process and where the needs of individuals and groups are simultaneously privatised and reflexively articulated in new forms of production, distribution and consumption, that provides the web of social relations promoting the exercise and development of new citizenship forms.

In this sense the metaphor of the *bazaar* arises as an interesting way of (un)thinking both the context of the development of higher education and the different models of higher education being proposed. If the *bazaar* were to be defined as a scenario, it would have, at a minimum, the following characteristics:

1. a public space (political, economic, social, cultural) that as such is susceptible to being regulated;
2. a public space that enables a variety of configurations in different parts of the world, but whose dominant configuration results from it being configured by the state (which, although suffering reconfiguration, shows no sign of losing its strength over the next fifteen years) and the market (via the private nature of commodities and the public nature of consumption);
3. a public space that accepts the legitimacy of individuals regulating their own lives ('I pay my taxes (duty), but I want to educate my children (right) as I think they ought to be educated');
4. a public space that constitutes a variable geometry (at the same time consensual and arbitrary and, therefore, fragile) whose degree of variation depends upon the degree of power and conflict that exists between social, cultural and economic differences.

On Higher Education in the Bazaar

In former work (Stoer, Magalhães and Rodrigues, 2004; Magalhães and Stoer, 2005), and on the basis of what has been said previously, we have developed four metaphors for thinking about European construction: the flag, the association, the network and the bazaar. These metaphors when related to higher education translate into the following table.

Metaphors	Political and Economic Indicators	Form of Higher Education
Flag	• Territory-based • National identity	Modern University
Association	• Deterritorialised • Cosmopolitan causes	University of ideas as World Heritage
Network	• Circulation/production of information/knowledge	Entrepreneurial University
Bazaar	• Knowledge producer • Celebration of cultural diversity; • World presence on the web of informational capitalism (Castells, 1996); • Meeting place for differences, in all their incommensurability, and negotiation among them	University of the Europe of Knowledge

On the basis of this framework, we will attempt a dialogue with the three CHEPS scenarios for higher education in 2020, confronting them with the metaphors developed and discussing the consequences for higher educational institutions with regard to each: from the scenario that conceives of the university as central, both at the national and European levels, to the scenario where the concepts of both the university and of higher education itself are dissolved into multiple institutions.

The metaphors are different from the scenarios to the extent that their use is totally heuristic, while the scenarios present alternative visions of reality. The metaphors are an analytical device useful for identifying layers of a complex reality, whereas the scenarios have the tendency to treat each layer as if it were itself a reality. The metaphor of the bazaar attempts to portray all the layers, not in the sense of dissolving the various layers in some overarching synthesis, but rather in the sense of preserving their, and its own, specificities. For this reason, the metaphors constitute a good point of departure for discussing the three CHEPS scenarios.

In the first place, such an approach allows one to recognise that, rather than articulation, there is considerable overlapping, with regard to higher education, of the second and the third scenarios. Even if one recognises that in the third there exists an increase of emphasis on institutional autonomy in the attribution of a central role to the institutions themselves in the development of higher education, as well as an increase in the degree of deregulation of the system and of institutions, it is still evident that the networking process is at the heart of Vitis Vinifera. In fact, even when recognising that the triumph of the market coordination system (conceived as 'a far more nuanced analytical appreciation') is clearer in this third scenario, it cannot be denied that this process can only take place via the network. Furthermore, with regard to higher

education, the design proposed for the concept and respective institutions can only be distinguished by degree: the second scenario refers to an accreditation agency (the 'European Accreditation Network') that works directly with the universities to assure the 'smallest common denominator', the third refers to a 'data-warehouse for higher education programmes' that is conceived as 'a body not to be messed with'; the second speaks of 3,500 education providers and the third speaks of 6,000. In addition, the degree of 'fuzziness', although only distinctly referred to in the scenario of Octavia, can equally be applied to the Vitis Vinifera scenario.

In different ways, both the metaphors and the scenarios take knowledge as central to both higher education and economy. The metaphor of the *flag* underlines that which is normally identified with the perspective of Europe as a mega-nation. The Centralia scenario appears to echo this perspective, by implying that *having a possible future* relates to *having a long past*. Both the Humboldtian and the Napoleonic universities, at the same time that they celebrated the universal character of knowledge, were framed by a national level system. The education systems created within the scope of the consolidation of the nation-state were, and, to a certain extent, still are, the disseminating mechanism of this knowledge and of this national character and, as such, are part of the tension between the universality of the former and the particularity of the latter. Centralia updates, to a certain extent, this conception of the university. To turn higher education into a central device for making Europe an economically viable zone vis-à-vis other mega-nations a development strategy is outlined centred on knowledge that feeds a process of regulation through deregulation. The use of this metaphor appears to make the key role of the 'European state' as manager more evident, even if via remote control, not only of the privatisation of social needs but also as the preserver of traditional, meaning attributed, citizenship.

In the sequence of work carried out by Beck (1994), it appears that one of the principal problems that knowledge faces is its own management. In other words, after that which he terms a 'first scientisation', the process through which modern science (in its attempt to impose human design on nature) de-codified and transformed (via technology) reality (both social and natural), we are now confronting the task of managing the impact of this process within the scope of a 'second scientisation'. Here, taking into account both the impact and the consequences of the first scientisation (for example, the effects on health of chemical fertilisers, the effects of modern medicine on the increase in life expectancy, etc.), science is constantly obliged to justify not only itself but also to demonstrate its relevance due to the risks it has created for humanity. In this sense, the British sociologist, Anthony Giddens (1990) has referred to the impact of the Chernobyl disaster on the world community as a challenge for science to reflect upon itself. Cosmopolitan causes find here not only a basis for the legitimation of new forms of association ('green causes', 'peace causes', 'the cause of the free movement of peoples and goods', 'causes related to the end of patriarchalism', 'the cause of the social economy', and so on) but also place emphasis on the social and cultural relevance of knowledge itself. These forms of association do not arise as absolute alternatives to capitalist development; instead they are articulated by new forms of citizenship that develop in and against such development. This posture of being in and against finds its source of dissemination in the network (web), itself a

product of 'hard' and 'soft' capitalism. It is this sort of articulation that the scenarios of Octavia and Vitis Vinifera apparently underestimate. In these scenarios higher education appears to dissolve in the diversity of the appeals made by the economic, social and cultural worlds. Our metaphor suggests, however, that the dissolution of the idea of higher education is itself an area of conflict and debate, and not only the object of thought of more-or-less-occupied philosophers.

On the other hand, the management of knowledge now involves dealing with increasingly plural and contextualised knowledges that claim a place in higher education. This implies, in Santos' (1994) words, the substitution of the 'idea of the university' by the 'university of ideas'. However, if it is true that the university has lost hegemony as knowledge producer and disseminator, this does not mean that the university has totally lost social and political responsibility. On the contrary, its responsibility now depends not only on consolidating national culture but, even more importantly, on promoting the articulation between different forms of culture and knowledge produced. The scenarios, however, appear to function as if, between the entrepreneurialism of individuals and groups and the unbearable weight of the Humboldtian university, nothing else is possible.

The metaphor of the bazaar as a heuristic device for (un)thinking change in higher education suggests the construction of Europe and of higher education as a multiple and heterogeneous process. In the same way that one finds a variety of intense smells, sounds and sights in the bazaar, one also finds in Europe a vast variety of projects, both national and trans-national, trends, with regard to institutional organisation and governance, and different ways of thinking with regard to the very nature of the structure of the system of higher education. Higher education itself is living an identity crisis (Magalhães, 2001) that is reflected in the manner in which the Bologna process is being managed, a process that appears to be divided between an option for post-secondary education and the 'good old' higher education dominant under the metaphor of the flag.

The metaphor of the bazaar assumes this somewhat cacophonous situation not as a development stage that will lead to a better and more tidy future but as a *de facto* situation that expresses the variable political, cultural and economic geometry referred to above. The heterogeneity of higher education and its continuing crisis in the context of an increasingly knowledge-intensive society constitutes, indeed, to paraphrase a prophet of 20th century social change, a 'permanent revolution'. Whether regulation takes place via the market, the state, or even reflexive consumers, higher education will not easily be domesticated in a tidy idea. This does not mean that one takes a position of 'anything goes'. It means, rather, taking on the assumption that privileged forms of higher education are being both dissolved and reinforced. On the one hand, without wishing to deny the positional value of higher education, the demands of the knowledge society, taking into account its different levels and seen from the perspective of what we have termed 'soft' capitalism, require diverse higher education forms. On the other hand, in order to escape from the dilemmas placed by the option between mass higher education and the 'massification' of higher education, traditional

forms of higher education tend to promote the renewal, on the basis of 'hard' capitalism, of distinction strategies and develop into hybrid forms of traditional collegiate institutions and entrepreneurial organisations.

In contrast to the CHEPS scenarios, in the bazaar, the Oxbridge model will flourish in the same space as two- to three-year community college courses, national universities will coincide with higher education institutions based on e-learning, institutions dedicated solely to research will co-exist with institutions whose fundamental emphasis is on teaching, scientific knowledge (both mode 1 and 2) will be confronted with other more contextualised knowledges and biographical projects, both individual and group, that will be interiorised as organisational profiles ('the greening of the universities', 'the inclusive university', 'the non-patriarchal university', 'the non-racist university', 'the entrepreneurial university', 'the indigenous university'), making higher education not only heterogeneous but also a site of conflicts and incommensurabilities.

In summary, our comment on the CHEPS scenarios takes as a starting point the idea that in order to consider what will happen to higher education in the near future, one needs to look at the context within which it will develop. We have summarised this context as one of both 'soft' and 'hard' capitalism where social and individual reflexivity take on an increasingly important role. In this context, higher education is made up of the tension between individuals and groups who insist on writing their own scripts with regard to higher education and top-down political projects that insist on writing these scripts for them.

Our emphasis on the intertwining of 'soft' and 'hard' capitalism leads us to stress the mixed nature of the sociological and economic characteristics of present contexts. It is this mixture that has led us to develop the metaphor of the bazaar. In the bazaar, the scenarios do not arise as alternatives, nor as mere heterogeneity but rather as a relational logic of political, economic and cultural demands and needs. As referred to above, the metaphor of the bazaar does not suggest a better and more tidy future but, rather, a *de facto* situation that expresses the variable political, cultural and economic geometry of both Europe and higher education.

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14 Politics, Markets, Networks and European Higher Education

Ivar Bleiklie

Introduction

The great theories that have shaped our understanding of social change since the 19th century tend to have one important thing in common. They were based on assumptions of causation or some dominant logic that drive processes of social change, be it relations of economic production, the rationalisation of organisational forms, the normative foundation and social cohesion or individual self-interested behaviour to mention a few. One of the great strengths of the CHEPS scenarios is the broad and 'thick' descriptions they give of possible futures for Europe only fifteen years from now. The scenarios provide three very rich and complex pictures that may furnish us with ideas about social change and help us think more profoundly about the forces that will shape the Europe of 2020. Yet, keeping some of the merits of classic social science theorizing in mind, we are also left to wonder about the decisive forces that have brought Europe to the states described in the scenarios, and that explain the differences between the paths along which the scenarios have developed. While there certainly are many implicit suggestions, from an explanatory and a comparative point of view there is a need to specify the underlying models of the scenarios so they may serve both as aides in explaining why a particular development occurred and in comparing what the major differences between the various development paths may be. When we move from the broad socio-political developments to higher education in particular, we also need to ask what the relationship is between the former and latter, and try to formulate assumptions about the factors most important in shaping the make up of higher education systems and their particular forms of institutional organisation, management and funding.

During the last years we have seen several important contributions analysing ongoing trends in research and higher education relevant to the formulation of scenarios. Two traditional divisions in the literature on and debate about the development and future of universities are the following. The first is the belief universities are drastically changing in ways that will make them constantly more similar or uniform vs. the belief

that basic features of academic institutions are deeply institutionalised, as is the influence of nation states on the way which institutions are run. This contributes to preserving established patterns of diversity across institutional and national borders. Secondly, there is a fundamental division informing most discussions about the future of academic institutions between those who believe drastic change is needed and those who see it as a threat to the mission and function of these institutions. Among the core questions in these discussions is firstly to what extent universities are likely to preserve or defend their autonomy and the academic freedom of their scientific personnel, or whether they will increasingly come under managerial control aiming at expanding the accountability of universities at the expense of autonomy. Secondly, there is the normative question of to what extent further development in the direction of managerialism is needed or not.

In the following I shall argue the scenarios may represent three trends visible today as universities are characterised by increasing managerialism, are becoming stakeholder organisations and increasingly are coordinated and regulated by market mechanisms. Then I shall point out these trends do not necessarily mean universities and university systems are becoming more uniform. Finally, I argue there are important continuities in the development of higher education systems, the implication of which is universities are not necessarily becoming less autonomous and unable to protect the academic freedom of their scientific staff.

The Scenarios – Characteristics and Differences

Let me first point out some of the major characteristics of the scenarios and the differences between them. I am not contending the characteristics and differences in themselves are the most important ones. However, from the perspective of organisational theory and theories of public policy, there are significant differences between the scenarios and this will hopefully aid our understanding of some of their implications for higher education and research.

In terms of driving logic we may in a somewhat simplified way distinguish two of the scenarios as, at least implicitly, driven respectively by a predominantly public political-bureaucratic logic (Centralia) and a market logic (Vitis Vinifera). There is an established literature about these two social arrangements that spell out the normative and interest based rationales driving human behaviour under the two different sets of circumstances provided by them. These characteristics make the two scenarios both easily understandable, familiar and clearly if not radically different. The third scenario (Octavia) may be considered a ‘network’ scenario where social structures, their success and failures, depend on what kind of networks they form. It is more difficult in this case to identify a theory about what motivates the behaviour of social actors. The interesting thing about the network scenario is it assumes markets and ‘the welfare state’ have become harder to identify because the boundaries between them have become blurred. Instead of the invisible hand of the market or the visible hand of the state, the name of the game is ‘networking’. Correct as the argument may be, this

blurring of boundaries is hardly new.[1] What is new is whereas previous theories used to assume identifiable systems became interwoven in new but stable patterns, network theory suggests more transient, flexible and less clearly defined networks. However, by pointing out these characteristics without providing more precise assumptions about how actors are motivated and the driving forces behind the process, the networking concept easily becomes more of a metaphor than part of a theory.

In what follows I shall develop on these characteristics by discussing some of the ideas contained in the scenarios. I shall do so by focusing first on the assumptions they make about: 1) demographics, in particular student-mobility, 2) organisational implications of growth, and 3) location of political and economic power.

One of the characteristics of the scenarios is they do not seem as radically different as one might expect. There are some striking similarities regarding the challenges with which European societies and higher education systems are faced, but although the challenges are similar the various scenarios assume they have been dealt with in different ways by society and governments.

First of all the scenarios assume quite soberly that Europe's population is aging or greying. The demographic source of variation across scenarios is the extent of immigration from other parts of the world. Thus the welfare state scenario does not only envision strong national and European political-administrative structures, but also that there are high barriers against immigration and student mobility. Immigration rates are accordingly kept low and there is little movement (of students) between the most integrated blocks, the US and the EU. The other scenarios presume higher student mobility but in somewhat different ways. The network scenario assumes ageing populations have led to a reduction in the number of younger traditional students, which is counter-balanced by an increasing number of international students particularly at the post-graduate level. The market scenario assumes on the other hand greater variations nationally of the student body and limited mobility.

The second common characteristic is all scenarios presume, although to varying extent, growth in higher education. However, the way in which growth has been handled varies both in terms of the organisation of higher education systems as well as in terms of the number, size and diversity of institutions involved. According to the welfare state scenario the sector will be characterised by a wave of mergers that by 2020 will turn the HE landscape into one made up by big (if not mega sized) multi campus regional universities. One campus universities are mainly found in small countries. Some global players, such as Oxbridge, have also become stronger by mergers. Universities have become more managerial, but still the notion of leadership by academics, particularly in elite institutions, keeps academic freedom a major value. The institutional hierarchy is still sustained by prestige and concentration of public research funding. The network scenario predicts a diverse and more diffuse

[1] From the 1960s on there has been a rich literature on different forms of blurring of boundaries between the state and the market, suffice it to mention such classics as Charles Lindblom's *Politics and markets* (1977) and Gösta Esping-Andersen's *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990).

institutional landscape. It will be harder than it is today to identify a university or a HE sector. Successful universities capitalise on traditional academic virtues. Other institutions are more network-like matrixes that may comprise public, semi-public and private entities for teaching, research and service. Open universities in Europe are affiliated with on-line providers on other continents. Some universities have disappeared through mergers. Others have organised themselves in specialised clusters. Most undergraduate students are still in national or regional universities. Inter-university alliances between these universities and the many local low cost providers of tertiary education are a widespread phenomenon. The market scenario displays a more utility oriented and in several aspects more privatised and market oriented higher education system in which private- and student funding is ubiquitous, competition at all levels for private and public research funding is common and diversity is increased. After experiencing problems as a result of mergers, institutions tend to be relatively small, particularly many of the most successful ones. In spite of their diversity there is no formal differentiation between institutions by type. A small minority of them will resemble today's comprehensive universities, while most are much more specialised. Research and Doctoral degree programmes are increasingly concentrated in elite universities in Western and Northern Europe.

Finally, it is a shared assumption in all scenarios that the political and economic power of nation states to some extent has been reduced or at least circumscribed by supranational structures, such as the European Union and other international structures with a global reach. Here it is the relative strength of different levels of governance: local, national, regional or global, which is an important source of variation across scenarios. The welfare state scenario depicts a relatively strong welfare oriented and integrated EU, driven by the EU commission, in spite of its expansion to 37 member countries. The scenario assumes the current trend towards *managerialism* within public systems will continue. Yet values of leadership by academics and academic freedom, particularly in elite institutions, limit the spread of managerialism. Within the network scenario the EU is less dominant as an integrating force. Integration is served by a number of different multilayered networks (in politics, business or the voluntary sector) of varying geographical reach (local, national, regional, global). This is also reflected in the looser matrix-like structure of higher education institutions. The network scenario assumes the trend towards universities as *stakeholder organisations* in which a varying and changing number of stakeholders get a stronger say over decisions made by and within institutions. The market scenario portrays an EU that is quite recognizable, an uneasy cohabitation of national sovereignty and shared supra-national interests and coordination. In this sense the market scenario further develops the trend towards use of *market and quasi market mechanisms* in higher education institutions and systems.

Three Scenarios and two Higher Education Regimes

The scenarios differ in other respects, such as regarding how and by what forces higher education, as well as social activities in general, tend to be coordinated. In order to conceptualise this coordination we may distinguish in broad and general terms between two types of emerging higher education regimes (Bleiklie 2005): One type is

an academic capitalist regime, driven by university-industry alliances, economic interests and a commercial logic. In spite of its huge influence on the discourse about higher education and as a symbol of current changes in higher education institutions, be it 'academic capitalism' (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997) or 'entrepreneurial universities' (Clark, 1998), industry funding is an important source for relatively few top research universities, particularly in the US (Powell & Owen-Smith 1998, Turk-Bicakci & Brint 2004). In fact the dominant pattern is most higher education institutions are publicly funded and owned by national or regional governments. This might be taken as an argument to the effect that stability prevails in the face of all rhetoric about fundamental change. Stakeholder leadership (Neave 2002), according to the business enterprise ideal, may however support the spread of 'capitalism' and be supported by a combination of public austerity policies and stronger influence by other outside interests financially and through university board positions. It should also be pointed out that in the area of teaching market mechanisms play a more prominent role than in basic research funding.

The way in which public authorities run universities has changed fundamentally, and this move towards increased 'managerialism' has been heavily influenced by notions of 'academic capitalism' and 'entrepreneurial universities'. It manifests itself in the notion of universities as business enterprises and the introduction of quasi-market mechanisms in order to promote competition, cost effectiveness and increased accountability. These *public managerialist regimes* are driven by university-state alliances, political-administrative interests and a semi-competitive logic based on incentive policies where public support depends partly on teaching and/or research performance. They come, however, in different versions that may be understood against the backdrop of the previous public regimes from which they have developed. Based on the findings of our comparative study of the systems of England, Norway and Sweden, (Kogan et al. 2000) we pointed out the public regimes that characterised the systems until the 1980s or 1990s were different in important respects. Although all systems in principle were mainly public, different actor constellations, alliances and interests characterised the regimes. This raises two questions: To what extent does a particular type of regime determine the specific organisation of universities and the higher education systems to which they belong? To what extent are universities and university systems becoming more similar? If they are becoming more similar this may indicate the capacity of nation states to shape universities and provide protection for their cultural mission against short term utilitarian concerns is reduced.

Based on evidence from a number of comparative studies of reform and change in higher education systems, it may be argued these variations cannot be deduced from a particular regime type. There are considerable variations within the same type of regimes, and this suggests those that dominate the European scene are deeply embedded in institutionalised patterns shaping the policies, administrative practises and educational traditions on which higher education systems are based. Thus one finds differences across Europe with respect to how higher education policies are formulated, administrative practices manifested and educational traditions play themselves out. Teichler (1988) has demonstrated how the exact implications of massification have varied across countries depending on what institutional and

organisational patterns were developed in order to deal with higher education expansion. Comparative evidence from countries such as England, France, Germany, Norway and Sweden suggests the solutions have been contested and shaped by established institutional structures (Kogan et al., forthcoming; Musselin, 1999). In particular, the comparative study of university reforms in England, Norway and Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates how reforms, apparently justified in terms of common ideals such as autonomy, accountability, efficiency and quality, were not only introduced in institutional settings that were quite different, but also followed different paths (Kogan et al., forthcoming).

As for the capacity of nation states to keep up traditional values, a study comparing changes in government regulation of higher education in eight countries – Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom and the United States – during almost the same period (late 1980s and 1990s), found autonomous collegial decision making still plays an essential role in all university systems, but enjoys a stronger position in continental Europe than in the Anglo-American countries and Japan. Conversely, competition plays a stronger role in systems with many and influential private institutions (Japan, the US) and countries that have pursued more radical New Public Management policies (Hood et al., 2004).

At the level of policy formulations and formal organisational arrangements there has been a noticeable movement towards what I have called the market model, i.e. a development in the direction of the Vitis Vinifera scenario. This is one that is characterised by Mode 2 practices and pragmatism and one in which the value of accountability ranks high. Yet there is also a concern for quality in teaching and research that in the final analysis must rest on good academic work as judged by academic peers.

At a level of actual behavior, policies and practices combine to push in the direction of stronger public state structures, although with many quasi market features, such as increased competition, at the national and European levels. This might be taken to support an argument that the Centralia scenario, particularly regarding the role of the national and supra national state structures, is a probable one. In this scenario several of the actual trends we may observe today are taken a step further: intra-institutional mergers (departments and faculties) have become inter-institutional mergers, and after the build up of national quality assurance agencies in the first decade of the 21st century, European level quality insurance agencies have become much more salient actors in the policy landscape.

Where does this leave the network or Octavia scenario? Today we can already observe market based and public operating modes tend to blend. Furthermore, the way in which those structures blend may be understood in terms of network characteristics of the actor constellations involved. Thus we may find systems in which networks are more or less under the influence of particular actors such as social and academic elites, interest organisations, state authorities or autonomous institutions (Bleiklie forthcoming). Such networks may furthermore vary in terms of social cohesion between tightly knit ‘policy communities’ to more loosely organised ‘issue networks’

(Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). One of the lessons from comparative research on change in higher education systems is that although they may be exposed to similar pressures (e.g. massification) and political-ideological trends (new public management, privatisation) that may push them in the same direction, they tend to remain on parallel courses and do not necessarily move closer to one another (Kogan et al., forthcoming).

Concluding Remarks on Autonomy and Academic Freedom

The above argument means major trends in university organisation (managerialism, stakeholder organisations and the use of market mechanisms) are all likely to characterise higher education institutions and systems 15 years from now, but they are also likely to be limited by counter-forces represented by key functions of modern universities and knowledge production. These characteristics may be considered stabilizing elements in higher education and knowledge producing systems. The Swedish historian Sverker Sörlin argues in a recent paper that in the face of the fashionable idea that universities need to be held more clearly accountable for the products they offer society, in return for the resources invested in them by public or private agencies, there is little available evidence that universities over time perform better if they operate under conditions that provide less autonomy and academic freedom in order to achieve more accountability and entrepreneurial efficiency (Sörlin 2004). There are several reasons for this. Firstly there is the fact that top rated universities generally operate under conditions of autonomy and offer considerable academic freedom to their professors. These universities are still the winners in the competition for public research funding. He argues further that although mission-oriented research groups seem to perform well in basic research, there is also overwhelming evidence to support the claim that basic research in traditional academic settings – research universities, with traditional academic funding and with a large degree of autonomy – is an enormously efficient way of producing new theoretical and empirical, if not immediately applicable, knowledge (Sörlin, 2004). Secondly there is no conclusive evidence to support the notion that research institutions organised as entrepreneurial universities along the lines of the business enterprise produce more useful results (licenses, patents, start-ups, firm formation) than traditional academic research institutions. Thirdly the entrepreneurial university is, however, only one of several dimensions of the third mission of universities. There are other kinds of services that universities openly or tacitly are expected to deliver and have provided to a large extent since the 19th century. These services may be: independent criticism, credibility, reliability, special expertise and trust. Regarding the wider cultural role of universities and basic research there are no other institutions than universities that seem able to sustain such important functions, and we may conclude the legitimacy of universities has very much to do with the extent they are able to serve as upholders of criticism, credibility, and trust. If such properties are dependent on autonomy and non-partisanship, which they are, autonomy and academic freedom is indeed something likely to find institutional protection 15 years from now.

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Part 4

Europe as a World Region: Responses to the Scenarios from other World Regions

15 Tertiary Education and Research in 2020: A View from the Developing World

Jamil Salmi[1]

Introduction

Forecasts are typically difficult to make, especially about the future.

Niels Bohr

From Centralia to Vitis Vinifera to Octavia, CHEPS has taken us on a fascinating voyage of imagination and exploration, outlining three distinct scenarios for the future of tertiary education in Europe.[2] The scenarios are constructed around a set of key variables such as the size of the sector, its institutional structure, the type of pedagogical organisation that would prevail, the role of private providers (both domestic and foreign), the focus of the research agenda, the quality assurance system and financing and management arrangements.

To assess the usefulness and relevance of these scenarios, this chapter applies the tests of time and space. It starts with a question about the actual distance between these possible futures and the present situation. It then moves from Europe to other parts of the world to explore the implications of these scenarios for developing countries. The paper also attempts to identify some missing elements in the three scenarios. Finally, it

[1] The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, the members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries the present.

[2] This paper adopts the OECD definition of tertiary education as 'a level or stage of studies beyond secondary education. Such studies are undertaken in tertiary education institutions, such as public and private universities, colleges, and polytechnics, and also in a wide range of other settings, such as secondary schools, work sites, and via free-standing information technology-based offerings and a host of public and private entities.' (Wagner, 1999).

briefly outlines how the changes represented by Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera might affect the way in which the World Bank supports tertiary education systems and institutions in developing countries.

How Different is the Future?

> All things change. Yet nothing is extinguished… there is nothing in the whole world which is permanent. Everything flows onwards and all things are brought into being with a changing nature. The ages themselves glide by in constant movement, for still waters will never reach the sea.
>
> Ovid

As provocative as some aspects of the three worlds anticipated by CHEPS may appear in the European context, in many ways the future has already arrived, at least in some countries and some institutions. We can look at five dimensions to illustrate this point: new information and communication technologies (ICT), networking, quality assurance, management practices, and financing.

The ICT revolution has already begun to transform the tertiary education landscape as well as the way institutions operate. The convergence of increased computing power and reduced communication costs has brought about the quasi neutralisation of physical distance, leading to the emergence of virtual universities and online programmes that can reach students anywhere in the world and compete with local institutions. The Virtual University of Monterrey in Mexico, for example, offers 15 master's degree programmes using teleconferencing and the Internet to reach more than 50,000 students throughout Latin America. The proliferation of distance education programmes within existing institutions all over the world has also increased opportunities for young people and adults whose circumstances prevent them from physically attending a tertiary education programme. In the United States, the largest – and fastest growing – university today is the for-profit private University of Phoenix, which expanded its reach from less than 20,000 students in 1995 to around 70,000 in 2000 and 230,000 in 2005, catering to working young adults who study toward professionally oriented degrees and diplomas in a mixed delivery mode.

Within existing universities and other tertiary education institutions, ICT can be applied to radically change pedagogical and administrative practices. The concurrent use of multimedia, computers and the internet can make more active and interactive learning experiences possible. For example self-directed learning and peer tutoring, experiential learning with virtual labs, problem-based learning through web-based artificial intelligence applications ('cognitive tutors'), or any combination of these approaches can greatly enhance the quality and effectiveness of the education experience. Finally, appropriate management information systems and tools have the potential to streamline and reduce administrative tasks, making it possible to manage tertiary education systems and institutions with greater efficiency.

The development of university networks is also a phenomenon already in motion. For more than four decades North American and European universities have been supporting counterpart institutions in developing countries through various modalities of linkage programmes, often with donor agencies funding. In the past fifteen years, EU-sponsored programmes such as Tempus, Erasmus (now Erasmus Mundus) or Colombus have encouraged and supported the creation of alliances among European institutions of higher learning as well as between European universities and institutions in other parts of the world. More recently, teaching and research institutions in many countries have felt the need to forge alliances and partnerships with each other, sometimes even with foreign partners, in order to better compete on the global scene. While many of these initiatives have not been very successful – witness the recent debacle of the British E-University and the closing down of the US Open University, due to the absence of a real pedagogical project in the first instance and the lack of a proper business model in the second case – some of them have pioneered path-breaking collaboration modalities. For instance, the partnerships between MIT and the University of Singapore, or between the University of Michigan and Seoul National University allow students in two continents to study together and do joint research projects through video-conferencing and the Internet. In the USA, many community colleges operate some of their courses through sub-contracting agreements with private training firms.

It is important to underline these networking arrangements have been greatly facilitated by the availability of ICTs and the ongoing expansion of the Internet 2 platform, which already links more than 200 universities and research centers in three continents and will likely multiply opportunities for joint activities, especially in the research area.

Quality assurance is a third dimension worth mentioning in the context of this discussion. While it is true the establishment of independent evaluation and/or accreditation agencies in the realm of tertiary education is a fairly recent development in Europe, there has been a long accreditation tradition in the United States and many developing countries have also moved in this direction. In Latin America, for instance, Colombia, Chile and Argentina have been at the vanguard of accreditation efforts since the early 1990s, while Mexico has recently set up a meta-level accreditation body whose purpose is to accredit accreditation organisations. In Western Europe, the Bologna process has certainly accelerated the movement in this direction with the search for common accreditation criteria and mechanisms. In this context, it is striking to observe the eagerness of accession countries in Eastern Europe to make progress in this area in preparation for their integration into the European Union.

Interestingly, one variation of quality assurance that has also emerged quite spontaneously in Europe is the increasingly frequent practice of calculating rankings to compare universities or programmes. Notwithstanding the usefulness of these often controversial exercises – in 2004, the New Zealand Council of Rectors successfully challenged the government's attempt to publish rankings of the country's universities – rankings are becoming a regular feature of the tertiary education scene**.** In the UK, for instance, the government has compiled and published peer rankings of individual

researchers and institutions for several years; daily newspapers such as the Financial Times, the Guardian and the Sunday Times have also done their own league tables of up to a dozen indicators; the Times even recently published a ranking of the top 200 universities worldwide. In Germany, a think tank financed by the Council of Rectors has developed an interesting methodology showing rankings for a variety of criteria without calculating an overall rank, unlike the US News and World magazine which provides an overall ranking for programmes compared across universities. Rankings are also commonly published by newspapers and magazines in several other European countries, such as France, Germany and Poland.

With respect to the management dimension, the move toward an entrepreneurial culture stressed as one of the salient features of the Vitis Vinifera scenario echoes the transformation of a growing number of European universities that have adopted more modern, business-like management practices. The entrepreneurial university was the theme of the OECD's Institutional Management Higher Education annual conference in September 2002. The conference showcased the results of several years of research on the evolution of management practices in OECD countries' universities, as well as the publication of Burton Clark's celebrated book on this theme (Clark, 1998).

Finally, it is worth noting the main features of financing presented in the Vitis Vinifera scenario, namely the generalisation of tuition fees with student loans, while novel in the European context with the notable exceptions of England and Wales, can be found in a growing number of Latin American (Chile, Colombia) and Asian nations (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea) where the private sector enrolls a large share of the student population and the public universities charge significant fees. The European student voucher scheme sustaining the Octavia scenario is certainly bolder in concept. Even though many education economists have argued that a voucher system could be an efficient mechanism to encourage quality improvement through competition, this approach has hardly been tested at the tertiary education level. In that respect, it will be quite instructive to follow the evolution of the recent introduction of a voucher scheme in the state of Colorado in the US.

In summary, these five areas (ICT, networking, quality assurance, management and financing) have served to illustrate the fact that the world of tertiary education has already evolved in more than one sense. To a large extent, the difference between the present and the future(s) explored by CHEPS is more a question of scale and scope rather than of significantly new trends. This observation does not diminish in any way the relevance of the Delphi projection process undertaken by CHEPS as a useful device to emphasise the possible consequences of existing trends by contrasting three possible evolution paths. It also suggests that elements of these scenarios may unfold sooner than the 2020 horizon of the CHEPS study.

Implications for Developing Countries

In questions of mind, there is no medium term:
either we look for the best or we live with the worst.

John Gardner

Another measure of the relevance of the three scenarios is to look at them from the viewpoint of developing countries and ask whether the salient features of Octavia, Vitis Vinifera or Centralia have any meaning for that part of the world. Despite the fact many developing nations are still struggling with basic issues of quantitative expansion and quality improvement in a resource-constrained environment, many of the challenges explored in the three CHEPS scenarios are indeed relevant to tertiary education institutions in the developing world. Key implications relate to tertiary education reform and quality assurance.

In the first place all nations, poor and rich alike, are feeling the pressure to reform their tertiary education systems to better respond to the changing skill needs arising from economic restructuring efforts within the context of these countries' competitiveness and globalisation agendas. In this context, the tertiary education system has the complex mission of imparting higher-level skills to a rising proportion of the workforce; fostering lifelong learning for all citizens with an emphasis on creativity and flexibility, to permit constant adaptation to the changing demands of a knowledge-based economy; and promoting international recognition of the credentials granted by the country's educational institutions. In the medium term this may lead to a progressive blurring between initial and continuing degree studies, as well as between young adult and mid-career training. Finland, one of the leading promoters of continuing education in Europe, is among the most advanced nations in terms of conceptualizing and organizing tertiary education along these new lines. Today, the country has more adults engaged in continuing education programmes (200,000) than young people enrolled in regular higher education degree courses (150,000).

This evolution means the primary clientele of universities will no longer be young high school graduates. Universities will need to organise themselves to accommodate the learning and training needs of an increasingly diverse clientele: working students, mature students, stay-at-home students, travelling students, part-time students, day students, night students, weekend students, etc. One can therefore expect a significant change in the demographic shape of tertiary education institutions, whereby the traditional structure of a pyramid with a majority of first degree students, a smaller group of post-graduate students and finally an even smaller share of participants in continuing education programmes will be replaced by an inverted pyramid with a minority of first time students, more students pursuing a second or third degree and the majority of students enrolled in short term continuing education activities.

Secondly, the concern around setting up or consolidating a national quality assurance system is equally strong in developing countries which are faced with the rapid growth of private tertiary education institutions and increased competition from foreign

providers in the form of virtual universities or branches of overseas universities (Salmi, 2002). Very few developing nations have an established accreditation and evaluation system, let alone access to the necessary information on these foreign programmes or institutional monitoring capacity to detect fraud and protect their students from low quality offerings. Many Latin American countries, for example, find themselves in the awkward situation of having more distance education doctoral programmes proposed by Spanish universities than conventional doctoral programmes offered in their national universities. These countries need to establish the capacity to accredit new providers and programmes and to recognise qualifications acquired through non-traditional modes of delivery (e-learning, individualised degrees, etc.). As Sir John Daniel – one of the world's experts on open universities and distance education – declared a few years back, 'distance learning is a world of extremes, when you look at the best university education around the world, some of it is now distance learning, when you look for the worst, all of it is distance learning. Bad distance learning may now be given a new lease on life by the brave new world of online teaching.' (Daniel, 1999). With the increased focus on lifelong learning and multiple learning paths and the expansion of online educational modalities, there is an irreversible trend toward student evaluation approaches that emphasise learning outcomes and acquired competencies of students over the input and process aspects of education. Low-income countries and small states that cannot afford (or where it does not make sense) to set up a full-blown national quality assurance system can join forces for the establishment of a common regional accreditation scheme, as has happened with the six Spanish-speaking countries of Central America.

Finally, it is not too surprising that universities in developing countries are facing many of the same issues as their European sisters since they belong to the same historical tradition. In most developing nations, the universities were built on the European model, reflecting either the influence of the former colonial power, Great Britain or France in most cases, or the Humboldt model of the traditional research university.

What is Missing in the CHEPS Scenarios?

Learning is but an adjunct to ourself,
And where we are our learning likewise is.

William Shakespeare

Understandingly the authors of the three scenarios had to be selective in the number of variables focused on. But there are several additional issues worth mentioning here which could have a significant influence on the role and shape of European tertiary education systems in 2020.

Global Dimension

A key issue is the global dimension and the effects, positive and negative, large countries such as the USA, China and India can have on Europe. The visa restrictions in the aftermath of September 11, for instance, have resulted in a dramatic decrease in

the number of foreign students enrolled in graduate programmes in the United States; for the 2004-05 academic year, applications from China have dropped 45 percent; from India, 28 percent. Countries with a proactive international vocation, such as the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have been able to take advantage of this opportunity to attract a growing number of students from Eastern Europe and Asia. New Zealand is even considering charging foreign PhD candidates domestic student tuition fees, in sharp contrast to recent trends in the United Kingdom and Australia.

Similarly, the fact that China has recently overtaken the USA in terms of overall number of universities and students, and that the Indian tertiary education market is also growing rapidly cannot be ignored by Europe. European universities will have to address the tension between a long tradition of solidarity with Third World universities and the recent evolution toward a more business-like model based on competitive behaviours.

Brain Drain

An inevitable consequence of an increasingly integrated global economy and an internationally linked knowledge society is a rise in the worldwide mobility of skilled human resources. While developing countries frequently view this mobility as a threat to national welfare and a loss of scarce resources, many European countries have benefited from the influx of professionals and skilled labour from Africa or Asia. But in recent years, a new facet of the brain drain has appeared with the migration of engineers and technicians from Russia and other Eastern European countries to the West. This trend, which started after the fall of the Berlin wall, is likely to accelerate with the enlargement of the European Union. It could aggravate existing economic imbalances and create tensions between receiving and exporting regions.

Role of Universities in Regional Development

This issue received scant attention in the CHEPS scenarios. Studies on clusters have stressed the strategic importance of building up a nexus of universities, research centers, business incubators and innovative firms that can drive economic growth at the regional level. This geographical dimension is underlined by a rich body of evidence on the contribution of universities to regional development and the spillover effects of academic research on industrial research and technology and local innovation (Adams, 2001; Branstetter, 2001; Carrin et.al., 2004; Shahid et.al., 2003)

Non-University Tertiary Institutions

The focus of the CHEPS scenarios on the future of universities should be nuanced with a better appreciation of the important social and economic role of such institutions. Over the past 30 years, the development of a variety of new institutions alongside the traditional universities – short duration technical institutes (French 'IUT', Dutch 'HBO'), polytechnics and Fachhochschulen (German and Austrian), distance education centers and open universities – has created new opportunities to meet the growing social demand for tertiary education and provide professional qualifications

that are often as, if not more, relevant than many university programmes. In many European countries, these institutions enroll a large proportion of the overall student population. The scenarios need to take into account the challenge of creating comprehensive lifelong systems that integrate a variety of qualifications acquired in different types of institutions.

Political Dimensions of Reform

Greater attention is needed on the political dimensions of some of the potentially controversial reforms featured in the three scenarios, such as the generalisation of tuition fees (Vitis Vinifera) or the introduction of a European voucher system (Octavia). In his famous political manifesto, *the Prince,* Machiavelli wrote that 'there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in introducing a new order of things'. While this observation is true in the political realm in general, it is even more valid in the case of the university community which tends to be among the most conservative constituencies in any country. In Germany, for example, the recent declaration of the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court to the effect that charging tuition fees is not unconstitutional was greeted by student protests in several states. The success of any tertiary education reform will depend on careful political management to build consensus and seek ownership among all stakeholders.

Evolution of World Bank Support for Tertiary Education

> It is impossible to have a complete education system without an appropriate and strong higher education system. . . . I am not for a moment suggesting that primary education and secondary education are not at the very essence of development . . . (but that is) not enough. You have to have centers of excellence and learning and training if you are going to advance the issue of poverty and development in developing countries. . . . the key . . . is higher education, not just on the technological side, but to create people with enough wisdom to be able to use it.
>
> James D. Wolfensohn, Launch of the Report of the Task Force on Higher Education and Society, March 1, 2000.

In a rapidly changing global world that is undergoing the kinds of deep transformations explored in the three CHEPS scenarios, the World Bank – and other donor agencies – cannot continue to interact with developing and transition countries in a 'business as usual' mode. The policy dialogue, knowledge sharing and financial assistance offered by the Bank need to focus on ways of helping tertiary education systems in these countries prepare effectively for continuous transformation. This implies two complementary approaches, discussed below.

First, countries need to formulate a clear strategic vision of how their tertiary education system can most appropriately contribute to the development of a knowledge-driven economy, how each institution elects to evolve within that system and under what conditions the new information and communication technologies can be harnessed to

improve the effectiveness and relevance of the learning experience. The 2000 report on the Size and Shape of Higher Education in South Africa, or the 2001 India as Knowledge Superpower strategy illustrate recent attempts to develop such a vision at the national level, as a tribute to the wise words of the Roman philosopher, Seneca, who cautioned us two millennia ago that 'there is no favorable wind for those who do not know where they are going.' (Council on Higher Education Size and Shape Task Team, 2000; Planning Commission Government of India, 2001)

Strategic planning exercises undertaken by individual tertiary institutions serve a similar purpose. By identifying both favourable and harmful trends in their immediate environment and linking them to a rigorous assessment of their internal strengths and weaknesses, institutions can better define their mission, market niche and medium-term development objectives and formulate concrete plans to achieve them. Through lack of strategic planning, many new distance education institutions have adopted inappropriate technologies, failing to assess their adequacy against the purpose of their programmes, the competency of their professors and the learning needs of their students. It is also important to stress strategic planning is not a one-time exercise; the more successful organisations in both business and academia are those that are relentless in challenging themselves in the pursuit of better and more effective ways of responding to client needs.

Second, there is a need for more flexible governance and management structures, complemented by appropriate financial incentives for innovation, to encourage tertiary education institutions to be responsive to changes in their economic and social environment. Effective labor market feedback mechanisms are indispensable to creating the capacity to react and adapt rapidly. Tracer surveys and regular consultations with employers and alumni, for instance, are useful instruments for orienting the curricula updates necessary to meet the changing needs of firms.

Furthermore, globalisation and the growth of borderless education have brought about important issues that affect tertiary education in all countries but are often beyond the control of any one government. Among the challenges of particular concern to developing countries seeking to build up or retain their advanced human capital capacity are new forms of brain drain that result in a loss of local capacity in fields critical to development; the absence of a proper international accreditation and qualifications framework; the dearth of internationally accepted legislation regarding foreign tertiary education providers; the lack of clear intellectual property regulations governing the content and distribution of distance education programmes; and barriers to access to information and communication technologies, including the Internet.

The World Bank is uniquely positioned to work with its partners in the international community – international organisations, bilateral donors and foundations – to help facilitate or create a discussion platform and promote an enabling framework for these global public goods that are crucial to the future of tertiary education in the developing world. In recent years, for example, the Bank has participated in the work on quality assurance guidelines for borderless education led by OECD and UNESCO. Funding from the World Bank's Development Grant Facility is supporting the establishment of

two regional accreditation networks, one in Asia and one in Latin America. To help countries tap the potential of new information and communication technologies, the Bank has become an active member of the Internet 2 network linking universities and research institutes in more than 50 countries. It is also exploring ways of distributing on a larger scale relevant resources (courses, tutorials, pedagogical tools) coming out of the Open Education movement spearheaded by the Hewlett Foundation, with the participation of prestigious universities like MIT and Carnegie Mellon.

Conclusion

> We live in an era where everything is possible and nothing is certain.
>
> Vaclav Havel

As plausible or convincing as they may appear, the three scenarios prepared by CHEPS remain, by definition, in the realm of uncertainty. But their merit is to make us aware of the possible consequences of several key drivers of change. Indeed what we can be sure of, in the midst of many unknown factors, is many of the phenomena described in the scenarios are already in motion. One of them is the rapidly growing demand for tertiary education, translating into more differentiated and less local programme offerings catering to an increasingly diverse clientele. The second is the growing competition on many levels. With the exception of a number of Western European countries, in most parts of the world there is intense competition for resources and customers among public and private universities. This form of competition is nowhere more severe than in countries with declining school age population, such as South Korea and Taiwan, where the government is actively encouraging the merger of universities to reduce excess supply. In addition, the trend toward increased institutional diversification and the appearance of new categories of institutions (virtual universities, corporate universities, franchise universities) has led to more intense competition among a wider range of providers. Last, but not least, modern information and communication technologies have already revolutionised the world of tertiary education.

This evolution has brought about many challenges, two of which are stressed in this conclusion. First comes the danger of a widening digital divide between countries in the North and South and, of course, between tertiary education institutions in the two parts of the world, fuelled by blatant differences in terms of Internet access and pricing. The findings of a recent study on connectivity in Africa dramatically illustrate the concrete dimensions of this digital gap. According to the survey undertaken in 2004 among 83 African universities, these universities have, on average, no more bandwidth than a median household in the United States, while having to pay about 100 times more than a US university would pay for the same level of access (African Virtual University, 2004). The challenge therefore, is to offer significantly better access and pricing conditions to tertiary institutions in developing countries. This would enable them to rely on the new information and communication technologies as agents of expanded equity and improved quality, assuming of course a proper integration of ICT into their pedagogical and managerial approaches.

The second even more important challenge is an ethical one. As increasing emphasis is placed on the role of science and technology in support of knowledge-driven economic development strategies, there is a danger of focusing exceedingly on the implacable logic of technical change and globalisation. Adapting to the changing environment is not only a matter of reshaping tertiary institutions and applying new technologies. It is equally vital to ensure universities play a leading role in building social capital by equipping students with the core values necessary to live as responsible citizens in complex democratic societies. The small private University of Monterrey in Northern Mexico has been able to compete effectively with the neighbouring Technology Institute of Monterrey because of its deliberate inclusion of community-related courses and activities stimulating the development of appropriate values and social skills among students. A meaningful education for the 21st century should stimulate all aspects of human intellectual potential, not only to give access to global knowledge but also to uphold the richness of local cultures and values, in support of which time-honoured disciplines like philosophy, literature, arts and social sciences will continue to remain essential. This overarching objective was artfully reemphasised by US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia in a speech at the 1998 graduating ceremony of William and Mary College in Virginia, USA.

Brains and learning, like muscle and physical skill, are articles of commerce. They are bought and sold. You can hire them by the year or by the hour. The only thing in the world not for sale is character. And if that does not govern and direct your brains and learning, they will do you and the world more harm than good.

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16 City of Dreams: Comments of a US Observer on the European Experiment with Mass Higher Education

David D. Dill

The American Advantage

An obvious introductory question is what can an observer from the US contribute to the current European debate about the future shape of its higher education system? One answer is well argued by the US scholar Martin Trow, who first articulated the useful distinctions among elite, mass and universal access forms of higher education (2005).

Trow (2000) has outlined what he terms 'the American Advantage' in higher education. By this he means the US higher education system is better adapted both normatively and structurally to the demands of a 'post industrial' age, which places a premium on the creation and wide distribution of knowledge and skill. Trow notes that the US was the first industrialised society to develop an organisational and structural framework for mass higher education, the basic characteristics of which were in place at the end of the 19th century. In a classic structural-functional analysis (Trow 2000) argues if other developed societies desire a productive mass system of higher education they will need to implement elements similar to those in the US:

- a vertically integrated degree framework (e.g., Associate/BA/MA/PHD)
- diversity of institutions *and* academic standards
- institutional autonomy marked by strong administrative leadership and multiple sources of financial support (including tuition fees)
- a relatively flat academic hierarchy
- modular courses, credit accumulation, and transfer
- competitive allocation of research funds

I will utilise these six elements to provide a US perspective for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the three suggested scenarios for European higher education: Centralia, Octavia, and Vitis Vinifera.

The Three Scenarios

Let me note at the outset that providing a coherent critique of these three scenarios is particularly challenging because of the way that they were constructed. The scenarios are quite complex. They not only offer diverse higher education policies, but also present dissimilar worlds. The assumptions made in each scenario about technological, economic, political and social developments vary, which makes it especially difficult if not somewhat illogical to compare the strengths and weaknesses of the particular policies. That said, while there is some overlap the three scenarios do provide distinctive approaches to coordinating a system of higher education and the frameworks correspond respectively with Burton Clark's (1983) well known distinction regarding state, academic oligarchy and market approaches. Therefore, given the basic differences in these policy frameworks, let me attempt to apply the previously introduced six elements to each scenario.

The Centralia Scenario

The Centralia scenario of state steering provides several of the elements I suggested for a successful mass system. The scenario also advances several enlightened public policies for steering higher education, not surprising since the scenario was written by researchers at the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) with a sophisticated understanding of higher education. Unfortunately one weakness of a state-centered scenario is that it is equally plausible to imagine an EU political process that would lead to the adoption of less enlightened policies. It is possible that 'rent seeking' behaviour by special interest groups, including academics, their institutions, and patrons, may lead to 'government failure' in the form of regulations that prove inefficient for the larger society (Weimer and Vining, 2005). Furthermore, the scenario's reliance on government agencies as the primary instrument for defining crucial variables such as common degree standards and the appropriate numbers of different types of institutions raises questions as to whether the resulting system will produce the diversity and innovation that best serves the public interest (Dill and Teixeira, 2000). The policy of retaining the title 'university' for institutions dedicated principally to teaching may also not be efficient for society. One problem noted in many expanding European systems of higher education is the tendency toward 'academic drift' in which all institutions seek to emulate the research university model and thereby drive up the costs of higher education.

Furthermore the changing ratio of private to public sector employment in EU countries may affect the traditional institutional framework, which has steered higher education in the past. For example, civil service employment and exams as well as the advocated 'public good' orientation to university education may become a less influential force in shaping higher education policies than the demands of private businesses and those of students interested primarily in the private benefits provided by higher education. In

addition, private sector higher education in Europe is less likely to play the prestige role suggested in this scenario. Private providers are more likely to flourish in life-long learning and vocational markets traditionally ignored by established universities (Dill, Teixeira, Jongbloed, and Amaral, 2004). The US experience would also suggest that competition will encourage existing institutions of high reputation to quickly co-opt any potentially prestigious degrees, as exemplified by the MBA programmes recently implemented at both Cambridge and Oxford.

The Octavia Scenario

The Octavia scenario better captures the elements of institutional entrepreneurialism, diversity and student mobility characteristic of the US mass system and essential to building a system of universal access. The development of short cycle academic programmes, multiple sources of institutional funding and more competitive forms of research funding are both more likely to occur and to be in the public interest (Trow, 2005). As in the US, this will likely lead to greater institutional stratification, with some institutions focusing on prestige and others on scale. It will also probably lead to regional disparities in the location of research-intensive universities.

While I endorse the view espoused in the Octavia scenario that network models could be an important coordinating device for the future of higher education, there is reason to doubt these will be similar to the disciplinary and departmental networks of the past (Dill, in press). The influence of these traditional networks is being eroded by the growing specialisation of academic knowledge, the proliferation of new interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary fields and increased mobility in the academic labor market. In contrast, the competitive advantages of formally organised and managed interdisciplinary research networks or centers have been well demonstrated in US higher education (Dill and Sporn, 1995). Furthermore, European experience seems to suggest an influential role for government steering in the development of effective accrediting or quality assurance networks (Schwartz and Westerheijden, 2004) as well as in the provision of valid academic quality information by secondary markets such as newspapers and magazines (Dill and Soo, in press). One element of the Octavia scenario appears irrefutable to me – the prediction that in the year 2020 university administrators will still be infatuated with the jargon of management!

The Vitis Vinifera Scenario

Finally, and unsurprisingly from a US perspective, I would argue that some form of the Vitis Vinifera scenario will most likely provide more of the outlined elements necessary for a successful mass higher education system as well as the necessary potential for developing truly universal access.

Three Challenges for European Higher Education

Although I think the Vitis Vinifera scenario is both more efficacious and more likely to occur, I don't believe any nation/state – including the US – has yet identified the institutional framework of rules and policies that will maximise the production of

human capital in a market-oriented mass system of higher education. I would therefore like to conclude with a brief discussion of three challenges for European mass higher education that we in the US are experiencing and have not yet solved:

- the 'cost disease'
- inadequate assurance of academic standards
- declining commitment to need-based financial aid

The Cost Disease

Over the last decade increases in costs for higher education in the US have been second only to those in the health care sector. Both public and private tuition increases have risen faster than inflation and the average family income. There is some evidence of a 'market failure' in that these increased costs are not matched by equivalent benefits in human capital (Kuh, 1999), but rather are being invested in an academic arms race to secure 'world-class' university reputations (Brewer, Gates, and Goldman, 2002). The competition among higher education institutions is greater than at anytime in US history (Hoxby, 2002) and there is rapid growth in the IT-based distance learning sector (Hentschke, 2004). Nonetheless, the US thus far seems unable to garner the efficiency benefits of this competition and there is little evidence that government price controls will prove an effective remedy or can be sustained in an environment of high social demand for access to higher education. Recent debates about the declining reputation of universities in the UK and Europe may portend a costly international version of this academic arms race. It is possible the European experience with the organisation and financing of health care, which has produced average costs much lower than the US and outcomes significantly better, may offer some clues as to the design of an effective policy framework for controlling the costs of higher education. One implication of this observation is the European higher education system, while providing greater diversity in types of institutions and increased student access, will need to discover more effective means of ensuring a better match between student needs and institutional capacities than has thus far been achieved in the US system.

Inadequate Assurance of Academic Standards

A related issue is the assurance of academic standards. Over the last decade academic missionaries from the US have been touring the globe advocating academic accreditation as the means of assuring academic quality in systems of mass higher education. Within the US university community, however, academic accreditation is often viewed as irrelevant to academic quality (Ewell, 1999). There is little empirical evidence that US institutional accreditation influences educational decisions that affect academic standards or improve student learning (The Landscape, 1999). This year the US Congress, controlled by a Republican party suspicious of federal regulation, has actively discussed eliminating the long-standing policy linking institutional accreditation to eligibility for federal student aid and may, in the words of the

accreditation community, 'federalise' academic accreditation.[1] While there are new experiments in academic accreditation underway in the US, a number of these reforms have been ironically inspired by Academic Audits first developed in the UK (Dill, 2000). Accreditation as a concept may of course still have value as a regulatory approach for assuring academic standards in higher education, but we need to discover an academic accreditation *process* that assures value for money in the creation of human capital.[2] New approaches to accreditation in Europe will therefore be watched with great interest.

We should also consider the greater use of certification exams as a means of assuring academic standards as suggested in the Centralia scenario. National exams for traditional university subjects, such as those experimented with in Brazil (Schwartzman, 2004), are likely of debatable efficiency for society. However, much of the social demand for higher education is not in university subjects but in vocational fields where the development of certification exams by educational providers and/or by business and industry may be more feasible (Adelman, 2000). Government incentives for the development of sophisticated and valid exams in these rapidly expanding applied areas may help preserve more qualitative forms of academic assessment for those academic fields where a subjective approach provides demonstrable social benefits (e.g., the traditional arts and sciences subjects).

Declining Commitment to Need-based Financial Aid

The third and final challenge is creating a mass higher education system that is both efficient and equitable. There is increasing evidence in the US that the availability of need-based financial aid is declining while merit-based aid for high achieving students regardless of need is rising (Geiger, 2004). One cause of this is the previously mentioned academic arms race, in which universities reallocate scarce financial resources from need-based aid to merit aid in order to build their reputation by attracting more high achieving students. But there is also some evidence of a 'democratic failure' (Weimer and Vining, 2005) in recently implemented state policies for student aid. A number of states have adopted expensive merit scholarship programmes for achieving students regardless of need and have reduced public support for need-based student aid. These student aid policies, similar to low or free tuition policies, are very popular among middle and upper class voters whose children disproportionately attend higher education. This is leading to what one observer described as 'aristocratic socialism' (Fallows and Ganeshananthan, 2004). European social policies have traditionally been more sensitive to the needs of the lower class than those in the US. But as the dispersion of average incomes increases within European countries, sustaining the social consensus in support of the poor in higher education policy may pose more of a challenge.

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[1] See for example the reports of US Congressional deliberations available from CHEA (Council for Higher Education Accreditation) at: http://www.chea.org

[2] For an analysis of public policies for developing human capital that challenges the need to increase public subsidies for higher education, see Heckman (2000).

Concluding Thoughts

Let me conclude by noting that we Americans fully appreciate the difficulty of designing an exemplary city. In 1630, while sailing aboard the Arbella for the New World, John Winthrop (1987, p. 26) wrote that he and his colleagues would build 'a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us'. The democratic community they founded in America is still a work in progress and the outcome is unclear. Europe is now building its own city of dreams in mass higher education and the world will be watching with great interest to see how this new system grapples with the modern challenges of cost, quality, and access.

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17 The Future of European Higher Education from a Chinese Perspective: the Internationalisation Dimension

Yuzhuo Cai

The CHEPS scenarios on European higher education in 2020 are primarily underlined by the potential social development within Europe as well as the influence of European Union (EU) strategies with respect to higher education. Given that European higher education is not limited to the intra-European context but rather a worldwide one, the role of other world regions should also be taken into consideration. This chapter reflects upon the possible influence of China on European higher education, particularly in the dimension of internationalisation. The central theme is how Europe-China cooperation might affect the development of European higher education. Amongst a wide range of issues, this paper focuses mainly on those that may have potential significance in the future but have not received enough attention to date.

How Chinese and European Higher Education Relate to Each Other

Discussion of this topic should not be isolated to the broad social and economic context. The social and economic relationships between two countries always include a significant education dimension; education exchange can strengthen the value of cultural ties and create potential mutual business opportunities. This proposition has been especially shaped by the historical development of relationships between China and the United States of America (USA). The importance of the USA attracting Chinese students was realised almost a century ago. In 1906 the president of the University of Illinois, Edwin James, wrote to the American President Roosevelt:

> The nation which succeeds in educating the young Chinese of the present generation will be the nation which for a given expenditure of effort will reap the largest possible returns in moral, intellectual, and commercial influence… Trade follows moral and spiritual domination far more inevitably than it follows the flag' (Smith, 1907).

While the USA has gained great social and economic benefits through education exchanges with China, the significance of such an approach has only been recently noticed in Europe, partly as a result of China's ascent in the world.

China with its 1.3 billion people, rapid economic growth and new 'open door' policy to the world, is fast becoming a major player in the world economy. It is estimated that by 2030 China will become the second largest economy in the world (People's Daily Online, 2002a). With this in mind, the financial rewards for building a strong relationship with China should seem irresistible to most European nations, despite their concerns over human rights issues. For instance, by 2003 China became the EU's second largest trade partner, with trade increasing more than twenty-fold in the past 25 years (Europa, 2004; Wiessala, 2002). It will be hardly surprising if this trade growth continues into the future. As China offers immense growth potential with its large market and skilled labour force, European countries are likely to adjust their strategies and policies in order to gain greater interest from China. Following the 1994 New Asia Strategy, the Commission of European Communities promulgated *A long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations* in 1995 and *Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China* in 1998. The significance of China's role in Europe can also be seen through the introduction of annual EU-China summits since 1998. These have all affected the relationship between European and Chinese higher education due to its social and economic ties to society.

However, the interaction between China and Europe with respect to higher education has not kept pace with their economic cooperation. Compared to the popular industry products such as 'Mercedes-Benz', 'Philips' and 'Nokia', the names of European universities are less known in China, with some exceptions such as Oxford and Cambridge. Chinese higher education institutions are probably even more unfamiliar to Europeans. The lack of mutual awareness is partly due to the fact that in the past there have been few exchanges of ideas and human resources with respect to higher education.

Since Chinese higher education emerged at the turn of the 20th century, it has been successively influenced by Japan, the USA, Europe, the Soviet Union and the USA again in the post-reform era. The introduction of the Western European higher education system in China took place in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1932, the government of the Republic of China invited a number of advisors from Germany, France, England and Poland to participate in a national project on Chinese higher education reform (Hayhoe, 1999). The reform started with the intention to develop a French style system that was characterised by centralisation, but the implementation was undermined by civil wars and the anti-Japanese war. When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, a reconstruction of a socialist higher education system (which appeared to be an all-out emulation of Soviet patterns and practices) followed. That system remained intact until the launch of higher education reforms in the 1980s as a response to China's economic transformation from a centrally planned system to a market oriented one.

In the post-reform era, Chinese higher education was largely influenced by American models (Yang, 2000). Although some researchers tend to compare the higher education policy changes in China with similar attempts in Europe, the initiation of most government policies in Chinese higher education were inspired by American ideas and experiences. Arguably the dominance of the American impact on Chinese higher education is attributable more or less to the thoughts of Chinese scholars who had graduated from American universities. Not only are there a considerable number of USA-educated Chinese, but many of them hold influential positions in China.

The USA has become the main destination for Chinese overseas students since China started its economic reforms at the end of 1970s. By comparison, the flow of Chinese students to Europe was quite limited until the 1990s when Europe's interest in developing relationships with China became clear, coupled with China's growing demands for higher levels of education.

Tensions in Expectations for Chinese Overseas Students

The impact of globalisation on higher education influences not only the social, economic and cultural role of the university but also ushers higher education into competitive international markets. Student mobility is an important issue here. This is why in each scenario this topic has been given high priority. Along with the growth in the Chinese educational market over the past two decades, universities in countries other than the USA (including those in Europe) have been moving methodically to compete for Chinese students. Currently China has more students abroad than any other country and has become the world leader in the consumption and import of education.

A survey by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation shows that at the end of 2000, there were 1.6 million overseas students studying in 108 countries throughout the world. Of these, 380,000 students, in 103 countries are from China. (People's Daily Online, 2002b)

Although Europe has received around one fifth of the total Chinese overseas students since 1978 (Zhang, 2003), the recent decade has seen a sharp increase in the number of Chinese students in Europe.

Most European countries have three expectations of Chinese overseas students. The first highlights revenue generation. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, the tuition fees paid by international students have become an important financial source for higher education institutions. The British practice provoked a major change throughout Europe on tuition fee policies. Although many Western European countries traditionally have free higher education, recent practices and debates demonstrate a common tendency towards the introduction of, or an increase in tuition fees; at least for non-EU students so as to make up for dwindling public expenditures on higher education. Ireland is the exception and has taken a different approach. In 1996, the Irish government abolished tuition fees for first-time undergraduate students (Swail & Heller, 2004). However the policy only applies to Irish students or conditional students

from other EU countries and the government has shown an increasing interest in expanding the revenue derived from international student fees (The International Education Board Ireland, 2004). Discussions on tuition fees took place in Scandinavian countries, which are renowned for their welfare state. For instance, Denmark has already decided to introduce fees from 2006 for degree students coming from countries outside the EU or European Economic Area, and something similar is currently underway in Finland. As Altbach (1997) predicted, 'it seems only a matter of time until Europe's public universities charge tuition (fees)'. The positive attitude towards tuition fees explicitly underlines the scenarios of both 'Centralia' and 'Vitis Vinifera'.

Aside from financial benefits, accepting foreign students is also a means to bring highly-skilled foreign talent into European labour markets. European countries mostly welcome foreign students in areas where there is a potential talent shortage. In those systems in which fees are introduced, the potential employability and availability of scholarships may become important factors determining where Chinese overseas students will choose to go. For national interests, those countries receiving foreign students expect the inflow of foreign talent will render more competitive economies, higher education and R&D, notwithstanding side effects such as employment pressure and cultural conflict. While Europeans are enjoying the benefits of this, the Chinese authorities are worrying about the brain drain. Although the scale of outflow of highly skilled Chinese professionals is relatively small, its negative impact cannot be ignored as they are the brightest talents (Zhang, 2003). Nevertheless, one third of overseas students return to China upon graduation and there is no sign that China's policy concerning Chinese students studying abroad will change in the near future. The trend of internationalisation is irreversible. The outflow of Chinese students can to some extent relieve some pressures, such as the shortage of advanced educational resources and underutilisation of human resources. Most importantly, China will benefit from today's overseas students in the long run in terms of the information resources, business opportunities and intelligent human resources derived.

Finally, the exchange of international students between China and Europe enriches mutual cultural awareness both socially and academically. Currently there are more students flowing from China to Europe than the other way around. Recruiting foreign students for degree studies not only provides new opportunities for contacts between students, researchers and institutions but also provides a firm basis for economic cooperation. On the one hand, student exchange between China and Europe can create immediate opportunities for Chinese-European business partnerships. On the other long-term benefits for European countries' business interests with respect to China will be achieved through the development of a mutual awareness and understanding. Due to the large differences in societies, ideologies and cultures, the two sides should make full use of their education resources to expand cultural exchanges in order to boost understanding and friendship between their peoples. In this respect Chinese overseas students will play an important role in transforming the understanding of culture and values between China and Europe. For example the establishment of Erasmus Mundus, a cooperation and mobility programme in postgraduate higher education, was for this reason, though it does not specifically concern China. It aims to promote the European

Union as a centre of excellence in learning around the world, by attracting high quality students from countries outside the European Union to register for Joint Masters Degrees. Similar efforts have also been made by individual European countries. In the Netherlands, for example, recruiting Chinese students has been considered a long-term lucrative market strategy for Dutch business, following the proposition that Chinese students will gain high-level employment in the fast growing economy of their own country after studying in the Netherlands. They will also be good ambassadors for Dutch business. Even though Chinese students might be employed in Europe after graduation, or return to China without a significant position, their role in cultural transformation can hardly be neglected.

The three expectations European countries have of Chinese students outlined above are associated with three corresponding approaches of 'revenue-generating', 'skilled migration' and 'capacity building' (Larsen & Vincent-Lancrin, 2004; OECD, 2004). However the philosophies underlying these approaches are somewhat contradictory to one another, which will make the policy orientation concerning international students, the Chinese in particular, more complicated and controversial. Those countries favouring tuition fees for international students may optimistically view the UK experience. Even though British universities have charged the highest fees in Europe since the 1980s the soaring cost has not stemmed the flow of international students, particularly those from China, into the UK. In the past decade the number of Chinese students in the UK increased almost 10 fold to 32,000 in 2003 (Leavey, 2004). The unique advantages of the UK, such as the availability of diversified courses delivered in English and the environment it provides for improving English language skills, are not available to many other countries. It should be noted, however, the UK is now threatened by a sharp fall in international student numbers, especially at postgraduate level. In some British institutions the Chinese student enrolment has fallen by about 50 per cent (Green, 2005), the reasons for which are varied. They include a lack of job opportunities, the high cost of education and living expenses and poor living conditions for alien students (Chopra, 2005), and increasing alternative study opportunities elsewhere.

For most non-English speaking European countries, especially those where the language is spoken by a relatively small population, their attraction to Chinese students is partly attributed to low or free tuition. The introduction of tuition fees will result in a dilemma. While there is a financial incentive to charge tuition fees for international students, the increasing education cost may negatively affect Chinese students' choices of destination. Even though China's growing middle class might ensure these countries still receive a significant percentage of Chinese students, the source of the students is likely to shift from those most academically inclined to those from wealthy families. Hence these countries could lose some of the potential advantages of bringing in Chinese talent and creating potential opportunities for business cooperation.

If the trend of charging tuition fees for non-EU students is seemingly irreversible, how can those countries avoid the potential loss? Some immediate solutions may be found in developing more flexible and diversified study programmes with English as the

language of instruction and increasing the availability of scholarships. These have been commonly acknowledged so I will focus on another possible response – cooperation between Chinese and European higher education institutions.

Participating in the Chinese Higher Education Market

EU-China higher education cooperation has resulted in a number of Europe-China related research networks and study programme, such as the Europe-China Academic Network, the China-Europe International Business School, the EU-China Vocational Training programme, the EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Programme and the EU-China European Studies Centres Programme (Wiessala, 2003). The on going EU-AsiaLink programme has also stimulated inter-institutional cooperation between Europe and China. While such inter-institutional cooperation has become common some recent changes in Chinese higher education, which may expand the agenda of international cooperation and provide new opportunities for European higher education, should be noted.

In China there is a gap between the provision of adequate higher education resources and increasing demand. In response the Chinese authorities have attempted to diversify education services, for example through allowing and encouraging the establishment of private institutions. Although private higher education has undergone rapid development in recent years, few could compete with public institutions due to a shortage of financial and human resources. After joining the World Trade Organisation in 2002, China opened its internal higher education market to the world as a commitment to the General Agreement on Trade in Services. According to the 'Regulations of the People's Republic of China of Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Running Schools' issued in March 2003, cooperation between foreign education institutions and Chinese counterparts is encouraged, especially in the private domain.

The Chinese government expects the involvement of foreign partners will make up for the limited education resources available in China. In the mean time, this will provide a challenge for national higher education institutions, but China will gain more benefits through the expansion of financial resources, experiencing advanced educational ideas and hence filling the gap between China and Europe at the scientific, technological and educational levels and the research and marketing environment.

In recent years the level of Chinese-foreign cooperation between higher education institutions has increased dramatically. However it still does not meet the society's demands and the quality of these institutions is far from satisfactory (Liu, 2002). This may be partly due to foreign participation in joint educational services in China being driven largely by the motivation of those seeking greater economic benefits. As such those institutions under financial threat in their home countries are more enthusiastic, while the higher prestige institutions do not have the same financial incentives for running campuses in China. However, running joint institutions in China will not only provide financial rewards for the foreign institutions involved but will benefit these institutions' home countries.

While more European enterprises establish their businesses in China, they demand increasing numbers of competent local employees to both master the technologies or skills required by European companies in China and also to understand the cultures and values of both China and the European countries. The Europe-China joint education services may facilitate training the Chinese labour force in line with the needs of these European companies. Furthermore, through running joint programmes in China European countries will promote cultural and economically valuable ties with China.

Compared to the USA, Australia, Canada, Japan and Singapore, the participation rate of European higher education institutions in joint projects is quite low. Although some countries have ambitions to provide higher education elsewhere, in practice little activity has occurred. When the governments and industries in Europe realise the significance of running joint higher education institutions in China, they will be more active in supporting their national institutions in taking their share of the Chinese higher education market. Consequently high-quality European higher education resources will be involved. In the mean time the possible loss caused by the decline of the number of Chinese overseas students in Europe may be counter-balanced. Although joint institutions might not offer students the same cultural and linguistic experiences gained through studying in foreign countries, 'they involve lower personal costs than studying abroad and can lead to beneficial spillovers in the receiving country's higher education' (Larsen & Vincent-Lancrin, 2004). Compared with educating Chinese students in European universities, the services in China may be much more cost effective due to the lower cost of living.

The Potential in China for European Higher Education

It is becoming clear that most European countries place emphasis on China and the issues relating to this are holding a higher priority in their agenda for economic development. As such higher education stakeholders, including both government and business sectors, become willing to exert their influence through policy and financial intervention. The aim is to enhance the dialogue and cooperation between European and Chinese higher education at both government and institution levels in order to maximise potential economic interests from Chinese markets.

Under these influences, the contemporary patterns of internationalisation of European higher education are likely to change in the future in the following directions. First, the dominance of traditional student mobility, namely studying abroad, will be supplemented by an 'offshore' education defined as 'taking a degree or other post-secondary courses offered by a foreign university without leaving their home country' (Larsen & Vincent-Lancrin, 2004). For instance, the offshore education taking place in China in the form of joint educational services is characterised by programme and institution mobility rather than students. While the number of Chinese students studying abroad remains relatively stable, the expansion of cross-border education will be notably reflected in the growth of 'offshore' enrolments.

Next, the Europe-China joint education services will aim at meeting the needs of European enterprises in China. While European companies will create growing professional vacancies in China, joint institutions can be more competitive among the diversified higher education institutions, serving the national interests of both China and Europe. In this respect, as indicated by all scenarios, the study programme emphasis will be on continuing education or lifelong learning rather than traditional degree study.

Finally, in order to respond to the above trends European universities may adjust their study programmes and conduct corresponding research with links to China. With regards to further academic or vocational training the EU Commission's 2001 paper stresses, 'the number of European academics or students with links to Asia remains very small, while European Studies remains an underdeveloped field in most Asian countries'. Both international study programmes in European countries and China-EU joint educational services in China have the capacity to fill the gap.

Despite the promising future for cooperation between Chinese and European higher education institutions, it is not without weaknesses and problems. Although English has commonly been used in international education programmes, the difficulty of learning Chinese languages and the diversity of languages in Europe are still big obstacles to education exchanges and collaboration. The language barrier is especially significant for European students studying in Chinese universities where the English programmes are quite limited. In addition strategies and policies in China need to be adjusted in response to intensified international cooperation. With respect to higher education, the real challenge for China is to find a suitable approach to resolve the tensions between local interests and the impact of internationalisation (Cai, 2004).

Implications for the Scenarios

The discussion above has presented a Chinese perspective on the future of European higher education, implying there are basic conditions important to education exchanges between China and Europe. One of which is that both states and industries have their say in higher education and the other requires a flexible structure in which there are few barriers to the mobility of students, academics and institutions. With this said, systems such as 'Centralia, the City of the Sun' may provide the most effective ways for both EU and national states' intervention in higher education, which could guarantee the development of higher education in line with EU strategies. On the other hand through exercising tight control the EU may hamper industry sectors or higher education institutions in expressing their interests and expectations with respect to the cooperation with China. As an illustration of this scenario, the flow of Chinese students to Europe may by largely undermined by the implementation of a restrictive EU visa policy, irrespective of the growing demands from both Chinese students and European universities.

In contrast, internationalisation may best be highlighted in the system of 'Vitis Vinifera, the City of Traders and Micro-climates', in which exporting higher education will become one of the most important trading services in Europe. As such, European countries try to entice increasing numbers of international students by competing with the USA and Australia and even other European countries. The problem is the prosperity of internationalisation in this scenario is mainly underlined by the revenue generation approach. Relatively little attention is given to long-term cultural and economic benefits for society.

'Octavia, the Spider-web City' may be advantageous to educational exchange between China and Europe in all aspects. Despite the fundamental changes in governance structure in 'Octavia', the state and market still have their role to play but in the game of 'networking'. The network structure enables a healthy interaction between higher education stakeholders' expectations and interests as well as higher education institutions themselves. Moreover, the flexibility and diversity of institutions and study programmes constitute a good infrastructure for different types of international cooperation. This scenario seems to be the most favoured. However, there is still little evidence that this will have taken place by 2020. The challenge comes not only from the dramatic structural transformation of the higher education system, but also the revolutionary changes of the underlying ideas. It may take some time for higher education stakeholders to reach such a consensus, but hopefully 'Octavia' represents the direction higher education development in Europe will take.

Discussion

Throughout the chapter I have stressed China's role in the future of European higher education, but this will not be a dominant one. The future of European higher education will be the outcome of a dynamic interaction of a range of influences, such as the development of a common EU framework, higher education competition influences across European nations and the role of other world regions. These affect higher education in Europe in different, sometimes opposing, directions. Future scenarios will be associated with the points at which they come into equilibrium. I use the plural forms of scenario to indicate the future of European higher education will probably not be homogenous, in spite of the implementation of the Bologna Process and the realisation of the European Higher Education Area in 2010. The reasons can be explained through traditional diversities in social culture and education systems, as well as various higher education expectations within Europe. For example, though the strategies and practices regarding China among EU member states may appear different and the priorities and practices of European higher education institutions accordingly may not be the same, they are likely to tend towards convergent reforms. Moreover, the competition for shares in Chinese higher education markets may also increase the gap between European countries, particularly between South and Eastern Europe and North and Western Europe.

Despite variations in government strategies in their relationship with China, both EU and other European governments have sent clear signals to their higher education sectors by selecting Asia, in particular China, as a priority with regards to policies.

These have largely influenced the orientation of institution strategies in their efforts to attract Chinese students. So far I have compared the USA and Europe from a historical perspective in terms of their strategies and ability to attract Chinese students. One should also try to predict future events. In order to do this, one needs to know the factors influencing Chinese students' decisions in their choice of destinations for overseas study (Yao, 2004):

1. the quality and reputation of the universities in the destination countries;
2. the languages and standards demanded by destination countries;
3. the cost of studying and living;
4. the employment opportunities available in the destination countries;
5. the scholarship situation and
6. the visa application procedures.

Europe has the advantage in most of the above when compared to its major competitor the USA. Language diversity has been a big obstacle to Chinese students studying in Europe, but today is no longer a serious issue due to the increasing availability of programmes and courses taught in English and a growing interest among Chinese students in European languages, such as German and French. The main reason European countries are unable to take advantage of this situation is the limited information available to Chinese students about European education providers. Some institutions prioritise the development of study programmes or courses in English, but spend relatively little time marketing them. The information can sometimes not even be found on the universities' webpages. Europe, as the origin and centre of modern higher education, has a number of prestigious institutions which provide high quality education at less cost than the USA. The problem is the majority of Chinese students have not realised this due to the limited information available. Within the strategic framework of strengthening relationships with China at government level, the active participation of individual institutions in the future will not only create more programmes for Chinese students, but will also stimulate rich information flows between Europe and China. By 2020, it would not be surprising to see Europe catching up to the USA, at least in terms of its ability to attract Chinese students. There is already evidence that this is occurring. At the 8th China International Education Exhibition Tour in 2003, a report on a survey of Chinese students' preferred destinations was presented. The results showed North America in the top position, preferred by 35% of Chinese students, followed by Europe with 28%. When a similar survey was conducted one year later and presented at the 9th China International Education Exhibition Tour, the data had changed notably: 35% of Chinese students chose Europe as their preferred destination while 28% chose North America. However it is worthwhile to note that European reforms in tuition policy might undermine this trend if not handled properly.

I have discussed the potential role of China in the future of European higher education with respect to the CHEPS scenarios. What should be stressed is that although the scenarios were developed in the European context, the philosophies underlying them, namely strongly coordinated, market coordinated and network coordinated, also have universal implications for higher education systems such as in China. The recent

higher education reforms in China are moving it from a strongly coordinated system to a market-oriented one. However the current market-oriented system still leaves much room for improvement in practice and the involvement of industry and civic groups in the policy process has been rather symbolic. Higher education institutions have not been granted sufficient autonomy in financial matters, human resource management or programme development and therefore they are far from being managed as businesses. It is even harder to find any sign Chinese higher education will move towards becoming a network system. The sluggish movement is largely determined by the country's political structure, traditional ideology and the people's mindset forged in a centrally planned system. According to the social structure and the pace of social reform and development in China currently, none of these factors is likely to fade in the near future, say within the next 15 years. In 2020, Chinese higher education is unlikely to become purely market oriented but there will definitely be many more market elements involved. As Chinese reforms always attach great importance to international experiences, especially those of advanced systems, the reforms in European higher education towards either a network or market coordinated system, or a combination of the two, may possibly speed up the transformation of Chinese higher education.

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18 Latin America Gazes upon Europe as a World Region

Rollin Kent

Between two Empires

As a Latin American reflecting on Europe as a world region, I must inevitably make reference to the immediate context. I began writing this section before the French and Dutch referenda on the EU constitution in May 2005 and concluded it immediately after the results were in. This was a vital moment, brimming with contradictions. For some in Latin America, it was a thin thread hanging between hope and uncertainty, between the possibility of a united Europe and the real difficulties facing this fascinating project. But others ask why Europe and its future should concern Latin America more than, say, the United States? Just as a united Europe has its own champions and sceptics, among Latin Americans opinions are divided over whether European integration is a crucial issue for the world. The Latin American defenders of a united Europe recall the multitude of historical, political and cultural affinities that have always linked the two regions and they see in Europe today a model for the future. On the other hand, the Latin American 'eurosceptics' affirm that in the wake of galloping globalisation those old ties have dissolved making a united Europe part of the problem, not the solution, for Latin America.

Latin America's very existence stems from European colonisation, and until the rise of the United States as a new imperial presence, Europe was the principal point of reference – for better or worse – for the very diverse Latin American nations. Once Spanish colonialism was defeated in Cuba by the emerging American empire in 1898 and especially after World War II, the United States fulfilled President Monroe's doctrine, supplanting Europe as an imperial power in Latin America.

Nevertheless the European presence has survived and even flourished throughout Latin America in various ways. It is useful to review some of these historical links. In the Southern cone – Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil – the balance between the two empires tilts more to the European side than in the northern part of the continent where the United States has a deep hold: in Mexico, Central America, Colombia and Venezuela.

Another example of these ongoing ties is the ebb and flow of political and economic refugees, which has a long trans-Atlantic history. Just as poverty-stricken Irishmen flocked to Boston and New York in the late 19th century, Spaniards in the same situation emigrated to Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina shortly thereafter. The Italian emigration to Argentina at that time was just as important for that country as it was for the United States. Later, Republicans escaping defeat in the Spanish Civil War went to Mexico and Argentina in the 1940s. Their impact on Mexican universities, publishing houses and the arts, humanities and sciences was deep and long lasting. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, political refugees from US-supported military regimes in South America fled to Europe and Mexico, which has always maintained an open door policy for political asylum.

However, over the past two decades the powerful solvent of globalisation has called into question those old ties. The flows have changed direction. The issues are different. Whereas today poor Mexicans go north to the United States in search of work; poor Colombians, Ecuadoreans and Peruvians find their way to Spain. On the other hand, the offspring of the Latin American elites flock to US universities for their PhDs in economics, engineering and science, and even more for their MBAs. However, European universities, especially the Spanish ones, are still the center of attraction for people interested in the humanities, arts and some of the social sciences.

There are other flows whose importance and sinister implications are on the rise. Cocaine cultivated and refined in Colombia and Bolivia makes its way through Mexico to the massive US market as well as to Europe through conduits in Spain. The international drug cartels are firmly entrenched on both sides of the Atlantic and are spreading their roots in the teeming Latin American cities through which they pass.

Democracy, Europe and Latin America

It must be said that for many Latin Americans, with the obvious exception of the Brazilians, the word ‘Europe’ has a specific meaning: it means Spain. The Spanish resurgence after Franco and the peaceful transformation of that country into a democratic and economically vibrant nation represent powerful symbols for Latin American societies struggling with similar problems: overcoming authoritarian regimes, developing democratic processes, restructuring their economies and strengthening their cultural and educational institutions.

For quite a while, the experience of building democratic institutions in Spain was perceived as an exclusively Spanish phenomenon. Now, Latin American admirers of this experience understand the role played in it by the European Union. In the minds of the Latin ‘euro-optimists’, the benefits received by Spain from its European ties symbolise the EU as a positive force for social reconstruction. It is possible the recent referendum on the EU constitution has jarred this vision of Europe as an unstoppable machine for integration. It will also surely contribute to widening the debate among Latin Americans over the reasons behind Europeans voting against political integration. The euro-optimists in Latin America may now begin to appreciate integration is a two-sided coin. In any case, Latin American euro-optimists insist on

drawing an important lesson from the link between democratisation in Spain and its membership in the EU: just as globalisation can be a destructive force, it is impossible to understand democracy in one country in isolation from its international ties.

Thus, the realities of international politics in Latin America are also part of the European connection. It is well known that Latin American diplomacy often plays this connection off with the influence of the United States in international power politics. The United States knows it can count on the support of certain Latin American countries, and Europe has its own allies. Special mention must be made of the 'democracy clause' in commercial agreements the EU establishes with other countries. Unlike the trade pacts with the United States, the question of democratic governance in Latin America is an important aspect of its relationships with Europe. This issue has been especially salient in the EU position on human rights violations in Cuba. There is an understanding among Latin American nations that their relationships with Europe are not limited to commercial and financial spheres, as is usually the case with the United States. Clearly, the existence of a European pole in international relations is in the best interest of Latin America.

Universities, Culture, Language

Universities on both sides of the Atlantic have constituted one of the most enduring links between Europe and Latin America. This institutional relationship goes back a very long way. The first universities in the New World were founded by representatives of the Spanish crown. The various orders of the Catholic Church have also played a leading role in the creation of Latin American universities. In the succeeding centuries, universities that cropped up in most Latin American countries were organised on the basis of the so-called 'continental model'. During the long period of 'Spanish decadence' in the 19th century, the French universities – and to a certain extent also the German universities – took up the slack and became the focal point for intellectuals and professionals in Latin America. The French educational reforms of the late 19th century were also closely observed by educators on the other side of the Atlantic.

Since the middle of the 20th century, the influence of US higher education has increased significantly. The reforms of the 1990s – evaluation, strategic planning, market-oriented management – that have swept Latin American higher education are the most obvious signs of US influence. Yet the basic mode of organisation in Latin American universities has changed relatively little, except for the newly founded institutions which have attempted to follow the US model. It is slightly ironic that today, as the 'continental model' is being called into question by the Bologna Accord, some Latin American universities retain the old format and do not seem to grasp the implications of the rapidly changing scenario of European higher education. Nonetheless, it is interesting that whereas some transformations in European higher education (such as the new degree structure) arise from formal decision making processes, similar changes in Latin America seem to emerge silently, within the existing structures, and therefore perhaps more chaotically.

The Spanish language is spoken by more than 400 million people today, many more than the population of Spain itself. The Portuguese speaking population of Brazil surpasses that of Portugal many times over. This cultural reality has been recognised by Spanish policy makers, universities and cultural institutions, and is symbolised by the fact that the venues for the last two international conferences on the Spanish language – sponsored by the Spanish Academy –have been Mexico and Argentina. Spain's vigorous editorial industry counts heavily on the mass market for books and magazines in Latin America. Although without question the second language for many Latin Americans today is no longer French but English, the Spanish-American cultural and educational markets continue to thrive.

Integration and Disintegration

The preceding argument comes down to this: from one of the several possible Latin American perspectives, the European project represents a positive historical force in the world today. The long lasting endeavor to democratically integrate a continent as diverse as Europe stands out against the dismal trends in the rest of the world that are pulling in exactly the opposite direction. Regardless of the future of the European Constitution, it can be argued that the European project symbolises the long and difficult process of construction of a common vocation among disparate countries, some of which have gone to war with each other in the cruel 20th century (not unlike Latin America in the 20th century). In international relations it can present a counterpoint to the imperial designs of the United States. It may symbolize the audacity to take commercial agreements beyond economic issues toward cultural and educational integration. In sum, the debate over the European project reflects a basic issue: whether a country or a region has some measure of control or decision over its future in the face of the growing economic and social disorganisation brought about by globalisation.

Now, this admittedly rosy picture of European integration can be readily torn apart by another Latin American perspective. The anti-globalists in Latin America are not happy with the formation of an economic block in Europe that subsidises its own farmers, pollutes the environment, raises tariffs on agricultural products from the rest of the world and closes its doors to immigration.

Thus when reflecting on Europe from other geographical standpoints, it is necessary also to examine different visions of the future. The vision of CHEPS on the European Higher Education and Research Landscape 2020 is inevitably and understandably a positive one. The three scenarios it poses – Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera – are different in many ways, but they share a common presupposition: that the future will be better, more prosperous, more developed. The three scenarios constitute three different paths toward such a future. The question about the future, however, may admit other options. Imagining the future from the Latin American standpoint does not necessarily imply purely positive outcomes.

In his seminal book, The Work of Nations, Robert Reich suggested that the 'knowledge society' will be increasingly stratified into basically two groups: the 'symbolic analysts' who will work with advanced knowledge and will receive the economic and status benefits thereof; and most other people whose educational qualifications will be insufficient to reap those rewards. This suggests a divided future: on the one hand, the group that is integrated into the international economy, the knowledge society and its benefits, and on the other the group that lives on the margins or is excluded from this knowledge society. I do not suggest that such a Manichaean and reductionist outlook is an accurate forecast, but it does serve to bring out the contradictions (or more accurately, the silences) in contemporary debates on higher education and the future.

This contradiction is definitely present in Latin American reflections on higher education and its role in society. To simplify once again, the positions in this debate come down to the following:
The neoliberal vision, spawned in the long shadow of the United States, that envisions higher education as a producer of knowledge and skills readily applicable in the market;
The idea higher education should fulfil a cultural and civic role as well as an economic and technical one. This 'civilizing' function of higher education arises as much from the European influence (especially the debates leading up to the Bologna agreement) as from Latin America's own university tradition.

In order to understand the context for this debate, it is important to remember most Latin American countries (in all their diversity, which is really quite vast) have experienced two decades of social, political and economic turmoil and have been struggling to build stable democracies and effective economies. Latin American nations face complex issues stemming from social disorganisation and instability. Corruption and crime are becoming major problems. Uncontrolled urbanisation and vast currents of internal and international migration are in full sway. In the wake of economic liberalisation, small agriculture and rural society have undergone enormous changes.

In this dialectic of integration and disintegration, Robert Reich's proposition makes sense to many people. Higher education is being used by the 'incorporated youth' of the elites to fuel their trajectory as the 'symbolic analysts' of tomorrow, for whom the term 'knowledge society' has a definite meaning. For those who have been through the school system but have not made it to a good university, being 'incorporated' is a more remote possibility. It may simply mean having some kind of a job that may or may not be related to one's training and whose stability is subject to the vagaries of the market. For yet others higher education and the 'knowledge society' are simply abstractions beyond their reach.

Thus, the debate between higher education as a 'civilizing' force or merely as an instrument for the preparation of the workforce takes on significance. Can higher education be called upon to contribute to citizenship, cultural integration and social equity? Is it feasible for higher education to serve as a cohesive force for society?

These questions are important to Latin America. They are also questions that have been placed on the European agenda. If leaders in Latin American higher education can see this and learn from it, the European project will have contributed to a discourse that seems almost completely submerged by the neoliberal agenda.

19 Cities of Angels and the Barbarians at the Gates

Simon Marginson

The scenarios are charming and their presentation is exquisite. Centralia looks backward and inward, but within their city, its ever-learning citizens find the best in themselves. Octavia, with its elastic networks, its 'new forms of vertical and horizontal integration' and its fecund individuality, is a beautiful realisation of modernity. Vitis Vinifera is a fine crafting of realism and conviviality. Virtue, beauty and truth: each one arranged before us like choices in a boutique department store (and no doubt higher education studies need to attend to these qualities). These are cities of angels. Each is true to its own moving ideal, whilst also having much in common with the others. Each speaks to us of freedoms we might have in a world of modest and respectful states: markets so differentiated and interplayed that small exceeds big, and universities do not hurt one another. Each is dazzling and detailed within its city walls, while the world beyond remains in shadow and the barbarian is somewhere outside the gate.

It goes without saying that none of these cities will ever be seen, none of the scenarios will happen as written, if only because in their perfection each of them is strangely incomplete. Like an unfinished jigsaw, that has been carefully arranged on a table in an empty room with its doors and windows open; a jigsaw for which the missing pieces do not and cannot exist. Jorge Luis Borges? Yet we learn from all these cities. They each speak to salient parts of higher education and what it might become. No doubt European higher education will combine Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera in some form or another and that is the underlying wisdom of this exercise.

But European higher education in 2020 will also have other components not listed here and will be less Eurocentric than these cases suggest. In a global era, mediaeval city walls no longer exclude the world outside. A singular City Continent of the Intellect, whether drenched in virtue, beauty or truth, is no longer possible. Worldwide our fates are bound together. You in Europe are of us in the southeast of the Asia-Pacific, and we are of you: we are just 21 hours and a conference paper away; we are a microsecond away; and we share a common discursive, political and economic space. Networking, imaging, ideas, data flows and ever changing identities: the 'outside' is

now and forever part of the 'inside' whether good or bad. To know the world beyond Europe is to become joined to it. This is inescapable and is the price scholarship and research always pay. Barriers can be erected against political and military power and (with more difficulty) against the power of money, but there is no evading the convergence of words and cultures. Octavia understands this better than Centralia and a little better than Vitis Vinifera; its sensibility is more cosmopolitan than pan-European; but Octavia too is shaped to be a thing in itself with a bounded logic. Hence the sense of fragility that is made explicit. 'Suspended over the abyss, the life of Octavia's inhabitants is less uncertain than in other cities. They know the net will last only so long'. The flaw in the image is that the net does not connect only Octavia. The fragility derives from the fact that its conditions of existence are impossible. There are no isolated utopias. It seems the creators of Octavia understand this and their intention is irony. Europe as imagined, with a continental horizon of vision in a globalising world, can last so long only if it has not already vanished.

It is not necessary to be quite so pessimistic as Octavia about the possibility of survival, but there is an underlying wisdom about the European project common to all three scenarios. In each, the target figure of 3 per cent of GDP on research and innovation is exceeded. In each, this does *not* position Europe as the world's leading 'knowledge power': the larger intention of the Bologna project fails. Ours is more than a global era, it is also an era of empty rhetoric about the 'knowledge economy'; a discursive escape-route from having to grapple with the complexities of the global, one that preserves the illusion of a world of autarkic nation-states in which each government carries 'its own' GDP on a stick. It is sensible to refute the absurd policy expectations about knowledge-led nirvanas that have been imposed on higher education systems and have made such a mess of research policy in many countries (though often, of course, with the willing connivance of the internal actors). After all it is preposterous to imagine universities are the new manufacturers, or information has substituted capital. There is much more to national or global competitive economic advantage than skills and R&D, as Octavia knows. But these scenarios are also grappling with a deeper difficulty they have not overcome. They conjure up their jolly old learners, networked symbolic creators and entrepreneur consumers; each in its different ways talks about what a Europe, that we might like, might be like; especially if you are an ageing baby-boomer, entrepreneurial and viticultural and abuzz with technology and lateral friendship. It is less clear that they have a sense of how and why this might be 'Europe', or how to get there.

Perhaps the angels know Europe has a hollow heart, at least as Europe is presently conceived? Do they realise this is connected to the failure of Bologna as a global strategy? Perhaps not. In their own imagining, the scenarios reproduce one of the chief conditions of that failure. It seems to this sympathetic outsider that Europeanisation in education and elsewhere has been much too defensive, much too place and time-bound in a mobile and connected world, and designed to secure 'what we are' rather than 'what we are becoming'. It is premised on keeping out the power of America, and the rising power of China, by turning away and erecting still higher city walls that will block those other metropolises from view. The scenarios share this myopia: America haunts every scenario but is scarcely ever mentioned despite the colossal impact of

Americanisation in every facet of worldwide higher education – alas, pretending a global hegemon is not there does not make it go away! – while China is mentioned but little understood. Bologna sets out to unify the European higher education zone (loosely) first to defend Europe and second as a precondition for taking on the world. It placed the cart before the horse. European identity will not be the precondition for global success. Global identity will be the precondition for success in the unification project.

Europe's starting point is necessarily different to that of the USA and China, which already know who they are. Bologna made the mistake of assuming the undoubted need for Europe to define itself to itself somehow reduced, or at least postponed, the global imperative. It would have been better for Bologna to conceive European global initiatives that all could support and many join (loosely, of course), an enterprise taking European universities to Asia, Africa, and the Americas, as a chief condition of building European educational identity. Unity would follow. Success breeds success.

Bologna was right in some ways. European higher education *is* a potential global resource and at the core of future European identity, and many European universities have the firepower. Europe has 35 of the Jiao Tong top 100 research universities compared to 53 in the USA, and European educational strength is more widely distributed regionally, creating potential for diverse specialisations; Europe has 41.0 per cent of the world's top 500 compared to 33.6 per cent in the USA where the market, government and philanthropy between them have concentrated status and resources in the top universities (Shanghai Jiao Tong University Institute of Higher Education, 2005). But no successful global strategy will postpone the moment of going global, as American and Chinese universities know. The meta-strategy of the global era is to sustain and develop a self-determining self-altering identity, while engaged effectively all round with everyone else. This is what the USA has always done (as much on its own non-reciprocal terms as possible) and this is what China is now learning to do. This is how to survive, to prosper and to leave a mark on the world at the same time. Unlike European universities, Chinese universities are weak. Despite its economic weight China has 3.6 per cent of the top 500 research universities and none of the top 100. China's project of modelling itself as a world class university nation will almost certainly succeed. It shows that self-formation and global engagement are combined and not sequential.

Does Europe still need the barbarians outside the walls, that old Greco-Roman sensibility, in order to be itself? It could be very different if the city walls came down and the world outside was brought in by a confident higher education Europe, eager at the same time to venture outside, where the objective would not be to seize territory to exploit but to find international partners in common enterprises. But as long as the city walls survive; as long as Europe is conceived primarily as a defensive project with its relationship-building in stages (one us, two them), then it will remain divided between pan-European defence and national defence and between the competing claims of various national defence corps, like feuding suburbs. Constricted behind city walls that

are all too easy to imagine, forever turning inwards, it will eat up its own potential for common identity. It is in that sense that whether they separate or merge, these cities of angels are ultimately impossible.

Centralia boldly ignores this logic. It names its barbarians.

> In the global risk society (a popular euphemism for the never-abating fear for terrorism) the EU has implemented a restrictive visa policy… discouraging mobility only for study… Free movement of persons across 'world blocs' has almost come to a standstill at least to the integrated blocs, i.e. the USA and the EU. Movement of goods and especially information is where the bulk of globalisation since 2000 is to be found.

In Centralia inward movement from Asia and Africa would largely be blocked because it is those people who are the potential terrorists, the ones who are the most different to 'us'. In a walled city of angels by definition pathology is forever on the outside. Slamming the door to non-whites on the neo-racist ground of cultural distinction would please Samuel Huntington. Centralia's collective good is a privileged circle of anti-global people 'like us'. In the American confederacy they were 'good old boys'. Jolly public climes and good old wealth are protected by confining the moral compass of the global public good to the city of Europe.

While this combination of public values is all too possible, one suspects the impact of the security climate will be more marginal than Centralia suggests. In the absence of an intensive militarisation, that would render jolly old anything impossible, it is inconceivable that temporary migration for tourism, business and education from Asia, Africa and Latin America would largely shut down. The proposed semi-closure of permanent migration would be almost as difficult to enforce. The education/migration nexus has become a fact of life (Lee, Maldonado-Maldonado & Rhoades, 2005) and some universities will need those foreign students badly. The optimistic Lifelong Learning scenarios of Centralia and Vitis Vinifera will not be met and the demographic hole is already obvious.

Octavia and Vitis Vinifera are more relaxed about foreign students. In Vitis Vinifera internationalisation is 'one of the most important dimensions of system diversity'. Octavia has 'growing virtual and physical mobility of students within global university partnerships and networks'. Half its PhD graduates are from abroad. The Anglo-Asian Academy is plausible: it might be on the drawing boards already. The Delphi-Phoenix Programme has hit upon the only way to market a global e-University: programmes in each of the major global languages (Arabic might need to be added). This is better. Perhaps the wall will come down. Perhaps the angels will not stay at home. Perhaps the beautiful Octavia will spin a wider stronger web. We can hope. We need Europe to be a world region.

There is also another kind of difficulty here. It derives from the state/market antinomies that animate all of the scenarios. Centralia assumes Europe could only be anti-global by closing out the market. Or is it that Centralia could only be publicly-led if it closed out the global? This is not the only possible way that collective values

might be reasserted. We can envisage societies led by public values open to the global; and a global sphere primarily regulated by nation-states and cross-border communities rather than markets, in which one supreme global public good would be cosmopolitanism itself. Arguably it is the *only* antidote to terror. It is no coincidence the spirit of an open Europe in a converging world is a target that terror, and every other kind of cultural or national particularism (Sen, 1999) inside or outside Europe and the USA, is desperate to defeat. Security needs walls and vice versa. Only in Centralia is this connection obvious and direct. In the obverse cases of Octavia and Vitis Vinifera, the state stands back, the market runs, and more or less automatically it seems global relations come back on the agenda. Here is the zero-sum reasoning again: the less public the more market, and vice versa. The less national the more global, and vice versa. Yet another (and all too likely) configuration is possible, that of Thatcher's free market and strong state joined to global closure. The crude zero-sum tradeoffs that shape Centralia and Vitis Vinifera in particular originated in the nineteenth century liberal dualism that so often blocks our understanding: free market *vs.* nation-state. There is also a variant for the global era: national public good *vs*. global market (Marginson, forthcoming). But the actual tendency in higher education is different.

All over the world the signs of marketisation, competition between institutions, tuition fees and university rankings are advancing in tandem with the newer methods of state steering via 'arms length' techniques developed from the mid 1980s onwards: funding for service, performance measures, audit and so on. Control over process and product is tighter than before. These are *state-created* markets. Rhetorical claims of market deregulation as the antinomy of state control ring hollow, given the coupling of the two is integral to neo-liberal government. Vitis Vinifera is the scenario that foreshadows the largest part of what higher education will become. Where it falters is where it imagines market deregulation as neo-classical economists want it, rather than the neo-liberal deregulation actually practised.

It is likely research will become more concentrated and teaching more diversified across a great range of institutions and types; that the functions of some higher education will be 'unbinded', boundaries with sub-degree programmes will blur and definitions will become more 'fuzzy' as Octavia suggests; and also that traditional universities will survive and gain prestige within the broader sector. It is likely that, as all scenarios promise, the sector will be stratified between high prestige research universities in the North and West and a mass teaching sector in the South and East. This was an easy prediction to make. Things are not so different in 2005 if German speaking nations are included in the West. Perhaps basic research in the South and East has surprises in store; and the North and West will also parent a mass commercial sector along University of Phoenix lines. It is also quite possible that not only will public-private partnerships flourish, but one third of students will enrol in the private sector, as Vitis Vinifera suggests. It is also possible enrolments in foreign campuses will be either small as in Vitis Vinifera or large as in Centralia. This time the smart money is on Centralia, though it is unlikely the graduates of foreign university campuses in Europe will monopolise all the 'dazzling careers in international business'. It is very possible that, as in Vitis Vinifera, public funding will average 57 per cent or less from heterogeneous sources; that universities will set their own fees

and their culture will more corporate and their management professional. 15 years is a long time in policy. Those changes have already occurred in many other nations. What stretches credibility are propositions that governments and the EU/EC will become more modest, 'realistic and selective' about what can be achieved; or that 'markets will drive most of what happens'; or that the boutique market producers leading Octavia and Vitis Vinifera would triumph so easily over IT companies or university chains with local franchises and old fashioned monopolies that fit easily with the traditions of the sector. Small is beautiful, but it is only sometimes competitive.

Because Vitis Vinifera and Octavia know the future has more market allocation not less, it is curious they underplay the elements structuring global and European stratification in the world status competition now emerging. Little is said about indicators of comparison: there is nothing much about global league tables, though we know the Shanghai Jiao Tong data on research performance have forced policy reflections in much of Europe, and the normative power of the Ivy League model is being strengthened. Octavia and Vitis Vinifera are soft markets driven more by consumption 'quality' than producer status. But *is* this how Europe's higher education markets will work (Marginson, forhtcoming)? A shift towards market production and distribution, in which the principal product is that of status goods and universities become singularly positioned as status producers, tends to steepen the status hierarchy in higher education, unless this is flattened again by compensatory public policy. There is not much state egalitarianism in Vitis Vinifera, yet somehow the edge is off status. There is also an odd absence of tensions between collaboration and competition and between access and social hierarchy. Vitis Vinifera is right about the complementarities of institutional autonomy and risk, but misses the threat of social risk. Somehow this market has found a way to largely dispense with accreditation, recognition protocols and quality assurance, even though in the Europe of 2005 these phenomena are currently growing in proportion to marketisation.

In contrast, both primarily non-market Centralia and marketised Octavia know accreditation functions are crucial. In Centralia, multiple accreditation has become a positioning strategy and there is a growing emphasis on data-driven indicators of 'graduate employability' despite the intellectual reduction this entails. Both predictions are likely to be realised. In Vitis Vinifera, beyond a 'rudimentary system of regulation, quality and relevance are widely believed to be matters best left to the markets to assess'. Not likely. Have information asymmetries been abolished? In any market, where accreditation and quality assurance are primary tools of marketing and positioning strategies, only the state can set the ring. More market means not less state but a different state. The market/state antinomy cannot see it.

Yet Vitis Vinifera promises a more nuanced social science where variety in markets, states and education is no longer marginalised by the categories used; and this takes us beyond the old liberal antinomy of market and state. We should wish for this, but a related promise *will* come to pass: each of states, markets and institutional identity will remain relevant and they will interface in complex ways. It is no longer Burton Clark's triangle (Clark, 1983). Corporate university identity has become crucial in its own right, supported by the weight of professional functions, and has partly replaced the

academic profession which all these scenarios know is becoming more fragmented and less decisive to university identity and subject to greater cross-professional variations in pay and work practices. Faculty authority survives in Centralian university governance, but this does not ring true when placed alongside a professionalised management with budget control. Something would have to give. But the scenarios do not say all that much about academic work or the disciplines (will the rise and rise of biomedicine continue? Will Europe follow the Anglo-American fascination with business studies?). Only Octavia notices the 'major generation change' in 2005-2015 when the retirement of the demographic bulge of baby-boom faculty creates conditions for wholesale disciplinary innovations and the emergence of a more entrepreneurial culture.

Nevertheless, for each thing missing something else is said, though often with tongue in cheek. This response might have seemed harsh but the brief was to be critical; and it is true that if value is to be added in a short space then criticism is more economical than praise. Let the last note then be positive. The achievement is respected. *The 20th Anniversary CHEPS Scenarios* are a rich exercise, full of insights and superbly written. Please do it again at 30.

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